Public Policy Commons^™

Mexico Peso Crisis (1994–1995): Procapte, Manuel León Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

In December 1994, Mexico entered a financial crisis. The government abandoned its crawling peg exchange rate policy, letting the peso float and devalue substantially. The recently privatized banking sector found difficulties in meeting regulatory minimum capital. The Mexican government assisted with a $52 billion international financial package, enacted multiple programs to contain the crisis. The first program introduced to recapitalize the banks was the Temporary Capitalization Program (PROCAPTE) in February 1995. Banks could issue subordinated debentures to the Bank Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA). These debentures were convertible into equity shares (common stock) with voting rights after five years. Banks …

Malaysia: Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal), Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

The Malaysian economy was relatively well positioned at the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, the government’s response of tight fiscal and monetary policy, along with contagion from surrounding countries, had severe negative consequences. The banking industry became particularly vulnerable due to substantial loan growth preceding the crisis and exposure to volatile sectors, leading to an increase in NPLs and capital deterioration. As part of its approach to assist the ailing banking sector, the Bank Negara Malaysia created Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) on August 10, 1998, as a wholly owned subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing banking institutions. Funding for Danamodal …

Korea: Bank Recapitalization Fund, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, a number of foreign governments enacted stabilization measures to protect their domestic economies in the wake of the global credit crunch. The Bank Recapitalization Fund (the Fund), announced by the South Korean government on December 18, 2008, and implemented on February 15, 2009, was one such intervention intended to assist Korean commercial banks in strengthening their capital bases and thus restore normal lending practices between banks and nonfinancial institutions. Invoking its authority under Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea …

Korean Capital Injections: Kdic 1997, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

After the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, international banks reduced their exposures to Korean financial institutions, rating agencies downgraded Korea’s sovereign rating, and the Korean won lost half its value. The government guaranteed all financial institution deposits and provided emergency liquidity support to the financial sector, but these measures did not restore market confidence. In December, Korea sought an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-by Arrangement. As part of the IMF program, the Korean National Assembly consolidated financial sector supervision into a new Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and broadened the scope of the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC). …

Japan Provision Of Subordinated Loans, Shiro Kawana

Journal of Financial Crises

During the international financial turmoil associated with the Global Financial Crisis, Japan’s financial institutions remained relatively sound because their exposure to overseas structured credit products was limited. Restructuring in the aftermath of Japan’s own banking crisis in the late 1990s also contributed to making Japanese banks resilient to external shocks. Nonetheless, Japanese banks’ profitability was at risk. Due to the large amount of stockholdings, major banks had large market risks which might significantly worsen their capital ratios. The increasing volatility of stock prices could make banks conscious of capital constraints in the future and could trigger an adverse feedback loop …

Japan’S Act On Strengthening Financial Functions (Asff), Vaasavi Unnava, Junko Oguri

Journal of Financial Crises

After the Japanese Financial Crisis in 1990s, the non-performing loan problem was mitigated in the large Japanese banks but persisted in the regional banking system. By 2004, regional banks accounted for half of all non-performing loans. In 2004, the government passed the Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF), legislation for capital injections to address the non-performing loan problem. Aimed at regional banks, the ASFF secured ¥2 trillion in capital, with various eligibility restrictions and requirements, such as a rigorous debt restructuring plan. As the Japanese economy and the financial system encountered multiple external shocks, the government amended the Act several …

Financial Functions Stabilization Act, Vaasavi Unnava

Journal of Financial Crises

In 1990, the asset-pricing bubble in Japan peaked and began a steady decline. Over the next seven years, a series of bank failures induced the Japanese government to introduce the first of a series of capital injections in 1998, 1999, and 2004. The capital injection of 1998, authorized by the Financial Functions Stabilization Act, made ¥13 trillion ($103 billion) available to financial institutions that applied. By the end of the injection window, 21 banks and trusts applied for and received ¥1.8 trillion ($13.5 billion) in subordinated debt and loans and preferred shares. While there were no limits on compensation for …

