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Articles 151 - 180 of 238
Full-Text Articles in Public Policy
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis B: Decreasing Loan Loss Provisions In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis B: Decreasing Loan Loss Provisions In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
All public companies in the European Union, including Ireland’s major banks, were required to adopt IAS 39 for their annual accounting periods beginning on or after January 1, 2005. Under the “incurred loss” model of IAS 39, banks could set aside reserves for loan losses only when objective evidence existed that a loan was impaired, not in anticipation of future losses. As a result, Irish banks saw their aggregate reserve for bad loans drop from 1.2% of loan balances at the end of 2000 to only 0.4% by 2006-07, just before the collapse of the banking industry caused loan losses …
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Ireland went from being the poorest member of the European Economic Community in 1973 to enjoying the second highest per-capita income among European countries by 2007. Healthy growth in the 1990s eventually gave way to a concentrated boom in property-related lending in the 2000s. The growth in the aggregate loan balances of Ireland’s six major banks greatly exceeded the growth in gross domestic product (GDP); as a result, bank loan balances grew from 1.1 times GDP in 2000 to over 2.0 times GDP by 2007. Given the small size of the domestic retail depositor base, the Irish banks increasingly funded …
Lessons Learned: James B. Lockhart Iii, Ben Henken, Dan Thompson
Lessons Learned: James B. Lockhart Iii, Ben Henken, Dan Thompson
Journal of Financial Crises
Insights from discussions with James B. Lockhart III, who was the Director (CEO) and Chairman of the Oversight Board of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) upon the agency’s creation on July 30, 2008. Topics include the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as other elements of the Bush Administration's 2008 crisis response activities.
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
As a global financial service provider, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in different countries. Bruno Iksil, the derivatives trader primarily responsible for the $6 billion trading loss in 2012, was based in JPM’s London office. This office was regulated both by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States (US) and by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the United Kingdom (UK). Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements with one another to define basic parameters …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used ways to measure and monitor market risk. At JPMorgan Chase (JPM), very large derivative positions established by Bruno Iksil in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) caused the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) to exceed its VaR limit for four days in a row in January 2012. In response, the CIO changed to a new VaR model on January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce VaR by half. However, JPM soon discovered that this new VaR model had not been properly implemented and the bank went back to using the …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
After consistently producing positive results through 2011, the JPMorgan Chase (JPM) traders who oversaw the bank’s Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) grew alarmed by a consistent string of losses beginning in January 2012. (The SCP was maintained by JPM to help hedge default risk and was the source of the 2012 London Whale trading loss.) To minimize the losses reported to their superiors until such time that market prices hopefully turned in their favor, the SCP traders began valuing their largest derivative positions in a manner that was not consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and JPM policy. The fair …
The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception, Lee Davison
The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception, Lee Davison
Journal of Financial Crises
In the fall of 2008, short-term credit markets were all but frozen, creating liquidity issues for banks and bank holding companies that could not rollover their debt at reasonable rates. Fearing that the situation would worsen if something was not done, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board invoked, and the Secretary of the Treasury approved, the use of the “systemic risk exception” (SRE) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, to provide unprecedented broad-based relief to struggling banks. The SRE permitted the FDIC to depart from its “least-cost” requirement when addressing failing …
Lessons Learned: Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Esq., Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Esq., Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Baxter, who was General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the crisis, gives us his take on how best to prepare for future crises.
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction To The Isda Master Agreement, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction To The Isda Master Agreement, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
When Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI) sought Chapter 11 protection, the more than 6,000 counterparties with which its subsidiaries had entered into over 900,000 over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions faced the question of how best to respond to protect their interests. The existence of standardized documentation developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for entering into such transactions meant that the counterparties likely thought that they were dealing with a well-defined and robust set of options in answering this question. Yet, in practice, the resolution of Lehman’s OTC derivatives portfolio ended up being less orderly than the existence of …
Yale’S Environmental Performance Index: The Construction And Use Of A Composite Index For Global Sustainability, Zach Wendling
Yale’S Environmental Performance Index: The Construction And Use Of A Composite Index For Global Sustainability, Zach Wendling
Yale Day of Data
No abstract provided.
The Politic 2011 Spring, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2010 Fall, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2010 Spring, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2010 Winter, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2009 Fall, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2009 Winter, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2008 Fall (Special Issue), The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2008 Fall (Special Issue), The Politic, Inc.
The Politic
No abstract provided.
The Politic 2008 Fall, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2008 Fall, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2008 Winter, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2007 Fall, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2007 Summer, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2007 Spring, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2007 Winter, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2006 Summer, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2006 Spring, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2005 Fall, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2005 Summer, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2005 Spring, The Politic, Inc.
The Politic 2004 Fall, The Politic, Inc.