Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons^™

Lessons Learned: Andreas Verykios And Kostas Tsatsaronis, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Andreas Verykios was appointed in 2018 to lead the board of directors of the General Council of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), an independent special purpose vehicle created to stabilize the Greek banking sector in the wake of the country’s debt crisis. The Greek economy was badly affected by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Sovereign Debt Crisis, when the government was found to have underreported its fiscal deficits and public debt. This led to a downgrade and eventual default of its sovereign bonds, requiring assistance from the European Commission. From 2010 through 2018, the commission implemented three …

Lessons Learned: Paul Tucker, Salil Gupta

Journal of Financial Crises

After joining the Bank of England (BoE) in 1980, Sir Paul Tucker held a number of positions of increasing responsibility including serving as a member of several key committees. Tucker played a crucial role in the BoE’s response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as director for markets, through March 2009, then as deputy governor of the bank until November 2013. Post-crisis, he has been instrumental in constructing the international regulatory framework on financial stability. From 2016 to 2021, Tucker also chaired the Systemic Risk Council.

Currently, Tucker is a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business …

Lessons Learned: Pedro Machado, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Pedro Machado began his career as a legal adviser to the European Central Bank in the years leading up the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), then joined the Bank of Portugal (BOP) in 2006, where he has held several positions. He was chief of staff to Portugal’s minister of state and finance in 2011, during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, when the government negotiated a bailout with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union. He returned to the BOP, as deputy director of the prudential supervision department, while the program was being implemented. The EUR 78 billion bailout was largely …

Lessons Learned: Karl-Philipp Wojick, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Karl-Philipp Wojcik is the general counsel of the European Union’s Single Resolution Board (SRB), the central resolution authority within the European Commission (EC) banking union. The banking union, which as of January 1, 2023, encompasses the 20 eurozone countries, along with Bulgaria, was established as part of the financial system reforms stemming from the Global Financial Crisis and the ensuing European sovereign debt crisis. The SRB’s stated mission is to ensure orderly resolution of failing banks, protect taxpayers from state bailouts, and promote financial stability. Wojcik became SRB general counsel in November 2020. Previously, he was a member of the …

Lessons Learned: Subba Rao Duvvuri, Salil Gupta

Journal of Financial Crises

Subba Rao Duvvuri served as governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for five years (2008–13). Before that, he was finance secretary to the government of India (2007–08), and secretary to the prime minister’s Economic Advisory Council (2005–07). With a career spanning 35 years in the Indian Administrative Services, Duvvuri has held various positions at the state level in the government of Andhra Pradesh, and at the central government of India. Duvvuri was previously lead economist at the World Bank (1999–2004) and, after 2013, served as a visiting fellow at the National University of Singapore and the University of …

Lessons Learned: Calvin Mitchell Iii, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Calvin Mitchell III served as executive vice president of the communications group within the executive office of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the Global Financial Crisis. In 2008, Mitchell was tapped by Timothy Geithner, who was then FRBNY president, to head a new group charged with expanding the communications and community affairs functions. Mitchell left the FRBNY in 2009 for the private sector and returned to government in 2021 as assistant secretary for public affairs in the US Treasury Department.

International Monetary Fund: Special Drawing Rights Allocations, 2009, Ikbal S. Ahluwalia, Owen Heaphy, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Despite efforts by the world’s major economies to address stresses in the global financial system, by early 2009, the Global Financial Crisis caused developing and lower-income countries to experience shortages of the major reserve currencies. In August 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) distributed a general allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of unprecedented size—totaling USD 250 billion (SDR 161.3 billion)—to all member countries in an effort to address these issues and provide liquidity to the world’s economies. In September 2009, it also distributed a special “catch-up” allocation of USD 33 billion in SDRs (SDR 21.5 billion) to eligible members …

Lessons Learned: Jason Cave, Vincient Arnold, Greg Feldberg

Journal of Financial Crises

Jason Cave was the senior adviser to the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 2008 to 2011 and the deputy director of the Division of Complex Financial Institutions at the FDIC from 2011 to 2013. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Cave held on April 8, 2024. During the interview, Cave discussed the so-called ring-fencing arrangements planned, considered, or executed between various agencies of the US government—the Federal Reserve, Department of the Treasury, and FDIC—and three banks: Wachovia, Citigroup, and Bank of America. These arrangements, sometimes referred to as wraps or risk shields, …