Prompt Recapitalization Act, Vaasavi Unnava

Journal of Financial Crises

In 1997, Japan’s banks were in crisis due to hundreds of billions of dollars of non-performing real estate loans. In response, the government performed three rounds of capital injections in 1998, 1999, and the early 2000s. The capital injection of 1999, authorized by the Prompt Recapitalization Act, made as much as ¥25 trillion ($208 billion) available to financial institutions that applied, regardless of their capitalization. By the end of the injection window, 32 banks and trusts applied for and received ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6 billion) total in preferred shares and subordinated debts. The Act required banks to submit and adhere to …

Italy (2008) Capital Injections, Manuel León Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

In response to the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis, in October 2008, the Italian government announced urgent measures to guarantee financial stability and the flow of credit. The Italian government targeted three areas of support: (1) bank recapitalizations, (2) liquidity access, and (3) expansion of guarantees on bank deposits. This case study exclusively examines the Italian bank recapitalization scheme introduced in December 2008 in line with European Union State Aid rules.

The four Italian banks recapitalized in 2009 under the scheme were Banco Popolare (€1.45 billion), Banca Popolare di Milano (€500 million), Credito Valtellinese (€200 million), and Banca Montepaschi di Siena …

Israeli Bank Shares Arrangement (Hesder Hamenayot Habankayot), Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

From 1980 to 1983, Israeli consumer prices more than doubled every year and the shekel lost more than 50% of its value annually. This high inflation and currency devaluation posed an extraordinary challenge for Israel’s biggest banks. They needed to grow their capital bases to keep up with the rising market value of their assets, but investors needed protection against the continually declining value of the local currency. Banks’ solution was to regularly issue new, nonvoting shares in extraordinary amounts while ensuring investors a high return by regularly buying their own shares to manipulate prices. The government tacitly supported the …

Ireland 2009 Recapitalization Program For Financial Institutions, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

At the November 2008 height of the Global Financial Crisis, Ireland’s Department of Finance announced a willingness to inject capital into the six largest banks. This announcement followed the issuance of a blanket guarantee of those banks’ liabilities in September 2008. After broadly designing the potential investments in 2008, the Irish government came to agreements with Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks in February 2009 to inject €3.5 billion ($4.5 billion) in each bank in exchange for preferred equity stakes. The government funded the investments from the funds of the National Pensions Reserve Fund, something it would secure the …

Indonesia Joint Recapitalization Of 1999, Vaasavi Unnava, Ariel Smith

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government implemented a joint recapitalization program in 1999 to aid some of its private banks struggling with the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis. Nine banks were eligible, and seven ultimately participated. The program was voluntary; in order to participate, bank managers had to pass a test proving that they were competent enough to run their bank and create a three-year plan for the bank’s operations subject to independent assessment. All of the bank participants were able to return to the 4% minimum capital adequacy ratio by the end of the program.

Hungary Recapitalization Scheme, Alec Buchholtz

Journal of Financial Crises

In the midst of the global financial crisis in October 2008, the Magyar Namzeti Bank (MNB), the Hungarian national bank, noticed a selloff of government securities by foreign banks and a large depreciation in the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint (HUF) in FX markets. Hungarian banks experienced liquidity pressure due to margin calls on FX swap contracts, prompting the MNB and Minister of Finance to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB) and the World Bank. The IMF and ECB approved the Hungarian government’s (the State) requests in late 2008 to create a €19 …

The Hungarian Bank Recapitalization Program, Junko Oguri

Journal of Financial Crises

Hungary implemented a number of new policies from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, shifting from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Despite the top-down market reforms, Hungary lacked the knowledge to build a fully functional financial system. Eventually, an economic turmoil caused by the collapse of eastern markets and fragility in the financial system led to the banking crisis of 1992–1993, revealing the undercapitalization of the financial system. The government implemented the recapitalization, or “bank consolidation,” as part of a stabilization program. It injected capital into banks in three stages—in December 1993, May 1994, and December …

Hong Kong Contingent Bank Capital Facility (Cbcf), David Tam, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

