Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Public Policy Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Journal of Financial Crises

Articles 31 - 60 of 148

Full-Text Articles in Public Policy

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George Dec 2022

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government closed 16 banks on November 1, 1997. At the time, the government said it would guarantee depositors up to 20 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR; USD 6,000) per account. The lack of immediate full protection for large depositors caused deposit runs throughout the banking sector and undermined foreign confidence in the Indonesian financial system. In response, the Indonesian president on January 26, 1998, announced a blanket guarantee and created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to administer the guarantee and other bank rehabilitation efforts. The blanket guarantee covered all depositors and nonsubordinated creditors in locally incorporated commercial banks. …

Go to article

Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

After a series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy in 1997–1998, foreign creditors reassessed their emerging-market risk and reduced external credit lines to Ecuador, thus draining liquidity. The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998 triggered deposit runs at other banks. Banks sought assistance from the Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE). By the end of September 1998, the BCE had issued emergency loans to 11 financial institutions, totaling nearly 30% of the money base. The crisis accelerated in August 1998 when Banco de Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank, was closed; the existing …

Go to article

Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija Dec 2022

Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Finland’s financial system suffered steadily increasing loan losses and falling earnings beginning in 1990. The Finnish Parliament created the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) in April 1992 to support banks with loans, capital, and guarantees. In a press release issued on August 6, 1992, the government said the GGF would “secure the stable functioning of the banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]”. Six months later, the Parliament of Finland specifically required the GGF to guarantee that all Finnish banks could meet their commitments. The government …

Go to article

Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner Dec 2022

Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

As foreign credit in Denmark dried up during the summer of 2008, Danish banks became increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing. The government took over the failing Roskilde Bank, the country’s eighth-largest bank, in late August. On October 5, 2008, the government announced a voluntary General Guarantee Scheme to fully insure deposits and other senior liabilities of participating banks. Banks could participate in the scheme by becoming members of the financial sector’s banking consortium, Det Private Beredskab, or in English, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), before October 13, 2008. The General Guarantee Scheme fully insured all depositors and senior unsecured creditors …

Go to article

Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick Dec 2022

Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees …

Go to article

Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick Dec 2022

Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require little process, and the change for banks …

Go to article

The Financialization Of Recession Response, Aaron Klein Dec 2022

The Financialization Of Recession Response, Aaron Klein

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper analyzes economic policy responses to the COVID-19-induced recession, focusing on the American policy response. Despite widespread political distrust between the two parties sharing control of the government and the timing of the upcoming presidential election, America’s political system was able to enact a massive policy response that reduced the severity of the recession. This political response happened faster than any automatic policy response would have, based on the delays in data reporting. The economic policies enacted continued America’s trend toward financialization of fiscal policy. The Federal Reserve and America’s private banking and financial systems were heavily relied upon …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Steven Rattner, Mary Anne Chute Lynch Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Steven Rattner, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Steven Rattner, an investment banker and private equity professional, joined the Obama administration as counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury and head of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensely throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Harry Wilson, Mary Anne Chute Lynch Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Harry Wilson, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Harry Wilson was one of four senior advisers to the US Department of the Treasury during the Obama administration and served on the President’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to General Motors and Chrysler, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Sadiq Malik, Mary Anne Chute Lynch Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Sadiq Malik, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Sadiq Malik was a member of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers, to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Malik, working for the Auto Task Force, helped take General Motors through …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Matthew Feldman, Mary Anne Chute Lynch Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Matthew Feldman, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Matthew Feldman was the chief legal advisor to the Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors (GM), and later other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recognized …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Mara Mcneill, Mary Anne Chute Lynch Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Mara Mcneill, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Mara McNeill was senior counsel to the US Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Automotive Investment Financing Program (AIFP) during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09. As senior counsel, McNeill was responsible for the department’s $80 billon financing of General Motors, Chrysler, Ally Financial, and Chrysler Financial. She worked with the Auto Team Task Force, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) legal team, and the Department of Treasury. The bipartisan AIFP team was charged with overseeing the government’s efforts to assist the companies toward a “new lease on life,” while exercising strong financial principles to protect the …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Ron Bloom, Mary Anne Chute Lynch Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Ron Bloom, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Ron Bloom served as senior adviser to Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner on President Barack Obama’s Task Force on the Automotive Industry and as assistant to the president for manufacturing policy (2009–2011). As senior adviser on the Auto Task Force team, Bloom helped lead the restructuring of General Motors and Chrysler LLC. Subsequently, he advised the Obama administration with policy development and strategic planning to revitalize the manufacturing sector. Bloom brought to Treasury his unique experience working with organized labor (including the United Steelworkers Union, United Auto Workers, the Teamsters, the Air Line Pilots Association), and in the investment …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Brian Stoker, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Brian Stoker, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Brian Stoker served in Merrill Lynch’s structured credit division for seven years, producing and trading asset-backed securities (ABS). In 2005, Stoker moved to Citigroup as a director of ABS CDO (collateralized debt obligation) and CLO (collateralized loan obligation) structuring. After the financial crisis, Stoker was an analyst at Carlson Capital for three years. In 2011, he joined StormHarbour Securities, serving as a managing director until 2018. From 2019 to 2021, he was director of securitization at Korth Direct Mortgage. Presently, Stoker is a licensed real estate agent in Miami. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Stoker.

