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Full-Text Articles in Other Economics
Cognitive Abilities And Individual Earnings In Hybrid Continuous Double Auctions, Yan Peng, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, S. Sarah Zhang
Cognitive Abilities And Individual Earnings In Hybrid Continuous Double Auctions, Yan Peng, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, S. Sarah Zhang
ESI Working Papers
There is growing evidence that human cognitive abilities strongly influence individual trader financial performance. Much of this evidence has been established in experimental asset markets whose participants are exclusively human traders. However, algorithmic trading has reshaped financial markets, raising the issue of whether these assessments on the impact of cognititive abilities still hold in these settings, particularly in markets with low latency algorithmic traders. Extending previous findings in experimental asset markets, we examine how individual cognitive abilities—reaction time, trader intuition (Theory of Mind), and cognitive reflection—affect human earnings in induced demand and supply markets with and without algorithmic traders of …
Possible Role Of The One-Half Heuristic In Overconfidence Research, Vojtěch Zíka
Possible Role Of The One-Half Heuristic In Overconfidence Research, Vojtěch Zíka
ESI Working Papers
Overconfidence research often involves estimating performance within a fixed range. Recent studies suggest that overprecision is affected by central tendency bias, the tendency to estimate near the center of a perceived distribution. This paper examines whether a similar pattern influences the other two overconfidence types, overestimation and overplacement. In a laboratory experiment (N = 120), participants estimated their own and the average performance over five rounds of ten Rock–Paper–Scissors games. Each round earned for up to 40 points, but average performance varied across three treatments, with means of 16.6, 20, and 23.3 points. The main question was whether this manipulation …
Asymmetric Shocks In Contests: Theory And Experiment, Jian Song, Daniel Houser
Asymmetric Shocks In Contests: Theory And Experiment, Jian Song, Daniel Houser
ESI Publications
Under optimal tournament design, equilibrium effort is invariant to the shape of the mean-zero additive stochastic component, often referred to as a “shock” or “noise”. We report data from laboratory experiments providing the first test of this prediction. Consistent with theory, we find that average effort does not significantly differ between a negatively skewed and uniform shock distribution. In addition, we test a second theoretical prediction that, in winner tournaments, when the shock distribution is asymmetric as in our design, one should exert minimum effort whenever one's competitors are exerting above equilibrium effort. With a symmetric shock distribution as in …
Discrete Rule Learning In First Price Auctions, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei
Discrete Rule Learning In First Price Auctions, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei
ESI Working Papers
We present a hidden Markov model of discrete strategic heterogeneity and learning in first price independent private values auctions. The model includes three latent bidding rules: constant absolute mark-up, constant percentage mark-up, and strategic best response. Rule switching probabilities depend upon a bidder's past auction outcomes and a myopic reinforcement learning dynamic. We apply this model to a new experiment that varies the number of bidders and the auction frame between forward and reverse. We find the proportion of bidders following constant absolute mark-up increases with experience, and is higher when the number of bidders is large. The primary driver …
Speed Traps: Algorithmic Trader Performance Under Alternative Market Structures, Yan Peng, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, S. Sarah Zhang
Speed Traps: Algorithmic Trader Performance Under Alternative Market Structures, Yan Peng, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, S. Sarah Zhang
ESI Working Papers
Using laboratory experiments, we illustrate that trading algorithms that prioritize low latency pose certain pitfalls in a variety of market structures and configurations. In hybrid double auctions markets with human traders and trading agents, we find superior performance of trading agents to human traders in balanced markets with the same number of human and Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP) buyers and sellers only, thus providing a partial replication of Das et al. (2001). However, in unbalanced markets and extreme market structures, such as monopolies and duopolies, fast ZIP agents fall into a speed trap and both human participants and slow ZIP …
One Step At A Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?, Maoliang Ye, Jie Zheng, Plamen Nikolov, Sam Asher
One Step At A Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?, Maoliang Ye, Jie Zheng, Plamen Nikolov, Sam Asher
Economics Faculty Scholarship
This study investigates a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With theoretical guidance using a belief-based learning model, we conduct a multi-period, binary-choice, and weakest-link laboratory coordination experiment to study the effect of gradualism – increasing the required levels (stakes) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately – on group coordination performance. We randomly assign subjects to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake while gradually increasing the stakes over time …
The Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman Sheremeta
The Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win …
Comparing A Risky Choice In The Field And Across Lab Procedures, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova
Comparing A Risky Choice In The Field And Across Lab Procedures, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova
ESI Publications
Controlled laboratory experiments have become a generally accepted method for studying economic behavior, but there are two issues regarding the reliability of such work. The first pertains to the ability to generalize experimental results outside the laboratory. The second pertains to the impact the payment procedure has on observed behavior. This paper adds empirical insight into both issues. Using data from the promotional campaign of a bank and a laboratory experiment that closely mimics the same decision, we find similar levels of risk taking controlling for gender and age. We also compare behavior on this same risky choice across three …
A Study Of The Triggers Of Conflict And Emotional Reactions, Michael Caldera, Michael T. Mcbride, Matthew W. Mccarter, Roman M. Sheremeta
A Study Of The Triggers Of Conflict And Emotional Reactions, Michael Caldera, Michael T. Mcbride, Matthew W. Mccarter, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Publications
We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a third trigger is uncertainty about an opponent’s desire to cause harm. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions …
The Cultural Transmission Of Trust Norms: Evidence From A Lab In The Field On A Natural Experiment, Jared Rubin, Elira Karaja
The Cultural Transmission Of Trust Norms: Evidence From A Lab In The Field On A Natural Experiment, Jared Rubin, Elira Karaja
ESI Working Papers
We conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune. From 1775-1919, these villages were arbitrarily assigned to opposite sides of the Habsburg and Ottoman/Russian border despite being located seven kilometers apart. Russian and Ottoman Öscal institutions were more rapacious than Habsburg institutions, which may have eroded trust of outsiders (relative to co-villagers). Our design permits us to rigorously test this conjecture, and more generally, whether historically institutionalized cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally. We Önd that participants on the Ottoman/Russian side are indeed less likely to trust outsiders but more likely to trust co-villagers.
Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta
Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
Tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, there is scant empirical evidence regarding behavior in a tug-of-war game. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects exert fewer resources, while in the follow-up battles, they exert more resources than predicted. Also, contrary to the theoretical prediction, resource expenditures tend to increase in the duration of the …
When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler
When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler
ESI Working Papers
We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find no cross-cultural differences in giving when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, but when uninformed, Americans give less than Spanish. Culture and information not only affect individual giving, but also the determinants of giving and the beliefs about how income inequality arises. Beliefs partially moderate cross-cultural differences in giving.