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Articles 151 - 180 of 214
Full-Text Articles in Cognition and Perception
Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish, Michael L. Woodruff
Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal consciousness. This is generally done on the grounds that the fish pallium lacks a sufficiently expansive gross parcellation, as well as even minimally sufficient neuronal organization, intrinsic connectivity, and reciprocal extrinsic connections with the thalamus to support the subjective experience of qualia. It is also argued that fish do not exhibit the level of behavioral flexibility indicative of consciousness. A review of neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioral studies is presented which leads to the conclusion that fish do have neurobiological correlates and behavioral flexibility of sufficient …
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are sentient. Moreover, their neuroanatomy, although different from mammalian, is sufficiently complex to support sentience. I answer some potential objections to Woodruff’s argument, and try to trace its moral significance. In so doing, I briefly address Birch’s (2017) target article as well.
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Animal Sentience
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, because mechanisms for consciousness are controversial even in humans. To the extent that there are consensuses in that literature, they do not support Woodruff's claims.
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Animal Sentience
Assuming an animal to be sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an extreme position, hence it should not and could not be the default assumption. Birch explains how the precautionary principle may be used to substantiate decisions to give the animal the benefit of doubt. Although I am reluctant to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument for the use of the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more research is needed to refine and understand this relationship.
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principal is often invoked when talking about the evidence of sentience in animals, largely because we can never be certain what any animal is thinking or feeling. Birch (2017) offers a preliminary framework for the use of the precautionary principal for animal sentience combining an epistemic rule with a decision rule. I extend this framework by adding an evolutionary phylogentic approach which spreads the burden of proof across broad taxonomic groups and a risk assessment component which magnifies the likely impact by the number of animals involved.
The “Precautionary Principle” – A Work In Progress, Shelley Adamo
The “Precautionary Principle” – A Work In Progress, Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
The target article by Birch illustrates the practical difficulties with the “Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle” (ASPP) while presenting potential solutions. However, the ASPP will be difficult to use without guidelines detailing how evidence of sentience should be assessed. Moreover, extrapolating conclusions found for a single species to all species within an Order is problematic. Finally, I recommend that Birch demonstrate his ASPP framework using a controversial test case to help show how it could be used in real-world situations.
Shoring Up The Precautionary Bar, Jon Mallatt
Shoring Up The Precautionary Bar, Jon Mallatt
Animal Sentience
I offer four ways to reinforce Birch’s precautionary principle so it can be used effectively and practically in deciding which animals to cover by legislation for humane treatment: (1) add one more credible indicator of sentience to the BAR rule; (2) use phylogenetic classification, not the outdated Linnaean classification, to test which animal clades have sentience; (3) disentangle the pain of suffering from sentience; and (4) reconsider the sentient status of decapods and insects to remove potential inconsistencies in the proposed framework.
Anecdotes Can Be Evidence Too, Heather Browning
Anecdotes Can Be Evidence Too, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Birch’s criterion for the precautionary principle imposes a high evidential standard that many cases will fail to meet. Reliable, relevant anecdotal evidence suggestive of animal sentience should also to fall within the scope of the precautionary principle. This would minimize potential suffering (as happened in the case cephalopods) while further evidence is gathered.
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Animal Sentience
Birch’s formulation is persuasive but not nuanced enough to capture at least one situation where it is reasonable to invoke the precautionary principle (PP): when we have multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically significant evidence of a single credible indicator of sentience within the order as required by BAR. I respond to the worry that if we include such cases in our framework for applying the PP, we open ourselves to the charge of being “unscientific.”
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principle regarding animal sentience is often used in decision-making about human actions that may cause harm to nonhuman animals. Birch (2017) develops an account of the precautionary principle requiring two pragmatic rules for its implementation. I support Birch's proposal but offer a cautionary note about relying on precautionary principles if one's ultimate goal is to emancipate animals from human domination.
Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater
Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater
Animal Sentience
Birch uses existing practice to develop a formal Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP), which he hopes will become more widely adopted and improve animal welfare outcomes. Birch considers the assumption that all animals are sentient to be extreme. Despite its merits, Birch’s ASPP remains human-centred.
Animal Pain And The Social Role Of Science, Leslie Irvine
Animal Pain And The Social Role Of Science, Leslie Irvine
Animal Sentience
Assuming that all animals are sentient would mean ending their use in most scientific research. This does not necessarily imply an unscientific or anti-scientific stance. Examining the social role of science reveals its considerable investment in preserving the status quo, including the continued use of animal subjects. From this perspective, the use of animal subjects is a custom that science could move beyond, rather than a methodological requirement that it must defend.
A Preliminary Investigation Into The Welfare Of Lobsters In The Uk, Gemma Carder
A Preliminary Investigation Into The Welfare Of Lobsters In The Uk, Gemma Carder
Animal Sentience
The welfare of invertebrates is overlooked and their needs are not understood. It is assumed that they do not experience pain and suffering. Studies on decapod crustaceans challenge this assumption. Research has focused on distinguishing between nociception (the ability to detect a harmful stimulus and to react to it reflexively) and pain (an aversive feeling or emotional experience). Findings indicate that decapod crustaceans can experience pain, which supports a case for protecting their welfare. I have investigated the current husbandry conditions of a globally consumed decapod crustacean, the lobster, as housed in tanks inside food outlets in the UK. Housing …
The Study Of Emotion In Animals, Thomas R. Zentall
The Study Of Emotion In Animals, Thomas R. Zentall
Animal Sentience
The responsiveness of dogs to humans encourages us to attribute human-like emotions to them. Indirect evidence for emotions in other animals can be obtained but one must be careful to find means of distinguishing what we believe to be evidence for such emotions from simpler mechanisms. For example, is a dog’s growl an indication of anger, fear, or possibly an unemotional defense of territory? By carefully designing experiments, we may be able to rule out alternative accounts and show better evidence for underlying emotions.
