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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Political Economy
Forgoing Nuclear: Nuclear Power Plant Closures And Carbon Emissions In The United States, Luke Petach
Forgoing Nuclear: Nuclear Power Plant Closures And Carbon Emissions In The United States, Luke Petach
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the effect of nuclear power plant decommissioning on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the United States. Using data on nuclear reactor closures in the United States between 1993 and 2022 and data on state-level carbon emissions and electricity generation from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), this paper adopts a difference-in- differences (DiD) approach to estimate the effect of nuclear decommissioning. Two-way fixed-effects (TWFE) DiD estimates suggest a nuclear plant closure increases annual state-level per capita carbon emissions between 6% and 8%. The increase in state-level carbon emissions is driven by a substitution toward fossil fuel electricity—particularly …
The Will To Chaos And Disorder: The Behemoth As A Model Of Political Economy, Bernard E. Harcourt
The Will To Chaos And Disorder: The Behemoth As A Model Of Political Economy, Bernard E. Harcourt
Faculty Scholarship
The history of political economy is tormented by beasts. The most famous is the Leviathan, the giant serpentine monster that figures in Hobbes’s masterpiece of modern political theory. Robert Fredona and Sophus Reinert spotlight another sea monster, the Kraken, that giant octopus or squid with a particular morphology (i.e., its tentacles) that so fittingly describes the grip of multinational corporations, stateless financial capital, social media, and tech giants today. But there are still other monsters in the bestiary of political economy. In this essay, I highlight the Behemoth, a land monster that captures another critical dimension of political economy: the …
Budgets And The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying In The U.S. States, John M. De Figueiredo
Budgets And The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying In The U.S. States, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines state level lobbying data to determine how budgeting affects the timing, intensity and composition of lobbying expenditures. Using a database of all available lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during the budgeting process, and the budgeting process is unlike other issues lobbyists face. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups, and these business groups account for most of the changes on the margin in lobbying activity. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby more intensely during legislative budgeting, consistent …
Perpetual Affordability Covenants: Can These Land Use Tools Solve The Affordable Housing Crisis?, Elizabeth Elia
Perpetual Affordability Covenants: Can These Land Use Tools Solve The Affordable Housing Crisis?, Elizabeth Elia
Faculty Scholarship
Approximately 3.8 million privately-owned residential housing units in America today contain affordability covenants recorded in their chains of title. State and local agencies and the District of Columbia use these covenants to ensure that publicly-subsidized properties are actually used to provide affordable housing. With rents at all-time highs and stagnant wages, the affordable housing crisis has reached a fever pitch. House Democrats are proposing billions more in housing subsidy. To the extent those funds subsidize privately-owned housing development they, too, will be secured by affordability covenants. In response to this crisis, a new trend in high cost markets is to …
Early Childhood Development And The Replication Of Poverty, Clare Huntington
Early Childhood Development And The Replication Of Poverty, Clare Huntington
Faculty Scholarship
Antipoverty efforts must begin early because abundant evidence demonstrates that experiences during the first five years of life lay a foundation for future learning and the acquisition of skills. Public investments can help foster early childhood development, but these efforts must begin early and must involve both parents and children. This chapter describes the patterns of convergence and divergence in state approaches to supporting early childhood development. For the prenatal period until age three, the federal government is the primary source of funds, and there is fairly limited variation in how this money is spent across the states. For the …
Moneys' Legal Hierarchy, Katharina Pistor
Moneys' Legal Hierarchy, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter discusses the way in which money is legally constructed and hierarchically structured. In financial markets, participants trade different forms of money, some of which is state-issued and some privately issued. A form of money is closer to the “apex” of the system the closer it is to entities that can issue liquid means or determine acceptable forms of payment, such as central banks and governments. During financial crises, market participants close to the “apex” are systematically advantaged. Various legal devices, e.g. property rights, collateral rights, or trust law, contribute to hierarchically structuring the financial system, by granting preferential …
Behavioral Public Choice And The Law, Gary M. Lucas Jr., Slaviša Tasić
Behavioral Public Choice And The Law, Gary M. Lucas Jr., Slaviša Tasić
Faculty Scholarship
Behavioral public choice is the study of irrationality among political actors. In this context, irrationality means systematic bias, a deviation from rational expectations, or other departure from economists’ conception of rationality. Behavioral public choice scholars extend the insights of behavioral economics to the political realm and show that irrational behavior is an important source of government failure. This Article makes an original contribution to the legal literature by systematically reviewing the findings of behavioral public choice and explaining their implications for the law and legal institutions. We discuss the various biases and heuristics that lead political actors to support and …
Advancing The Empirical Research On Lobbying, John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher Richter
Advancing The Empirical Research On Lobbying, John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher Richter
Faculty Scholarship
This essay identifies the empirical facts about lobbying which are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges—with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The essay then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in lobbying. It closes by discussing a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance the empirical research in lobbying.
Sovereign Wealth Funds And Global Finance, Katharina Pistor
Sovereign Wealth Funds And Global Finance, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter focuses on a number of specific sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) whose portfolios indicate strong interests in finance both in their home countries and abroad. It first reviews empirical evidence that shows SWFs having been major investors in Western financial intermediaries for decades. It then considers the organization and governance of SWFs, with particular emphasis on the three main schools of thought as well as the predictions one can derive from them vis-à-vis the behavior of individual actors in the global financial network: economic theories, economic sociology, and political economy. It also presents case studies that “test” these theories …
How Much Does Money Matter In A Direct Democracy?, John M. De Figueiredo
How Much Does Money Matter In A Direct Democracy?, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis Of Structural Policy Windows In The States, John M. De Figueiredo
The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis Of Structural Policy Windows In The States, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring “structural policy windows” and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular--the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby …
Lobbying And Information In Politics, John M. De Figueiredo
Lobbying And Information In Politics, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem In The Multi-Commodity Case, Jagdish N. Bhagwati
The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem In The Multi-Commodity Case, Jagdish N. Bhagwati
Faculty Scholarship
Ronald Jones, in his seminal paper (1957) on Heckscher-Ohlin theory, has argued that, for the case of two countries, two factors, and several commodities, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem would remain valid in the following weak sense: "Ordering the commodities with respect to the capital-labor ratios employed in production is to rank them in order of comparative advantage. Demand conditions merely determine the dividing line between exports and imports; it is not possible to break the chain of comparative advantage by exporting, say, the third and fifth commodities and importing the fourth when they are ranked by factor intensity" (p. 85).
It …
Domestic Distortions, Tariffs, And The Theory Of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, V.K. Ramaswami, T.N. Srinivasan
Domestic Distortions, Tariffs, And The Theory Of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, V.K. Ramaswami, T.N. Srinivasan
Faculty Scholarship
Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) showed that if there is a distortion, the Paretian first-best policy is to intervene with a tax (subsidy) at the point at which the distortion occurs. Hence a domestic tax-cum-subsidy with respect to production would be first-best optimal when there was a domestic distortion (defined as the divergence between domestic prices and the marginal rate of transformation in domestic production) just as a tariff policy would be first-best optimal under monopoly power in trade (which involves a foreign distortion). An important corollary, for the case of a distortionary wage differential, is that while a tax-cum-subsidy policy …