International Monetary Fund: Short-Term Liquidity Line, 2020, Carey K. Mott, Léo Brougher

Journal of Financial Crises

As the COVID-19 pandemic spread in March 2020, global financial conditions tightened considerably. In response, global reserve currency-issuing countries extended bilateral swap lines to select countries. Strong demand for US dollar liquidity among emerging markets led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to introduce the Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL) on April 15, 2020. The SLL functioned as a swap lending facility. Unlike other IMF liquidity tools, the SLL was a revolving credit line that allowed countries to repeatedly draw funds and make repayments, with each repayment restoring access up to the approved limit across SLL arrangements. Its purpose was to enable …

International Monetary Fund: Foreign Exchange Liquidity Through The Special Drawing Rights Allocation, 2021, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

The official response to the COVID-19 pandemic was costly for governments, particularly those in developing economies with significant existing external debt. On August 2, 2021, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced in a press release the allocation of SDR 456 billion (USD 650 billion) in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to “address the long-term global need for reserves, build confidence, and foster the resilience and stability of the global economy.” The COVID-19 allocation was a form of unconditional (or “concessional”) liquidity to IMF member nations, similar to a capital injection or grant. It was the fourth-ever general allocation and the largest …

Lessons Learned: Martín Redrado, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

Martín Redrado was appointed president of the Central Bank of Argentina by President Néstor Kirchner in 2004 and oversaw measures to manage the external shocks of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09. He resigned in 2010 after President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner tried to remove him over a dispute regarding the use of the bank’s reserves to fund the government. After leaving the bank, Redrado authored the book No Reserve: The Limit of Absolute Power, which argues against the danger of mixing politics and economics. He is currently a director of the think tank Fundación Capital and most recently was …

Lessons Learned: Alfred Dellibovi, Maryanne Chute Lynch, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

The Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) interviewed Alfred DelliBovi about his tenure as president and chief executive officer of the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York leading up to and during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC). The Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) played a critical and unexpected lending role for their member banks at the start of the crisis. DelliBovi remained in his position for 21 years, until 2014. Before moving to the FHLB, DelliBovi had served as deputy secretary at the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 1989 to 1992, in …

Policy Note | Discount Window Stigma: What's Design Got To Do With It?, Susan Mclaughlin

Journal of Financial Crises

This article utilizes discount window transaction data, which the Federal Reserve began disclosing in 2010, to assess how the Fed’s 2003 redesign of the discount window has affected banks’ use of the window. The data show that while the discount window remains stigmatized and relatively little used outside periods of funding market stress, secondary credit has at times played a role in supporting bank recovery and resolution, as envisioned by the 2003 redesign. This development raises a policy question: has the two-tiered design of the discount window implemented in 2003, in which a lending facility for sound banks operates alongside …

Policy Note | Weekly Fed Report Still Drives Discount Window Stigma, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

As banking regulators work to destigmatize the Federal Reserve’s discount window—and fervently so since the 2023 banking crisis—they’ve pointed to several potentially fruitful policy routes. These have included supervisory improvements, regulatory changes, and operational enhancements by both the banks and the Fed. Left off the menu so far have been changes to the Fed’s weekly publications that reveal up-to-date discount window borrowing data by regional geography. Reforms following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 have made mandatory the disclosure of discount window borrowers on a two-year lag—higher transparency than previously when no disclosure was required. However, bigger banks, such as …

Russia: Otkritie Bank Restructuring, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In July and August 2017, Otkritie Bank, Russia’s largest privately owned bank, experienced a deposit run related to concerns over Otkritie’s recent acquisitions. The run prompted Otkritie’s shareholders to approach the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) for assistance. On August 29, 2017, the CBR announced a rescue plan for Otkritie. In it, the CBR pledged to become Otkritie’s main investor using a newly created resolution mechanism wherein the CBR would take at least a 75% equity stake using funds from the Fund for Banking Sector Consolidation, a subdivision of the CBR. The CBR simultaneously appointed a provisional administration, composed of …

United States: Citigroup Capital Injection, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

During the first three weeks of November 2008, Citigroup’s stock price dropped almost 80%, and its credit default swap spreads spiked as the market lost confidence in the bank’s ability to honor its commitments. Counterparties pulled away, and regulators determined Citi’s failure would constitute a systemic risk. On November 23, 2008, the Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announced a package of measures to rescue Citi, which included an Asset Guarantee Program (AGP) to cover $306 billion in Citi’s assets and an ad hoc capital injection—the Targeted Investment Program (TIP). Under the guarantee, Citi would absorb the …

