Legal Theory Commons^™

District Of Columbia V. Heller And Originalism, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

On June 26, 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed down its 5-4 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, striking a District of Columbia statute that prohibits the possession of useable handguns in the home on the ground that it violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Justice Scalia's majority opinion drew dissents from Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer. Collectively, the opinions in Heller represent the most important and extensive debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation among the members of the contemporary Supreme Court.

This article investigates the relationship between originalist constitutional …

Incorporation And Originalist Theory, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution incorporate the Bill of Rights contained in the first eight amendments? And how should an originalist answer that question? This paper focuses on the latter question--the issues of originalist theory that are raised by judicial and scholarly debates over what is called "incorporation."

The inquiry proceeds in six parts. Part I answers the questions: "What is incorporation?" and "What is originalism?" Part II examines the theoretical framework for an investigation of incorporation that operates within the narrow confines of interpretation of the linguistic meaning text based on the assumption that the …

Originalism And The Natural Born Citizen Clause, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The enigmatic phrase "natural born citizen" poses a series of problems for contemporary originalism. New originalists, like Justice Scalia, focus on the public meaning of the constitutional text, but the notion of a "natural born citizen" was likely a term of art, derived from the idea of a "natural born subject" in English law--a category that most likely did not extend to persons, like John McCain, who were born outside sovereign territory. But the constitution speaks of "citizens" and not "subjects," introducing uncertainties and ambiguities that might (or might not) make McCain eligible for the presidency.

What was the original …

Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Part I of Judicial Selection: Ideology versus Character sets the stage for an argument that character and not political ideology should be the primary factor in the selection of judges. Political ideology has played an important role in judicial selection, from John Adams's entrenchment of federalists as judges after the election of 1800 to the Roosevelt's selection of progressives, liberals, and New Dealers, the contemporary era, from the failed nominations of Fortas, Haynsworth, Carswell to the defeat of Robert Bork, the narrow confirmation of Clarence Thomas. But until recently, political ideology has played its role behind the scenes--mostly off the …

But Pierre, If We Can't Think Normatively, What Are We To Do?, John Henry Schlegel

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

The Virtues Of Redundancy In Legal Thought, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Redundancy has a bad reputation among legal intellectuals. When someone says, for example, that the ninth and tenth amendments are redundant, we can be pretty sure that this person attaches little importance to these constitutional provisions. Listen to one of the definitions of redundant provided by the Oxford English Dictionary: "superabundant, superfluous, excessive."' In this essay, the author proposes that legal theorists pay serious attention to the concept of redundancy used by engineers. He explains how redundancy--in this special sense--is essential to any intellectual enterprise in which we try to reach action-guiding conclusions, including the enterprise of law. The author …

Of Chickens And Eggs−−The Compatibility Of Moral Rights And Consequentialist Analyses, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Philosophers are accustomed to thinking of moral rights and consequentialist analyses as fundamentally incompatible. They frequently debate cases--both hypothetical and real--in which rights and consequences are in conflict. For example, suppose an innocent child knows the whereabouts of a terrorist who has planted a nuclear bomb in a city. Would it be permissible to violate the child's moral right to be free from torture, if this was the only way to save millions of innocent lives? If this is permissible, then do not moral rights yield to concerns about consequences? Or suppose that a community incorrectly believes that an innocent …

Law As Rule And Principle By Theodore M. Benditt, D. M. Patterson

Buffalo Law Review

No abstract provided.