Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Publication
Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Other Economics
Poking Holes And Adding Points In Dictator Games, James C. Cox, Cary Deck, Laura Razzolini, Vjollca Sadiraj
Poking Holes And Adding Points In Dictator Games, James C. Cox, Cary Deck, Laura Razzolini, Vjollca Sadiraj
ESI Working Papers
Deviations from choices predicted by self-regarding preferences have regularly been observed in standard dictator games. Such behavior is not inconsistent with conventional preference theory or revealed preference theory, which accommodate other-regarding preferences. By contrast, experiments in which giving nothing is not the least generous feasible act produce data that is inconsistent with conventional preference theory including social preference models and suggest the possible relevance of reference point models. Two such models are the reference-dependent theory of riskless choice with loss aversion and choice monotonicity in moral reference points. Our experiment includes novel treatments designed to challenge both theoretical models of …
Final Offer Arbitration With Asymmetric Evidence, Yongjoon Kim, Afia Promi, Jiatong Xue, Cary Deck
Final Offer Arbitration With Asymmetric Evidence, Yongjoon Kim, Afia Promi, Jiatong Xue, Cary Deck
ESI Working Papers
As disputants increasingly rely upon arbitration it is critical to understand outcomes that are likely to arise from mechanisms like final offer arbitration. While a sizable experimental literature investigating strategic behavior in final offer arbitration exists, that work has overwhelmingly focused on situations where the arbitrator’s beliefs about the appropriate resolution are symmetric and uninfluenced by the disputants’ cases. This paper considers a setting where the arbitrator’s beliefs depend on the strength of each disputant’s case. We find disputant responses to changes in the relative strength of their case generally follow comparative statics predictions. Further, we find that final offers …
Multidimensional Arbitration, Cary Deck, Paul Pecorino, Brian R. Powers
Multidimensional Arbitration, Cary Deck, Paul Pecorino, Brian R. Powers
ESI Working Papers
Most analyses of arbitration consider disputes over a single dimensional issue; however, in many situations more than one issue can be in dispute. In a labor context, the parties may disagree on the hourly wage, number of paid holidays, and fringe benefits as well as other conditions of employment. In addition to conventional arbitration (CA), two variants of multidimensional final-offer arbitration (FOA) are employed in practice. Under one version of FOA, the arbitrator must pick the entire package submitted by one of the disputants. Under the other version of FOA, the arbitrator can select elements from each disputant’s final offer …
Information Aggregation With Heterogeneous Traders, Cary Deck, Tae In Jun, Laura Razzolini, Tavoy Reid
Information Aggregation With Heterogeneous Traders, Cary Deck, Tae In Jun, Laura Razzolini, Tavoy Reid
ESI Working Papers
The efficient market hypothesis predicts that asset prices reflect all available information. A seminal experiment reported that contingent claim markets could yield market outcomes consistent with information aggregation when traders hold heterogeneous state-contingent values. However, a recent experiment found the rational expectation model outperformed the prior information and maxi-min models in contingent claim markets when traders hold homogeneous values despite the no trade equilibrium in that setting. But that same study failed to replicate the original result calling into question when, if ever, prices reliably reflect the aggregate information of traders with heterogeneous values. In this paper, we show contingent …
Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González
Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González
ESI Working Papers
We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to …
Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González
Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González
ESI Working Papers
We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to …
Information (Non)Aggregation In Markets With Costly Signal Acquisition, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, David Porter
Information (Non)Aggregation In Markets With Costly Signal Acquisition, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
Markets are often viewed as a tool for aggregating disparate private knowledge, a stance supported by past laboratory experiments. However, traders’ acquisition cost of information has typically been ignored. Results from a laboratory experiment involving six treatments varying the cost of acquiring signals of an asset’s value suggest that when information is costly, markets do not succeed in aggregating it. At an individual level, having information improves trading performance, but not enough to offset the cost of obtaining the information. Although males earn more through trading than females, this differential is offset by the greater propensity of males to buy …
Using Experiments To Compare The Predictive Power Of Models Of Multilateral Negotiations, Cary Deck, Charles J. Thomas
Using Experiments To Compare The Predictive Power Of Models Of Multilateral Negotiations, Cary Deck, Charles J. Thomas
ESI Working Papers
We conduct unstructured negotiations in a laboratory experiment designed to empirically assess the predictive power of three approaches to modeling the multilateral negotiations observed in diverse strategic settings. For concreteness we consider two sellers negotiating with a buyer who wants to make only one trade, with the modeling approaches distinguished by whether the buyer negotiates with the sellers sequentially, simultaneously, or in a “take-it-or-leave-it” fashion. Our experiment features two scenarios within which the three approaches have observationally distinct predictions: a differentiated scenario with one high-surplus and one low-surplus seller, and a homogeneous scenario with identical high-surplus sellers. In both scenarios …
State Dependent Price Setting Rules Under Implicit Thresholds: An Experiment, Justin Deloy Leblanc, Andrea Civelli, Cary A. Deck, Klajdi Bregu
State Dependent Price Setting Rules Under Implicit Thresholds: An Experiment, Justin Deloy Leblanc, Andrea Civelli, Cary A. Deck, Klajdi Bregu
ESI Publications
How firms make their pricing decisions is a fundamental question of macroeconomics. We use a laboratory experiment to examine individual choices in a price updating task that provide insight into how well state dependent models reflect behavior. We find that in general subjects behave as if they recognize the importance of a state dependent pricing strategy, but they are unable to ascertain this threshold with precision and they also exhibit a substantial degree of time dependence. As a result, they update prices too frequently, and perform statistically significantly fewer real effort profit-generating tasks than theoretically optimal under full state dependence, …
Double Bubbles In Assets Markets With Multiple Generations, Cary Deck, David Porter, Vernon Smith
Double Bubbles In Assets Markets With Multiple Generations, Cary Deck, David Porter, Vernon Smith
ESI Working Papers
We construct an asset market in a finite horizon overlapping-generations environment. Subjects are tested for comprehension of their fundamental value exchange environment, and then reminded during each of 25 periods of its declining new value. We observe price bubbles forming when new generations enter the market with additional liquidity and bursting as old generations exit the market and withdrawing cash. The entry and exit of traders in the market creates an M shaped double bubble price path over the life of the traded asset. This finding is significant in documenting that bubbles can reoccur within one extended trading horizon and, …
Personality And The Consistency Of Risk Taking Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes
Personality And The Consistency Of Risk Taking Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes
ESI Working Papers
Researchers have found that an individual’s risk attitude is not stable across elicitation methods. Results reported by Deck et al. (2009) suggest that personality may help explain the apparent inconsistency, offering support to Borghans et al.’s (2008) argument that economists should consider a multi‐domain approach to measuring risk attitudes. This paper uses laboratory methods to compare risk attitudes as measured by the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure under two different frames. We find that, as in Deck et al. (2009), one’s willingness to take financial risks (as measured by Weber et al. 2002) significantly affects behavior; however the effect is …