Legal Theory Commons^™

The Duty To Obey The Law, David Lefkowitz

Philosophy Faculty Publications

Under what conditions, if any, do those the law addresses have a moral duty or obligation to obey it simply because it is the law? In this essay, I identify five general approaches to carrying out this task, and offer a somewhat detailed discussion of one or two examples of each approach. The approaches studied are: relational-role approaches that appeal to the fact that an agent occupies the role of member in the political community; attempts to ground the duty to obey the law in individual consent or fair play; natural duty approaches; instrumental approaches; and philosophical anarchism, an approach …

Navigating Through The Fog: Teaching Legal Research And Writing Students To Master Indeterminancy Through Structure And Process, Spencer L. Simons

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

Centering Men's Experience: Norah Vincent's Self-Made Man Complicates Feminist Legal Theorists' Views Of Gender, Kathy A. Thomack

Buffalo Women's Law Journal

No abstract provided.

On Moral Arguments Against A Legal Right To Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, David Lefkowitz

Philosophy Faculty Publications

As the international response to recent events in Darfur demonstrates, the restriction of authority to intervene to the United Nations poses the greater legal barrier to intervention. From a practical perspective, then, the more pressing question may be whether international law ought to be modified to permit states, or multi-state organizations, to carry out unilateral humanitarian interventions; that is, interventions that are not authorized by the United Nations. The issue here is essentially a moral one: would the incorporation of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention entail a moral improvement to international law – for example, a decrease in the …

Against Nomopolies, David Sandomierski

Law Publications

Legal pluralism stands in counterpoint to conceptions of l~ that sharply distinguish the legal from the non-legal. This essay considers a neglected feature of classical legal theory - prescriptivism - that sustains this binary ambition. Prescriptivists assert that legal artefacts such as norms are distinct from the human world upon which they operate. Each of centralism, monism, positivism and prescriptivism subsu'!1es diverse associational nomoi · into the nomos of a given community, often the State, thereby creating a nomopoly. To the prescriptivist, human beings are subjects under an external sphere of law. The anti-prescriptivist perspective invites legal subjects to imagine …

Liberalism And Republicanism: In Federal Indian Law, Bethany Berger

Faculty Articles and Papers

This essay shows the ways that, despite apparent contradictions, tribal claims fit within the liberal and republican strands of American democratic theory. Critics of tribal sovereignty and, I believe, the modern Supreme Court, are influenced by the seeming conflict between tribal interests and a liberal philosophical framework. I argue that properly understood, most tribal claims do fit within classical liberal theory, with its emphasis on equality and freedom. It is true that some tribal claims are distinctly those of groups or peoples, and so cannot be adequately captured by an individualist liberal framework. Drawing on the later work of John …

Principles Of Fairness For International Economic Treaties: Constructivism And Contractualism, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

No legal system deserving of continued support can exist without an adequate theory of justice. A world trade constitution cannot credibly exist without a clear notion of justice upon which to base a consensus. This paper examines two accounts of fairness found in moral philosophy, those of John Rawls and Tim Scanlon. The Rawlsian theory of justice is well-known to legal scholars. Scanlon's contractualist account may be less well-known. The aim of the paper is to start the discussion as to how fairness theories can be used to develop the tools for examining international economic policies and institutions. After elaborating …

Public Legal Reason, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay develops an ideal of public legal reason--a normative theory of legal reasons that is appropriate for a society characterized by religious and moral pluralism. One of the implications of this theory is that normative theorizing about public and private law should eschew reliance on the deep premises of deontology or consequentialism and should instead rely on what the author calls public values--values that can be affirmed without relying on the deep and controversial premises of particular comprehensive moral doctrines.

The ideal of public legal reason is then applied to a particular question--whether welfarism (a particular form of normative …

Pluralism And Public Legal Reason, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What role does and should religion play in the legal sphere of a modern liberal democracy? Does religion threaten to create divisions that would undermine the stability of the constitutional order? Or is religious disagreement itself a force that works to create consensus on some of the core commitments of constitutionalism--liberty of conscience, toleration, limited government, and the rule of law? This essay explores these questions from the perspectives of contemporary political philosophy and constitutional theory. The thesis of the essay is that pluralism--the diversity of religious and secular conceptions of the good--can and should work as a force for …

Constitutional Texting, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

"Constitutional Texting" introduces an account of constitutional meaning that draws on Paul Grice's distinction between "speaker's meaning" and "sentence meaning." The constitutional equivalent of speaker's meaning is "framer's meaning," the meaning that the author of the constitutional text intended to convey in light of the author's beliefs about the reader's beliefs about the author's intentions. The constitutional equivalent of sentence meaning is "clause meaning," the meaning that an ordinary reader would attribute to the text at the time of utterance without any beliefs about particular intentions on the part of the author. Clause meaning is possible because the words and …

Natural Justice, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Justice is a natural virtue. Well-functioning humans are just, as are well-ordered human societies. Roughly, this means that in a well-ordered society, just humans internalize the laws and social norms (the nomoi)--they internalize lawfulness as a disposition that guides the way they relate to other humans. In societies that are mostly well-ordered, with isolated zones of substantial dysfunction, the nomoi are limited to those norms that are not clearly inconsistent with the function of law--to create the conditions for human flourishing. In a radically dysfunctional society, humans are thrown back on their own resources--doing the best they can in …