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Articles 61 - 90 of 397

Full-Text Articles in Public Administration

Colombia: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Natalie Leonard, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Colombia: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Natalie Leonard, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

On May 6, 2007, the Bank of the Republic (BR), the central bank of Colombia, introduced countercyclical marginal reserve requirements (RRs) on increases in banks’ deposit accounts to constrain leverage and credit risk in the financial system. A month later, the BR also raised the ordinary RR on outstanding deposit balances. The BR kept those requirements in place for more than a year. In June 2008, when the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began to temper economic and credit growth, the BR eliminated marginal RRs. Also in June 2008, however, the BR raised the ordinary RR on outstanding …

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China: Reserve Requirements, 2015–2016, Carey K. Mott Dec 2022

China: Reserve Requirements, 2015–2016, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

After China devalued the renminbi against the US dollar in August 2015, Chinese equity markets experienced a significant drop that spilled into international markets. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) adjusted the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) five times between February 2015 and October 2015: three times before the market turmoil, to allocate credit to preferred sectors, and twice in response to the crisis to release liquidity into the financial system. Throughout this cycle, the central bank applied lower RRRs to rural credit institutions, agricultural lenders, leasing and financing companies, and other sectors in which government policy promoted lending. Although the …

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China: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Carey K. Mott Dec 2022

China: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In 2008, China experienced several natural disasters that slowed economic growth, and fearing contagion from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the central bank cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) three times for large financial institutions, to 15.5%, and four times for small and medium-size financial institutions, to 13.5%. This monetary easing, combined with a USD 586 billion fiscal stimulus package, caused explosive credit growth in China. One year after these RRR cuts, the central bank hiked the ratio 12 times, to a historically high 21.5% for large banks in June 2011; however, it maintained a different ratio for rural credit …

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Brazil: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer Dec 2022

Brazil: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer

Journal of Financial Crises

After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, deposits began to accumulate at large Brazilian banks, representing a flight to safety away from small and medium-sized banks. While total deposits in the Brazilian financial system grew by 13% from August 2008 to January 2009, the total deposits held by small and medium-sized banks declined by 23% and 11%, respectively. Because of high statutory reserve requirements and legal disincentives to lend directly to financial institutions, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) used reserve requirements as its primary tool for providing liquidity to incentivize large banks to provide credit to smaller …

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Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995, Natalie Leonard Dec 2022

Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 sparked concerns about the quality and safety of government debt across Latin American countries, including Argentina. In late 1994 and 1995, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) implemented three changes in reserve requirement policy to restore liquidity throughout the financial system and defend the currency peg to the US dollar. First, it lowered the existing minimum reserve requirement, which required banks to hold reserves entirely in cash (pesos or US dollars). This released more than ARS 4 billion (USD 4 billion) in resources into the banking system, according to the …

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Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George Dec 2022

Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Thai government’s decision to allow the baht to float in July 1997 was the pivotal event of the Asian Financial Crisis. The baht fell 20% by the end of the month, further pressuring Thai financial institutions that had borrowed heavily in US dollars and other foreign currencies. In early August, Thailand’s Finance Minister and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the suspension and restructuring of insolvent finance companies and a blanket guarantee covering depositors and creditors of all domestic banks and the remaining finance companies, administered by the BOT’s Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF). However, the blanket guarantee was …

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Mexico: Fobaproa Blanket Guarantee, 1993–1994, Stella Schaefer-Brown Dec 2022

Mexico: Fobaproa Blanket Guarantee, 1993–1994, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

On December 22, 1994, the Mexican government allowed the peso to float freely against the US dollar, aggravating the run on peso deposits, leading to the rapid devaluation of the peso, and sparking the peso crisis. The following week, the Bank of Mexico announced that the Mexican deposit insurer would fully guarantee all commercial bank deposits and liabilities except subordinated debt. The announcement of the blanket guarantee appeared effective at reassuring foreign investors, as the central bank was soon able to ease the liquidity support that it had been providing to banks during the crisis. The government created a deposit …

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Sweden: Bank Support Authority, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija Dec 2022

Sweden: Bank Support Authority, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Sweden’s financial system suffered its worst shock in the post–World War II period. Swedish banks were heavily dependent on foreign credit, which dried up amid signs of instability. The Swedish government announced a blanket guarantee on September 24, 1992, for all banks’ obligations except share capital and perpetual subordinated loans. According to a 1995 IMF Working Paper by Drees and Pazarbasioglu, the purpose of the blanket guarantee was “to guarantee the stability of the payments system and to safeguard the general supply of credit.” The …

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Korea: Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Korea: Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Korea entered the Asian Financial Crisis in August 1997 with highly leveraged firms and a banking system inexperienced in managing systemic risk. Korea faced a currency crisis and a banking crisis, as foreign banks froze credit to Korean commercial banks and merchant banks. On August 25, 1997, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) announced that it would guarantee all Korean financial institutions’ foreign debt—both existing debt and new borrowings. Nonetheless, foreign lenders continued to withdraw credit from Korean financial institutions. On November 19, 1997, a newly appointed MOEF minister announced a suite of measures to promote foreign creditors’ confidence …

