Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons^™

Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 sparked concerns about the quality and safety of government debt across Latin American countries, including Argentina. In late 1994 and 1995, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) implemented three changes in reserve requirement policy to restore liquidity throughout the financial system and defend the currency peg to the US dollar. First, it lowered the existing minimum reserve requirement, which required banks to hold reserves entirely in cash (pesos or US dollars). This released more than ARS 4 billion (USD 4 billion) in resources into the banking system, according to the …

Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Thai government’s decision to allow the baht to float in July 1997 was the pivotal event of the Asian Financial Crisis. The baht fell 20% by the end of the month, further pressuring Thai financial institutions that had borrowed heavily in US dollars and other foreign currencies. In early August, Thailand’s Finance Minister and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the suspension and restructuring of insolvent finance companies and a blanket guarantee covering depositors and creditors of all domestic banks and the remaining finance companies, administered by the BOT’s Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF). However, the blanket guarantee was …

Mexico: Fobaproa Blanket Guarantee, 1993–1994, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

On December 22, 1994, the Mexican government allowed the peso to float freely against the US dollar, aggravating the run on peso deposits, leading to the rapid devaluation of the peso, and sparking the peso crisis. The following week, the Bank of Mexico announced that the Mexican deposit insurer would fully guarantee all commercial bank deposits and liabilities except subordinated debt. The announcement of the blanket guarantee appeared effective at reassuring foreign investors, as the central bank was soon able to ease the liquidity support that it had been providing to banks during the crisis. The government created a deposit …

Sweden: Bank Support Authority, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Sweden’s financial system suffered its worst shock in the post–World War II period. Swedish banks were heavily dependent on foreign credit, which dried up amid signs of instability. The Swedish government announced a blanket guarantee on September 24, 1992, for all banks’ obligations except share capital and perpetual subordinated loans. According to a 1995 IMF Working Paper by Drees and Pazarbasioglu, the purpose of the blanket guarantee was “to guarantee the stability of the payments system and to safeguard the general supply of credit.” The …

Korea: Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Korea entered the Asian Financial Crisis in August 1997 with highly leveraged firms and a banking system inexperienced in managing systemic risk. Korea faced a currency crisis and a banking crisis, as foreign banks froze credit to Korean commercial banks and merchant banks. On August 25, 1997, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) announced that it would guarantee all Korean financial institutions’ foreign debt—both existing debt and new borrowings. Nonetheless, foreign lenders continued to withdraw credit from Korean financial institutions. On November 19, 1997, a newly appointed MOEF minister announced a suite of measures to promote foreign creditors’ confidence …

Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

The Global Financial Crisis exposed fragilities in the Irish banking system and led to widespread runs on Irish banks. Irish authorities attempted to address the runs on September 22, 2008, by increasing the country’s deposit guarantee limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 28,800 to USD 140,000) and raising the coverage of deposits from 90% to 100%. When the runs continued, the Irish minister for finance announced a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities on September 30 without consulting European Union authorities. The announcement specified the blanket guarantee would be effective immediately and remain in effect for two years. The …

Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

After a period of sustained distress in the early 1990s, Jamaican financial institutions faced significant liquidity issues by 1996, evidenced by runs on banks by depositors. The government responded by creating the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) on January 29, 1997, to rehabilitate weak financial institutions and administer a blanket guarantee on financial sector liabilities. The blanket guarantee covered all deposit-taking financial institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds registered under the Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, and Insurance Act. Within eligible institutions, the blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension funds managed by authorized institutions, …

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government closed 16 banks on November 1, 1997. At the time, the government said it would guarantee depositors up to 20 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR; USD 6,000) per account. The lack of immediate full protection for large depositors caused deposit runs throughout the banking sector and undermined foreign confidence in the Indonesian financial system. In response, the Indonesian president on January 26, 1998, announced a blanket guarantee and created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to administer the guarantee and other bank rehabilitation efforts. The blanket guarantee covered all depositors and nonsubordinated creditors in locally incorporated commercial banks. …

Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

After a series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy in 1997–1998, foreign creditors reassessed their emerging-market risk and reduced external credit lines to Ecuador, thus draining liquidity. The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998 triggered deposit runs at other banks. Banks sought assistance from the Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE). By the end of September 1998, the BCE had issued emergency loans to 11 financial institutions, totaling nearly 30% of the money base. The crisis accelerated in August 1998 when Banco de Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank, was closed; the existing …

Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Finland’s financial system suffered steadily increasing loan losses and falling earnings beginning in 1990. The Finnish Parliament created the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) in April 1992 to support banks with loans, capital, and guarantees. In a press release issued on August 6, 1992, the government said the GGF would “secure the stable functioning of the banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]”. Six months later, the Parliament of Finland specifically required the GGF to guarantee that all Finnish banks could meet their commitments. The government …

Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

As foreign credit in Denmark dried up during the summer of 2008, Danish banks became increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing. The government took over the failing Roskilde Bank, the country’s eighth-largest bank, in late August. On October 5, 2008, the government announced a voluntary General Guarantee Scheme to fully insure deposits and other senior liabilities of participating banks. Banks could participate in the scheme by becoming members of the financial sector’s banking consortium, Det Private Beredskab, or in English, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), before October 13, 2008. The General Guarantee Scheme fully insured all depositors and senior unsecured creditors …

Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require little process, and the change for banks …

Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees …

Nevada Workforce Diversity, Equity, And Inclusion Study 2022, Jan Jones Blackhurst, Becky Harris

International Gaming Institute Faculty Research

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) metrics enable organizations to set concrete goals and self-monitor their performance. In 2021, Nevada’s legislature passed Senate Bill No. 267 (SB267), authorizing the University Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) to study DEI benchmarks in the State. The study is designed to produce actionable results capable of informing policy and employer best practices in Nevada. This study was piloted in 2021, with study participation taking place between January 3-April 30, 2022.

The questions in the study were crafted based on DEI public policy considerations as well as metrics for gauging the scope of offerings available to women …

Lessons Learned: Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Zeti Akhtar Aziz, a Malaysian economist, was governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, her nation’s central bank, from 2000 to 2016; prior to that, she was acting governor and deputy governor. Dr. Zeti was a key leader in Malaysia’s response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997¬-98, as well as the financial sector restructuring that followed. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on a 2022 interview with Dr. Zeti. At the time of the interview, she was co-chair of the board of governors of the Asia School of Business in Kuala Lumpur, which is a partnership between Bank Negara and the …

Lessons Learned: Mark Van Der Weide, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

With more than two decades of continuing service at the Federal Reserve Board, Mark Van Der Weide brings a unique insider perspective on central bank policymaking before, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), including the Fed’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. From 1998 to 2009, Van Der Weide served in the Fed’s legal division. De-tailed to the Treasury Department in 2009, he helped draft the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Back at the Fed in 2010, Van Der Weide served for eight years in the Division of Supervision and Regulation, where …

Lessons Learned: David Wilcox, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

David Wilcox was the deputy director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-¬09. He assisted in developing the Federal Reserve policy response that ultimately stabilized the economy by providing insight into the economic and financial outlook to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) prior to each of its policy-setting meetings. Wilcox became director of the division in 2011 and served in that role through 2018, acting as the division’s chief economist, manager, and the senior adviser to three Fed chairs. After leaving the Fed, he joined …

Lessons Learned: Brooksley Born, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Brooksley Born, a lawyer with decades of experience in derivatives law, served as chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) from 1996 to 1999. At the CFTC, she advocated for federal regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives (OTC) market, but legislation failed to pass. The OTC derivatives market had a central role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09. Born, who returned to private practice after her CFTC term, served as a commissioner on the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which investigated the causes of the crisis and issued its report in January 2011. This “Lessons Learned” is based on …

Lessons Learned: Michael Silva, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Michael Silva was chief of staff to then-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) Timothy Geithner from 2006 to 2009, including the early stages of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As such, Silva was critical in the coordination of personnel and information during the GFC, specifically during the period when the FRBNY was addressing liquidity stresses in the bank sector, including the bailout of Bear Stearns, the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the rescue of American International Group. When Geithner became President Barack Obama’s Treasury Secretary in 2009, Silva became chief of staff to his successor at …

United States: Main Street Lending Program, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic caused slowdowns and disruptions to economic activity, businesses faced disruptions to their revenues and experienced increased demand for credit. Yet, as the pandemic worsened the economic outlook, banks tightened credit. Starting on March 17, the Federal Reserve rolled out several emergency programs aimed at capital markets. Most of these programs tended to benefit relatively large companies. On March 23, the Fed said it would introduce a program targeting small and mid-sized companies. On April 9, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced its first design iteration of the novel Main Street Lending Program (MSLP). The …

Lessons Learned: Scott G. Alvarez, Esq., Part 2, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