United States: Bank Of America Capital Injection, 2009, Benjamin Hoffner, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On September 15, 2008, Bank of America (BofA) announced a merger with the investment bank Merrill Lynch. In December, BofA learned that Merrill Lynch had experienced large, unexpected losses amounting to $15.5 billion during the fourth quarter of 2008. In light of these losses, BofA’s CEO informed the US Treasury secretary and Federal Reserve chairman that BofA intended to invoke the material adverse change clause of the merger agreement, allowing for a renegotiation of, or escape from, the merger. Officials at the Fed and Treasury warned BofA that a failure of the merger would have adverse consequences for BofA and …

Switzerland: Schweizerische Volksbank Capital Injection, 1933, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Schweizerische Volksbank, or Swiss People’s Bank, grew to be the second-largest bank in Switzerland by 1930, when its balance sheet peaked at 1.7 billion Swiss francs (CHF). Beginning in 1929, nonperforming assets weighed on Volksbank’s profitability. By 1933, the bank faced losses on CHF 118.5 million in assets, representing approximately 10% of total assets. The government provided liquidity in the form of loans and deposits to Volksbank in 1931 and again in 1933 until it could finalize a capital injection. In 1933, the government determined that Volksbank was too important to the national economy to allow its failure. As owners …

Switzerland: Ubs Capital Injection, 2008, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

UBS, the eighth-largest bank in the world and the largest bank in Switzerland in 2008, incurred write-downs totaling USD 50 billion during the Global Financial Crisis, mostly on exposures to securities linked to US subprime mortgages. On October 16, 2008, the Swiss Federal Council announced that the government would subscribe to CHF 6 billion (USD 5.3 billion) of mandatory convertible notes (MCNs) issued by UBS to restore confidence in the bank and the financial system. UBS agreed to use the government’s capital to fund the equity for a special purpose vehicle, StabFund, that the central bank created to take over …

Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Capital Injection, 2009, Lakshimi Swaminathan, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

Caja de Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha (CCM) was a small Spanish savings bank with just 1% market share in deposits and loans. Following years of rapid credit expansion in the real estate sector and reliance on wholesale funding markets to carry out its operations between 2000 and 2008, CCM found itself on the brink of insolvency in early 2009, with a Tier 1 capital ratio of just 1.3%, compared with the 8% regulators required. The authorities placed the bank under administration in 2009. Consequently, the Spanish Savings Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos de Ahorros, or FGD) agreed …

Portugal: Banco Espírito Santo Capital Injection, 2014, Salil Gupta, Shavonda Brandon

Journal of Financial Crises

Banco Espírito Santo (BES) was the second-largest private bank in Portugal in 2014, with assets of EUR 80 billion (USD 81 billion). A capital increase of EUR 1.1 billion to the BES was concluded on market terms in June 2014. The Bank of Portugal (BOP) adopted a resolution measure for BES on August 3, 2014, to safeguard financial stability by protecting all depositors and ensuring continuation of operating activities of the bank. The Portuguese Resolution Fund provided equity capital of EUR 4.9 billion to a bridge bank, Novo Banco, with 100% public ownership and the expectation of sale to private …

Russia: Otkritie Bank Capital Injection, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In July and August 2017, Otkritie Bank, Russia’s largest privately owned bank, experienced a deposit run related to concerns over recent acquisitions, including a large, troubled bank and insurance company. The run prompted Otkritie’s shareholders to ask the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) for assistance, which the CBR announced on August 29, 2017. In the announcement and subsequent press interviews, the CBR pledged to become Otkritie’s main investor using a newly created resolution mechanism wherein the CBR would take at least a 75% equity stake using funds from the Fund for Banking Sector Consolidation (FBSC), a subsidiary of the CBR. …

Latvia: Parex Bank Capital Injection, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Heading into the Global Financial Crisis, JSC Parex banka was Latvia’s second-largest bank in terms of assets, comprising 13.8% of total assets in the Latvian banking sector. In autumn 2008, Parex faced a capital shortfall owing to massive credit and market losses in addition to increasing liquidity problems and deposit runs of 240 million Latvian lats (LVL; USD 428.6 million). Parex’s capital adequacy ratio fell below the regulatory minimum of 8% on October 28, 2008. Parex had two senior syndicated loans maturing in February and June 2009, totaling EUR 775 million (USD 992 million). Latvian authorities doubted that Parex would …