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Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown Dec 2022

Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

The Global Financial Crisis exposed fragilities in the Irish banking system and led to widespread runs on Irish banks. Irish authorities attempted to address the runs on September 22, 2008, by increasing the country’s deposit guarantee limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 28,800 to USD 140,000) and raising the coverage of deposits from 90% to 100%. When the runs continued, the Irish minister for finance announced a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities on September 30 without consulting European Union authorities. The announcement specified the blanket guarantee would be effective immediately and remain in effect for two years. The …

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Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George Dec 2022

Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

After a period of sustained distress in the early 1990s, Jamaican financial institutions faced significant liquidity issues by 1996, evidenced by runs on banks by depositors. The government responded by creating the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) on January 29, 1997, to rehabilitate weak financial institutions and administer a blanket guarantee on financial sector liabilities. The blanket guarantee covered all deposit-taking financial institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds registered under the Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, and Insurance Act. Within eligible institutions, the blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension funds managed by authorized institutions, …

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Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George Dec 2022

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government closed 16 banks on November 1, 1997. At the time, the government said it would guarantee depositors up to 20 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR; USD 6,000) per account. The lack of immediate full protection for large depositors caused deposit runs throughout the banking sector and undermined foreign confidence in the Indonesian financial system. In response, the Indonesian president on January 26, 1998, announced a blanket guarantee and created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to administer the guarantee and other bank rehabilitation efforts. The blanket guarantee covered all depositors and nonsubordinated creditors in locally incorporated commercial banks. …

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Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

After a series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy in 1997–1998, foreign creditors reassessed their emerging-market risk and reduced external credit lines to Ecuador, thus draining liquidity. The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998 triggered deposit runs at other banks. Banks sought assistance from the Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE). By the end of September 1998, the BCE had issued emergency loans to 11 financial institutions, totaling nearly 30% of the money base. The crisis accelerated in August 1998 when Banco de Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank, was closed; the existing …

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Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija Dec 2022

Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Finland’s financial system suffered steadily increasing loan losses and falling earnings beginning in 1990. The Finnish Parliament created the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) in April 1992 to support banks with loans, capital, and guarantees. In a press release issued on August 6, 1992, the government said the GGF would “secure the stable functioning of the banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]”. Six months later, the Parliament of Finland specifically required the GGF to guarantee that all Finnish banks could meet their commitments. The government …

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Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner Dec 2022

Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

As foreign credit in Denmark dried up during the summer of 2008, Danish banks became increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing. The government took over the failing Roskilde Bank, the country’s eighth-largest bank, in late August. On October 5, 2008, the government announced a voluntary General Guarantee Scheme to fully insure deposits and other senior liabilities of participating banks. Banks could participate in the scheme by becoming members of the financial sector’s banking consortium, Det Private Beredskab, or in English, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), before October 13, 2008. The General Guarantee Scheme fully insured all depositors and senior unsecured creditors …

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Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick Dec 2022

Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require little process, and the change for banks …

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Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick Dec 2022

Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees …

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The Financialization Of Recession Response, Aaron Klein Dec 2022

The Financialization Of Recession Response, Aaron Klein

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper analyzes economic policy responses to the COVID-19-induced recession, focusing on the American policy response. Despite widespread political distrust between the two parties sharing control of the government and the timing of the upcoming presidential election, America’s political system was able to enact a massive policy response that reduced the severity of the recession. This political response happened faster than any automatic policy response would have, based on the delays in data reporting. The economic policies enacted continued America’s trend toward financialization of fiscal policy. The Federal Reserve and America’s private banking and financial systems were heavily relied upon …

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Lessons Learned: Christopher Spoth, Sandra Ward Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Christopher Spoth, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

As senior deputy director of the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Spoth led examinations, enforcement actions, problem bank remediations, and failure resolutions, among a range of responsibilities. During the Global Financial Crisis, he was on the front lines of fast-moving policy discussions and actions to help stabilize the financial system, and he oversaw the closure and restructuring of some of the nation’s largest banks. This abstract is based on an interview with Spoth on February 4, 2021.

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Lessons Learned: Kevin Warsh, Matthew A. Lieber Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Kevin Warsh, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

As senior deputy director of the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Spoth led examinations, enforcement actions, problem bank remediations, and failure resolutions, among a range of responsibilities. During the Global Financial Crisis, he was on the front lines of fast-moving policy discussions and actions to help stabilize the financial system, and he oversaw the closure and restructuring of some of the nation’s largest banks. This abstract is based on an interview with Spoth on February 4, 2021.

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Lessons Learned: Brian Sack, Sandra Ward Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Brian Sack, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Charged with overseeing the implementation of the asset-purchase programs and liquidity facilities in his roles as executive vice president of the Markets Group and manager of the System Open Market Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), Brian Sack played a critical role in keeping markets functioning during the years 2009–2012. He served as an adviser to top policymakers, and, in addition to implementing the various programs designed to stabilize financial conditions, he monitored their impact and measured their performance. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Sack on November 13, 2020.