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Eric Kolchinsky, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Eric Kolchinsky, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Eric Kolchinsky served as managing director of ratings for ABS CDOs (asset-backed security collateralized debt obligations) at Moody’s Investor Services from 2005 to 2007. Kolchinsky started his career in structured finance with stints at Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch. He joined Moody’s in 2000 as vice president for credit. In 2007, after Kolchinsky raised questions concerning the ratings of new deals in light of subprime downgrades, Moody’s removed him from his client-facing position. Kolchinsky supervised methodology for structured finance valuations at Moody’s Analytics for two years, before Moody’s suspended him altogether in 2009. Separated from Moody’s, Kolchinsky testified before Congress …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Chris Ricciardi, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Chris Ricciardi, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

Chris Ricciardi was a CDO pioneer who built the structured products units at CS First Boston and Merrill Lynch before moving to the asset management side. Ricciardi began his career structuring novel fixed-income securities at Prudential. At CS First Boston and Merrill, he catapulted each investment bank’s lagging unit into the top of the league tables for CDO (collateralized debt obligation) issuance. He was CEO of Cohen & Co. from 2006 to 2011, when he left to co-found investment management firm Mead Park Management. A graduate of the University of Richmond with an MBA from the Wharton School of the …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Sohail Khan, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Sohail Khan, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

Sohail Khan was managing director of fixed-income sales at Citigroup from 2005–09. Khan started his finance career in 1996, after completing his MBA at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). Khan gained broad experience in product structuring and sales of credit derivatives at Citigroup. As managing director during the subprime securitization boom and bust, he was involved with institutional sales of asset-backed securities (ABS) including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs); his clients were hedge funds, structured vehicles, and institutional buyers. In 2009, Khan left Citigroup to co-found StormHarbour Securities, a boutique investment bank he has headed since as managing principal. This …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Stephen King, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Stephen King, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

Stephen King started his career in finance at Bankers Trust in 1997 as a computer scientist with a business degree. He worked on structured credit transactions when credit derivatives were just being invented. In 2005, King joined Barclays’ structured credit group, where he managed a CDO (collateralized debt obligation) correlation desk that was different from standard dealer CDO units. In 2009, he launched C12 Capital Management to relieve Barclays of distressed subprime positions. Presently, King finances and builds luxury hotels as founder and CEO of Sardis Developments. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with King.

Go to article

Lessons Learned: Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Steve Kasoff was employed at Elliott Management Corporation from 2003 until 2020. His responsibilities centered on developing the structured products and real estate groups at Elliott. He was made senior portfolio manager, a member of the firm’s management committee, and equity partner. Kasoff has extensive experience in the origination, trading, and management of structured products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and mortgage-backed securities, including earlier posts at Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers. He earned his BA in economics from Yale College and his MBA in finance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. In 2016, …

Go to article

Lessons Learned: James Finkel, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber Apr 2022

Lessons Learned: James Finkel, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

A Wall Street veteran specializing in structured credit transactions, Jim Finkel was co-founder and director of the structured credit asset management firm Dynamic Credit Partners (DCP) from 2003 to 2009. Finkel started his career as a securities lawyer for the international law firm Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, before moving over to the banking side in 1992. He specialized in mortgage-backed securities and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) for several firms, including Bear Stearns and Deutsche Bank, where he headed the London-based CLO group. In 2003, Finkel returned to New York to launch and run DCP. In 2010, he joined financial …

Go to article

A Special Project: Inside The Cdo Machine, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick Apr 2022

A Special Project: Inside The Cdo Machine, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In this issue of the Journal of Financial Crisis, we feature Inside the CDO Machine—a special undertaking recently completed under the auspices of the Yale Program on Financial Stability Lessons Learned Oral History Project by Steven H. Kasoff, a Yale School of Management Fellow and former equity partner and head of real estate and structured products investments at the Elliott Management Corp., a global hedge fund. For the project, Kasoff undertook a series of interviews with industry professionals to focus on one of the critical derivatives products of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and how they …

Go to article

Wall Street’S Subprime Debacle: Firsthand Accounts From Inside The Cdo Machine, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff Apr 2022

Wall Street’S Subprime Debacle: Firsthand Accounts From Inside The Cdo Machine, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

The observations, perceptions, and actions of participants in the subprime markets remain poorly documented and incompletely understood. Seeking to deepen our understanding, this study has produced seven interview summaries and one article telling the story of a hypothetical CDO deal. This article is organized in four parts. First, it presents our research questions and methods in relation to the existing knowledge on the topic. Second, it describes what we think are the study’s main contributions. Third, it previews the Lessons Learned summaries and interviews from each of the participants. And last, it identifies what we believe are some of the …

Go to article

Anatomy Of A Trade: The Making Of A Subprime Cdo, Steven H. Kasoff Apr 2022

Anatomy Of A Trade: The Making Of A Subprime Cdo, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

This article presents a short story, a sketch in eight parts of a single fictitious subprime collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction. The story is informed by expert interviews, documentary research, and the author’s firsthand experience.