The Potential For Sentience In Fishes, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
The Potential For Sentience In Fishes, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Animal Sentience
Balcombe’s book is filled with information on the biology, behavior, and life history of fishes. I do not agree with all his premises. I am still somewhat perplexed about the discussion of whether fish feel pain; I am not sure whether the distinction between nociception and pain makes any difference. Overall, however, his treatment of the principles of both natural and sexual selection is comprehensive and accurate, and has greatly increased my knowledge and awareness of the biology, ethology, and potential for sentience in fishes. In summary, this work has exposed me to new ideas about how to examine fishes …
Review Of Bird Brain: An Exploration Of Avian Intelligence By Nathan Emery, Alan B. Bond
Review Of Bird Brain: An Exploration Of Avian Intelligence By Nathan Emery, Alan B. Bond
Avian Cognition Papers
Over the past 30 years, the study of bird behavior has been completely transformed by the ongoing revolution in cognitive psychology, opening up wholly new perspectives on the mental processes underlying such areas as foraging decisions, social intelligence, problem solving, memory encoding, and communication. Although these studies have contributed to a number of recent popular books, until now there has been no attempt to integrate avian cognition and recent findings in avian neuroanatomy and endocrinology into a single account that is attractive and accessible to a general readership. It is a steep challenge, but Nathan Emery has undertaken it in …
Experiment Versus Analogy In The Search For Animal Sentience, Geoffrey Hall
Experiment Versus Analogy In The Search For Animal Sentience, Geoffrey Hall
Animal Sentience
Deciding between rival accounts of an instance of an animal’s behavior can frequently be achieved by experimental tests of different predictions made by the alternatives. When, however, one (or both) of the alternatives is expressed in terms of the mental state of the animal, an experimental test to distinguish them can be hard to find. Although it is unsatisfactory in many ways, it may be necessary to fall back on argument from analogy with human behavior and experience.
Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith
Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith
Animal Sentience
Zentall suggests that the same mechanism underlies cognitive dissonance in humans and the within-trial contrast effect in pigeons (and humans). The contrast effect has face validity in explaining cognitive dissonance, but more research is needed to establish construct validity. To determine whether both phenomena share the same mechanism, future research should test (1) whether both share physiological processes, (2) whether individuals who show sensitivity to one are also sensitive to the other, and (3) whether both phenomena are affected by the same changes in an independent variable.
Collective Memory And History: An Examination Of Perceptions Of Accuracy And Preference For Biased “History” Passages, Stephanie Doi
Collective Memory And History: An Examination Of Perceptions Of Accuracy And Preference For Biased “History” Passages, Stephanie Doi
CMC Senior Theses
Collective memory is a socially shared representation of the past. History, contrastingly, strives to be an unbiased, objective, and critical account of the past. Many researchers have argued that the so-called “history” found in school textbooks and curriculums align more with collective memory; however, many individuals do not know of the pervasiveness of collective memory in supposed “history” texts. To examine perceptions of accuracy and preference of American “history” textbook passages, individuals from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (n= 404) participated in an online study where they were randomly assigned to read one passage that was either negatively biased, neutral, or positively …
Examining The Effects Of Enclosure Size At Training And At Test In Spatial Reorientation, Zebulon K. Bell
Examining The Effects Of Enclosure Size At Training And At Test In Spatial Reorientation, Zebulon K. Bell
College of Graduate Studies: Theses & Dissertations
Previous research has begun to shed light on the differentiated influence of enclosure size on cue use during reorientation (Sturz, Forloines, & Bodily, 2012). Namely, the question remains of why both feature (i.e., objects or landmarks in the enclosure) and geometric (i.e., shape of the enclosure) cues are differentially affected by enclosure size, and the extent to which local (i.e., wall lengths and corner angles) and global (i.e., principal axis of space) geometric cues are affected by enclosure size. Further, it remains unclear whether training size, testing size, or the relationship between training and testing size influences the use of …
Recovery From Design, Cassandra J. Ellison
Recovery From Design, Cassandra J. Ellison
Theses and Dissertations
Through research, inquiry, and an evaluation of Recovery By Design, a ‘design therapy’ program that serves people with mental illness, substance use disorders, and developmental disabilities, it is my assertion that the practice of design has therapeutic potential and can aid in the process of recovery. To the novice, the practices of conception, shaping form, and praxis have empowering benefit especially when guided by Conditional and Transformation Design methods together with an emphasis on materiality and vernacular form.
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms. Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“a-conscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to cognitive …
Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Animal Sentience
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, interpretation of Grosenick et al.'s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered.
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Animal Sentience
I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish.
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Animal Sentience
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between …
Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela
Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson
Animal Sentience
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for considering the fish as a sentient being. This becomes more important for animal ethical discussion as the fish becomes a more important and legitimate animal model for investigating animal states and traits associated with higher levels of behavior such as learning and memory.
The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas
The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mammals and fish to understand where sentience and social cognition might reside in teleosts. He compares neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioural correlates. I discuss current advances in the study of fish cognitive abilities and emotions, and advocate an evolutionary approach to the underlying basis of sentience in teleosts.
Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing, José E. Burgos
Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing, José E. Burgos
Animal Sentience
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is worth pursuing. The case is philosophically uncontroversial under functionalism and reductive materialism. It is also highly heuristic, as it raises interesting issues for further investigation, such as the neural causation of behavior, the role of Mauthner cells in conditioned avoidance, and whether operant conditioning is constitutive of fish sentience.