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Articles 31 - 38 of 38
Full-Text Articles in Political Economy
On The Segmentation Of Markets, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
On The Segmentation Of Markets, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.
The Coevolution Of Economic And Political Development, Fali Huang
The Coevolution Of Economic And Political Development, Fali Huang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different production factors, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, …
A Spatial Analysis Of The Xiii Italian Legislature, Massimiliano Landi, Riccardo Pelizzo
A Spatial Analysis Of The Xiii Italian Legislature, Massimiliano Landi, Riccardo Pelizzo
Research Collection School Of Economics
We present a spatial map of the Italian House of Deputies during the XIII Legislature obtained by applying the Poole and Rosenthal methodology to roll call data. We estimate coordinates for almost all the 650 Deputies that were on the House’s floor at the time, and we aggregate them according to parties. We find that voting patters generate basically a two dimensional political space. The first dimension represents loyalty to either the ruling coalition or the opposing one. The second dimension is represented by the European Union. These findings are consistent with the exceptional case of the party Northern League, …
Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An Empirical Investigation Of Aumann's Hypothesis, Vincent Chua, Dan S. Felsenthal
Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An Empirical Investigation Of Aumann's Hypothesis, Vincent Chua, Dan S. Felsenthal
Research Collection School Of Economics
In one of the earliest attempts to examine the effect of a priori voting power on actual political phenomena, Riker (1959) looked at changes in party affiliation in the French National Assembly in 1953–54, and used these data to test the hypothesis that deputies who switched parties were seeking thereby to increase their a priori voting power. His findings were negative, or at best inconclusive.
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or foreseeable retaliation, …
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or foreseeable retaliation, …
Social Trust And Economic Governance, Fali Huang
Social Trust And Economic Governance, Fali Huang
Research Collection School Of Economics
The paper investigates the dynamic relationship between social trust and economic governance using a principal-agent model with stochastic returns. To mitigate the inherent moral hazard problem both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are useful. The cooperative tendency of an agent measures his intrinsic discipline against shirking, the distribution of which characterizes social trust in society. The economic governance methods include direct monitoring and efficiency wage. The main results are the following. An agent with a higher cooperative tendency needs less monitoring and a lower wage to make effort, which brings higher profit for the principal. But competition among principals for more …
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao-Li Chang
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao-Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes in the wake of a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant’s strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant’s compliance or compensation in response to the proposed …