Netherlands: Sns Reaal Capital Injection, 2013, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The property finance division of SNS Reaal N.V., a financial conglomerate comprising SNS Bank, the fourth-largest Dutch bank, and Reaal Insurance, the second-largest Dutch life insurer, was heavily exposed to losses in the real estate sector from 2008 to 2010. In January 2013, a growing bank run and the revelation of substantial losses forced the government to intervene. The Minister of Finance rejected proposals from the bank and a private equity firm, and nationalized SNS Reaal on February 1, 2013. Upon nationalizing the firm, the Dutch state injected EUR 2.2 billion into the firm in the form of ordinary shares, …

Korea: Korea First Bank And Seoul Bank Capital Injections, 1997, Jisoo Park, Owen Heaphy

Journal of Financial Crises

Korea First Bank (KFB) and Seoul Bank (SB) were two of the five largest commercial banks in Korea with high levels of exposure to conglomerates, which had high short-term foreign debt in the late 1990s. Starting in the late summer of 1997, Korea, like other Asian economies, experienced capital outflows due to international creditors’ reducing their exposures to Korean financial institutions. Banks relied on the Bank of Korea for foreign exchange liquidity support. The two banks became insolvent owing to high levels of nonperforming loans and required government recapitalization after experiencing a run in early December 1997. As financial conditions …

Japan: Nippon Credit Bank Capital Injection,1997, Owen Heaphy

Journal of Financial Crises

In 1997, Japan experienced a financial crisis caused by the bursting of a bubble in commercial real estate prices. By March, Nippon Credit Bank (NCB), the smallest of Japan’s three long-term credit banks, required government assistance due to its heavy exposure to commercial real estate and large amount of nonperforming loans. On April 1, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) announced the government’s intention to recapitalize NCB as part of a restructuring package. To facilitate the injection, Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) engineered a consortium of large existing shareholders in NCB (mainly insurance companies) and the other two Japanese long-term credit …

Italy: Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Capital Injection, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

The 2017 recapitalization of Italy’s third-largest bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the oldest bank in the world, represents an unusual precautionary, “open bank” recapitalization under the European Union’s Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) rules. In 2015, the bank held the largest portfolio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in Italy (with 34.8% of its total loans), and in 2016 it was the only bank to fail the European Banking Authority’s adverse scenario stress test, although its reported total capital ratio at the end of the year was 10.4%. To address its NPL problem, MPS agreed with the European …

Iceland: Arion Bank, Islandsbanki, And Landsbankinn Capital Injections, 2008, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

Iceland’s three largest banks—Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki—grew rapidly in the 2000s and failed amid depositor runs when they lost access to foreign funding markets at the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). On October 6, 2008, the Icelandic Parliament passed the Emergency Act, and authorities quickly used their new powers to nationalize the three banks. The Ministry of Finance created and capitalized Arion Bank (for Kaupthing), Islandsbanki (for Glitnir), and Landsbankinn (for Landsbanki), to hold the old banks’ performing domestic assets and all insured domestic deposits, and the prime minister assured all domestic depositors that they would be protected. …

India: Yes Bank Capital Injection, 2020, Salil Gupta

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) helped engineer a capital injection and restructuring of Yes Bank, India’s fourth-largest private sector bank, to prevent a run on the bank and to preserve broader financial stability. On March 14, 2020, Yes Bank received a total capital injection of 100 billion Indian rupees (INR; USD 1.34 billion) in total from the State Bank of India and a group of private sector banks (HDFC, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank, Federal Bank, Bandhan Bank, IDFC First Bank). The government-owned SBI received a 48.2% equity stake, committing to contribute up to …

Greece: Piraeus Bank Capital Injection, 2015, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

Greek banks experienced heavy deposit outflows from December 2014 through June 2015, which led Greece to declare a bank holiday from June 28, 2015, until July 18, 2015. Greek banks’ reliance on liquidity assistance from the Eurosystem began in August 2011, with a second peak in 2015; emergency liquidity assistance was fully repaid in 2019. The European Central Bank’s Single Supervisory Mechanism, responsible for banking supervision in Europe, conducted a stress test and asset quality review of the four large Greek banks and identified a capital shortfall of EUR 4.7 billion for Piraeus Bank (the Bank) in October 2015. To …