Go to article

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module G: The Auto Warranty Commitment Program, Benjamin Henken Apr 2022

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module G: The Auto Warranty Commitment Program, Benjamin Henken

Journal of Financial Crises

On March 30, 2009, President Barack Obama announced a plan for government-funded protection of warranties on new vehicles sold by General Motors (GM) and Chrysler while the companies underwent restructuring. The initiative, which would become known as the Auto Warranty Commitment Program (AWCP), was intended to bolster consumer confidence by alleviating a major risk—the loss of warranty benefits—to consumers associated with the companies’ potential bankruptcies. Under the AWCP, GM and Chrysler established independent special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to which they transferred a combination of their own money along with funding they received from Treasury in the form of a loan. …

Go to article

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module Z:Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Greg Feldberg, Alexander Nye, Andrew Metrick Apr 2022

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module Z:Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Greg Feldberg, Alexander Nye, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2008, credit markets tightened amid a broader economic downturn that severely impacted the US auto industry, especially the three largest domestic manufacturers, General Motors (GM), Ford Motors, and Chrysler. The companies requested assistance from the government in a bid to stay afloat, but Congress declined to authorize funding. The Bush administration, however, provided bridge loans to GM and Chrysler under the Auto Industry Finance Program (AIFP), funded through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), to sustain them until the Obama administration was in place. Within months, the Obama administration decided that a speedy bankruptcy would be …

Go to article

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module E: Emergency Assistance For Chrysler Financial, Alexander Nye Apr 2022

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module E: Emergency Assistance For Chrysler Financial, Alexander Nye

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2008, due to the confluence of the Global Financial Crisis and years of structural decline in the auto industry, Chrysler was nearing bankruptcy. Chrysler’s related finance company, Chrysler Financial, was also in dire straits. On December 19, 2008, President Bush announced the Automotive Industry Financing Program and that the US Treasury would extend Chrysler a $4 billion Bridge Loan to give the company time to prepare a viable restructuring plan. Two weeks later, the Treasury arranged $1.5 billion in low-interest financing for Chrysler Financial to fund the securitization of new consumer car loans and the facility …

Go to article

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module F: Auto Supplier Support Program, Riki Matsumoto Apr 2022

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module F: Auto Supplier Support Program, Riki Matsumoto

Journal of Financial Crises

The Global Financial Crisis that began in 2007 intensified the decade-long malaise of two of the largest auto manufacturers in the US, General Motors and Chrysler. Their possible collapse was deemed to pose a systemic risk by the United States government. In response, the Department of the Treasury made efforts to provide support to the automotive industry through the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP). As US auto parts suppliers experienced deteriorated automotive markets, disrupted manufacturer operations, and stressed credit markets, the Treasury announced the Auto Supplier Support Program (ASSP) on March 19, 2009, as an auxiliary program to the overall …

Go to article

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance To Ally Financial (Formerly Gmac), Riki Matsumoto, Kaleb B. Nygaard Apr 2022

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance To Ally Financial (Formerly Gmac), Riki Matsumoto, Kaleb B. Nygaard

Journal of Financial Crises

In 2008, GMAC was a $200 billion company providing financing to General Motors customers. As the Global Financial Crisis entered a critical stage in early 2008, GMAC’s funding strategy and liquidity position were adversely affected by the significant disruption in credit markets and the broader economic downturn. This reduced access to financing, which impacted GMAC’s ability to provide automotive wholesale inventory and retail financing to General Motors and Chrysler. In late 2008 and early 2009 GM and Chrysler underwent a complex restructuring process. To restore liquidity to GMAC’s auto finance business, the Federal Reserve agreed to expedite GMAC’s conversion to …

Go to article

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module C: Restructuring Chrysler Through Bankruptcy, Alexander Nye Apr 2022

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module C: Restructuring Chrysler Through Bankruptcy, Alexander Nye

Journal of Financial Crises

In late 2008, due to the confluence of the financial crisis and years of structural decline in the auto industry, Chrysler was nearing bankruptcy. The US Treasury provided Chrysler’s owner, Chrysler Holding, with a $4 billion bridge loan and Chrysler’s related finance company, Chrysler Financial, with a $1.5 billion financing program under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The government-led restructuring through bankruptcy involved the commitment of roughly $5 billion in debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans from the US Treasury and the Canadian government, under which the US Treasury ultimately lent $1.89 billion, using TARP funds, and Canada lent about $1 billion, …

Go to article

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans, Alexander Nye Apr 2022

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans, Alexander Nye

Journal of Financial Crises

In 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis, America’s Big Three automakers neared their breaking point. Two of them, General Motors (GM) and Chrysler, asked Congress for funding to prevent uncontrolled bankruptcies. Policymakers realized these uncontrolled bankruptcies would damage the manufacturing sector. Congress considered but failed to pass a framework conditioning short-term financing on the companies’ producing acceptable restructuring plans. With the companies warning that they could not survive the coming presidential transition, on December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush announced the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) under the authority of the Emergency Economic Stability Act (EESA) …

Go to article

First Prev Next Last