On October 14, 2008, Hong Kong’s financial secretary announced the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) would use Hong Kong’s Exchange Fund to provide standby capital to banks if needed. The Contingent Bank Capital Facility (CBCF) was available until the end of 2010 to shore up depositor and investor confidence in the local banking sector and commenced in parallel with a broader set of announced measures including a consumer bank deposit guarantee. Twenty-three locally incorporated “Authorized Institutions” were eligible to access CBCF capital upon request. The provisioning of CBCF capital would be accompanied by enhanced oversight from the HKMA. The Hong …

Greece (2008) – Capital Injections, Manuel León Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis (2007–09), the Greek government announced a €28 billion ($36 billion) government package. Greek Law 3723/2008, “Enhancement of Liquidity in the Economy in Response to the Impact of the International Financial Crisis,” was passed and approved under European Union State Aid rules. The Greek law provided for three voluntary programs: recapitalizations (€5 billion), guarantees (€15 billion), and securities (€8 billion). This case study exclusively examines the recapitalization program. In this program, the Greek government acquired convertible preferred shares in banks in order to build and maintain banks’ Tier 1 capital …

Germany Soffin Capital Injections, Priya Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

The insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the subsequent global liquidity crisis spurred the German state to pass the Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz, “FMStFG”) establishing the Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision (Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung), or FMSA. Created in October 2008, it provided government support to ailing financial institutions. The FMSA supported German banks and maintained the stability of the German banking system, in part by establishing the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (Sonderfunds Finanzmarktstabilisierung), or SoFFin. SoFFin could provide capital injections and risk shield measures of €80 billion and also possessed a guarantee provision of up …

France Société De Prise De Participation De L’État (Sppe), Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

As the Global Financial Crisis deepened, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and ensuing contagion began affecting the French economy and financial system. France experienced declines in major economic indicators such as GDP, household consumption, and investment. In addition, the ensuing credit crunch in financial markets resulted in the seizing up of various lending markets. Due to conservative business practices, a consolidated market structure, and a sound regulatory framework, the French banks were relatively better situated than their European counterparts to weather the crisis. However, the French authorities instituted a precautionary recapitalization scheme in order to “restore …

Finland’S 1992 Capital Injection, Kaleb B. Nygaard

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector during the 1980s and subsequent massive credit expansion, a banking crisis in Finland caused a sharp contraction in the economy in the early 1990s. To prevent the collapse of the banking system, the government offered FIM 8 billion in capital injections. Parliament appropriated the funds in the spring of 1992 and terms were defined in June 1992. The program was open to all banks, in proportion to their size, regardless of their solvency. In the fall of 1992, FIM 7.9 billion was deployed to 56 cooperative banks and 22 savings banks of …

Danish Capital Injections Scheme 2009 (Dk Gfc), Priya Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

Both the international financial system and Denmark were experiencing challenges in 2007 and 2008, and they came to a head in Denmark when Roskilde Bank experienced liquidity pressures in June 2008. As it became clear that Roskilde Bank was insolvent and no private solutions would be found, and as the global financial crisis worsened leading to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Danish government decided to take stronger action. To ensure the short-term survival of Roskilde Bank, the national bank issued a non-limited credit facility. After it passed a deposit guarantee scheme in 2008 and established a Financial Stability Company, …

Austria: Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz (Finstag), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the adoption of a joint framework by euro area countries in response to the intensifying financial crisis in October 2008, Austria enacted a package of measures including the Financial Market Stability Act (Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz, or FinStaG). In addition to permitting nationalization under certain circumstances, FinStaG allowed the Austrian government to use six specific measures to recapitalize credit institutions operating in Austria and Austrian insurance companies. According to FinStaG, €15 billion ($22 billion) could be used for this purpose, though this amount was later increased. Eight institutions received support through FinStaG, and the government granted capital and liquidity support totaling €21 …

Comment Letters May Have Helped Shape Federal Reserve’S Municipal Liquidity Facility (Mlf) And Main Street Lending Program (Mslp), Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

YPFS Archive Notes highlight noteworthy content or additions to the YPFS Resource Library.