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Lessons Learned: Nathan Sheets, Yasemin Sim Esmen, Rosalind Z. Wiggins Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Nathan Sheets, Yasemin Sim Esmen, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Between 2007 and 2011, Nathan Sheets was director of the Division of International Finance at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. He oversaw the operations of the division and advised the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on economic and financial developments in foreign countries. Sheets also regularly represented the Federal Reserve Board at international meetings and in its contacts with foreign central banks. Under his helm, the division was involved in helping establish and manage the US dollar liquidity swap lines with foreign central banks. This Lessons Learned abstract is based on an interview with Sheets on …

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Lessons Learned: Frederic Mishkin, Matthew A. Lieber Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Frederic Mishkin, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Rick Mishkin served as a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 2006 to 2008 and as director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1994 to 1997. A leading expert on monetary economics and financial markets and a professor at Columbia University’s School of Business since 1983, Mishkin has written 20 books, including the textbook The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Mishkin conducted on October 20, 2020.

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Lessons Learned: Simon Potter, Maryann Haggerty Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Simon Potter, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Simon Potter, an economist, worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for more than two decades. Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis, he was the New York Fed’s associate director of economic research; in 2010, he became director. In 2012, he shifted to become the head of the markets group, putting him at the helm of the Fed’s open markets operations, the mechanism by which the central bank steers monetary policy and interest rates. He moved to the private sector in 2019. For this April 2021 Lessons Learned interview, he emphasized that these are his personal opinions, …

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Lessons Learned: Susan Mclaughlin, Matthew A. Lieber Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Susan Mclaughlin, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

A veteran staff member of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), Susan McLaughlin served as head of the discount window and chief operating officer of the FRBNY’s Markets Trading Desk during the Global Financial Crisis. She was centrally involved in the Fed’s policy response to the disruptions to secured and unsecured funding markets during 2007–2008. Following the crisis, McLaughlin coordinated an effective Fed initiative to reform the triparty repurchase agreement (repo) market’s settlement infrastructure. The Fed’s reform efforts, engaging the financial industry under FRBNY president Bill Dudley, were instrumental in im-proving the stability of the funding market. This …

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Lessons Learned: Kieran J. Fallon, Matthew A. Lieber Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Kieran J. Fallon, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Presently the senior deputy general counsel for regulation and government affairs at PNC Fi-nancial Services Group, Kieran Fallon completed a 16-year tenure in the legal division of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 2011. As associate general counsel dur-ing the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), he helped design the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Pa-per Funding Facility, restructure American International Group (AIG), and implement the Dodd-Frank Act. Relatedly, Fallon also served as general counsel for the Financial Stability Oversight Board from 2008 to 2011. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview conducted with Fallon on August 13, 2020.

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Lessons Learned: Steven B. Kamin, Yasemin Sim Esmen Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Steven B. Kamin, Yasemin Sim Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Steven B. Kamin was the deputy director of the division of international finance at the Federal Reserve Board during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and was appointed director in 2011. He was responsible for research, policy analysis, and reporting in the areas of foreign economic activity, US external trade and capital flows, and developments in international financial markets and institutions. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview conducted with Kamin on August 16, 2019.

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Lessons Learned: Seth Carpenter, Maryann Haggerty Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Seth Carpenter, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Seth Carpenter was a senior staff member of the Division of Monetary Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), meaning he was part of the team that advised the Board of Governors and members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in setting monetary policy. He led the Board team that worked daily with the Open Market Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to implement policy. He left the Federal Reserve System as deputy director of monetary affairs in 2014 to work at the US Department of the Treasury, where …

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Lessons Learned: Tim Clark, Lynnley Browning Sep 2022

Lessons Learned: Tim Clark, Lynnley Browning

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09, Tim Clark was senior adviser in the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Clark was a chief architect of the Federal Reserve’s capital and liquidity stress tests that helped to stabilize the banks. He was also one of the leaders behind the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and other reforms at the Federal Reserve, and ultimately served as deputy director of the Division for Supervision and Regulation. This abstract is based on an interview with Clark that occurred on December 13, 2019.

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The Internal Capital Markets Of Global Dealer Banks, Arun Gupta Sep 2022

The Internal Capital Markets Of Global Dealer Banks, Arun Gupta

Journal of Financial Crises

This study uncovers the existence of a trillion-dollar internal capital market that played a central role in the financing of dealer banks during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis. Hand-collecting a novel set of dealer microdata at the subsidiary level, I present a unique set of facts on the evolution of inter-affiliate loans between US primary dealers and their (primarily foreign) siblings. First, the aggregate size of these dealer internal capital markets quadrupled from $335 billion in 2001 to $1.2 trillion by 2007. Second, 25 percent of total repurchase agreements and 62 percent of total securities lending reported on US primary …

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