Scott G. Alvarez was general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). He met with the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) to discuss a litany of legal aspects related to the Fed’s interventions under its emergency liquidity provision authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. We summarize some highlights from our interview with Mr. Alvarez. The transcript of this interview, conducted in April 2022, and one from an earlier Lessons Learned interview, in December 2018

United States: Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Congress passed and funded the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to help small businesses facing business disruptions keep workers on their payrolls and meet other expenses. The PPP, signed into law on March 27, 2020, provided a mechanism for authorized lenders to extend concessionary, forgivable loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Lenders ultimately extended approximately $800 billion in PPP loans. The SBA distributed the funds when the loan either defaulted or met the law's terms for SBA forgiveness. To buttress lenders' ability to fund PPP loans, the Federal Reserve …

United States: Municipal Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused severe financial stress for state and local municipalities. Municipalities' public health responses led to material increases in expenditures. At the same time, many municipalities faced revenue delays and declines due to extended tax deadlines and disruptions in taxable economic activity. Institutional investors also put heavy selling pressure on municipal bonds. In response to stresses in the municipal financing market, the Federal Reserve invoked its Section 13(3) emergency lending authority and created the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF). The Fed created the facility to backstop municipal entities' access to capital markets to help them manage …

United States: Primary Dealer Credit Facility, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, the uncertain outlook for the United States in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted extremely high demand for cash and near-cash assets. Amid intense selling pressure from investors, securities dealers were unable to fully absorb the high volume of trade orders into their inventory due to balance sheet capacity and funding constraints. As dealer capacity declined and demand for liquidity continued rising, volatility spread to the critical and normally highly liquid market for US Treasury securities, prompting the Federal Reserve to increase open market operations (March 12) and begin historically large purchases of US Treasuries (March …

United States: Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 caused widespread economic uncertainty, prompting government officials to act swiftly to combat potentially severe fallout. On March 23, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced a series of monetary policy measures and established several emergency lending facilities to assist the US economy. Among these, the Fed revived the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), a Global Financial Crisis (GFC)-era facility that used a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to encourage the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS). Its main purpose was to restore the flow of credit to households and businesses. TALF II made $100 …

United States: Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, Carey K. Mott, Mallory Dreyer

Journal of Financial Crises

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, prime and tax-exempt money market funds (MMFs) faced increased demands for redemption. Meeting redemptions required MMFs to sell assets into increasingly illiquid markets. Using the emergency authority outlined in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve established the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), a facility similar in structure and purpose to a program that the Fed implemented in 2008 amidst the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The MMLF extended nonrecourse loans to banks and their affiliates for the purchase from some …

United States: Commercial Paper Funding Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 caused widespread economic uncertainty, prompting government officials to act swiftly to combat potentially severe fallout. On March 17, 2020, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve announced the revival of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), a program that the government had utilized during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to provide a liquidity backstop to domestic issuers of commercial paper (CP). As with the first iteration of the program, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) funded a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to purchase highly rated, US dollar-denominated CP, …

United States: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility And Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

The COVID-19 pandemic reached a critical stage in early 2020 causing severe distress and disruption in financial markets, and the United States government declared a federal state of emergency in the second week of March. As institutional investors including mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies withdrew from corporate bond markets and funding options for large US businesses dried up, the Federal Reserve became concerned that solvent businesses might have difficulty financing their operations. On March 23, the Federal Reserve Board invoked Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, creating two novel emergency lending facilities to support the corporate bond …

United Kingdom: Covid Corporate Financing Facility, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

During the COVID-19 crisis, sterling-denominated money markets froze, and otherwise-healthy companies were shut out of short-term, wholesale funding markets. To unfreeze these markets, the UK government announced a series of corporate funding measures. One of the measures was the Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF), which enabled the Bank of England (BoE), acting on behalf of Her Majesty's Treasury's, to purchase commercial paper (CP) on primary and secondary markets from eligible dealers. The purpose of the CCFF was to provide stopgap wholesale funding to large, financially healthy firms while preserving British banks' capacity to serve small and medium-sized companies. Under the …

Thailand: Bond Stabilization Fund, Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

Early in the COVID-19 crisis, non-financial businesses grew concerned that they would be unable to roll over their maturing bonds. To calm corporate debt markets, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the Bond Stabilization Fund (BSF) on March 22, 2020. The BSF planned to purchase newly issued commercial paper from viable companies that could not roll over their maturing bonds. However, the program was not used. The BOT, seeking to avoid public criticism for directly supporting large corporations, imposed restrictions that made the program less attractive to borrowers. The main deterrent to participation was the requirement that borrowers must have …