In support of the YPFS efforts to archive primary and secondary materials that shed light on financial crises, this YPFS Archive Note highlights the addition of public comment letters solicited by the Federal Reserve to evaluate two of its proposed emergency lending facilities, the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) and the Main Street Lending Program (MSLP) designed to help the US economy endure the financial stresses caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The released correspondence reflects a wide array of congressional and stakeholder concerns. Ultimately, the Fed incorporated …

Lessons Learned: Zachary Taylor, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Zachary Taylor joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in January 2009 to lead the team responsible for managing and unwinding the central bank’s Maiden Lane II and III portfolios, which were acquired in connection with the intervention to assist American International Group (AIG). Taylor later took over responsibility for the Maiden Lane portfolio consisting of former Bear Stearns assets as well as the unwinding of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), another crisis-era program. All told, those portfolios amounted to more than $140 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), credit default …

Lessons Learned: Robert Hoyt, Esq., Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Robert Hoyt was General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Treasury between 2006 and 2009. He oversaw legal aspects of policies implemented to manage the crisis, including the rescues of Bear Stearns, AIG, and the U.S. Auto industry, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the failure of Lehman Brothers, as well as the creation and implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP.) This Lessons Learned is based on a phone interview with Mr. Hoyt.

Lessons Learned: Alejandro Latorre, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

At the time of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, Alejandro Latorre was an assistant vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). He was active in the bailout of American International Group (AIG) from its inception to the end, when AIG repaid its outstanding obligations to both the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. This Lessons Learned summary is based on a Feb. 26, 2020, interview. He emphasized that the views discussed here are his own, not the views of anyone else currently or previously within the Federal Reserve System or the views of his current employer.

Lessons Learned: Sarah Dahlgren, Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Sarah Dahlgren was the Executive Vice President and head of the Financial Institution Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the crisis and instrumental in the rescue of American International Group (AIG). This Lessons Learned summary is drawn from a March 22, 2018, interview in which she gave her take on how central bankers can prepare for future crises.

The Rescue Of American International Group Module F: The Aig Credit Facility Trust, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) experienced a liquidity crisis. To avoid the insurance giant’s bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion emergency secured credit facility to AIG. In connection with the credit facility, AIG issued 100,000 shares of preferred stock, with voting rights equal to and convertible into 79.9% of the outstanding shares of AIG common stock, to an independent trust (the Trust) set up by the FRBNY. Three trustees held the stock for the sole benefit of the US Treasury, exercised the rights, powers, authorities, discretions, and duties of the …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

Starting in mid-2007, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing collateral calls from counterparties looking to protect their positions in credit default swap (CDS) contracts that AIG had written on residential and commercial collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (US COP 2010, 28-30). Per these agreements, the AIG parent company was responsible for insuring the value of the CDOs against the risk of a negative credit event, such as default (GAO 2011, 5; US COP 2010, 29-30). AIG’s immediate need for liquidity on September 16, largely driven by a securities lending program and those collateral calls, prompted the Federal Reserve to lend the …

The Spanish Guarantee Scheme For Credit Institutions (Spain Gfc), Lily Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Given Spanish banks’ heavy investment in the housing and construction markets in the lead-up to the global financial crisis (GFC), the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, impelled the government to implement stabilization measures to calm, recapitalize, and restructure its domestic banking sector. The Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (the Guarantee Scheme) was one of the first interventions to be enacted, announced by Spain’s Ministry of Economy and Finance on October 13, 2008, by Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 on “Urgent Economic and Financial Measures in relation to the Concerted Action Plan of …

The Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands Gfc), Lily Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments around the world sought to implement stabilization measures in order to calm and protect their domestic markets. While not directly exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Kingdom of the Netherlands announced the creation of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) on October 13, 2008, to boost confidence in interbank lending markets and to ensure the flow of credit to Dutch households and companies. In establishing this program, the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA) committed €200 billion to support the issuance …