Other Economics Commons^™

Further Towards A Theory Of The Emergence Of Property, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

This article explores the emergence of property as a moral convention. To understand this process I make use of several laboratory experiments on property in its nascence. These experiments illustrate how a rule of property arises from our knowledge of what is morally right, and not vice versa. I also argue that while the ultimate end of property is our interest in using things, the proximate end of property is not losing them, i.e., the end of a rule of property is to secure from morally unfounded harm.

Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-Based Interaction, Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Publications

We observed reports of conflicted (concurrent positive and negative) emotions activated after interactions in the Trust game. Our analyses reveal that activation of 20 emotional states following trust-based interaction is better explained by predictions derived from a multi-dimensional Recalibrational perspective than by predictions derived from two-dimensional Valence and Arousal perspectives. The Recalibrational perspective proposes that emotions are activated according to their functional features – for example, emotions help people achieve short or long-sighted goals by up or down-regulating behavioral propensities, whereas Valence and Arousal perspectives consider simpler hedonic dimensions lacking functional specificity. The Recalibrational perspective is also distinguished from the …

To Trust, Or Not To Trust: Cognitive Reflection In Trust Games, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

We present results from two studies that show a positive relation between cognitive reflection and trusting behavior, but no significant relation with trustworthy behavior. Our finding holds regardless of individual distributional social preferences and risk aversion. Our results add to a growing body of literature that illustrates the role of cognitive ability in helping explain outcomes in economic experiments.

Dynamic Optimization And Conformity In Health Behavior And Life Enjoyment Over The Life Cycle, Hernán D. Bejarano, Hillard Kaplan, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

This article examines individual and social influences on investments in health and enjoyment from immediate consumption. Our lab experiment mimics the problem of health investment over a lifetime (Grossman, 1972a,b). Incentives to find the appropriate expenditures on life enjoyment and health are given by making in each period come period a function of previous health investments. In order to model social effects in the experiment, we randomly assigned individuals to chat/observation groups. Groups were permitted to freely chat between repeated lifetimes. Two treatments were employed: In the Independent-rewards treatment, an individual's rewards from investments in life enjoyment depend only on …

Advancing The Understanding Of Behavior In Social-Ecological Systems: Results From Lab And Field Experiments, Marco A. Janssen, Therese Lindahl, James J. Murphy

ESI Publications

"Experiments have made important contributions to our understanding of human behavior, including behavior relevant for understanding social-ecological systems. When there is a conflict between individual and group interests in social-ecological systems, social dilemmas occur. From the many types of social-dilemma formulations that are used to study collective action, common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas are most relevant for social-ecological systems. Experimental studies of both common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas have shown that many predictions based on the conventional theory of collective action, which assumes rational, self-interested behavior, do not hold. More cooperation occurs than predicted (Ledyard 1995), “cheap talk” increases cooperation …

Performance Benefits Of Reward Choice: A Procedural Justice Perspective, Arran Caza, Matthew W. Mccarter, Gregory B. Northcraft

ESI Publications

Reward choice – employees' ability to exercise control over the formal rewards they receive from work – is an important part of many HRM strategies. Reward choice is expected to increase employee performance, but conflicting findings highlight the need to better understand how and when it will do so. Based on fairness heuristic theory, we predicted that procedural justice mediates reward choice's influence on performance, and that choice attractiveness moderates that influence. A field study and an experiment both had similar results, supporting our predictions. Reward choice can increase performance by as much as 40 per cent, but only when …

Sustaining Group Reputation, Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin

ESI Publications

When individuals trade with strangers, there is a temptation to renege on agreements. If repeated interaction or exogenous enforcement is unavailable, societies often solve this problem via institutions that rely on group, rather than individual, reputation. Groups can employ two mechanisms to uphold reputation that are unavailable to individuals: information sharing and in-group punishment. We design a laboratory experiment to distinguish the roles of these mechanisms when individual reputations are unobservable. Subjects are split into groups and play a trust game with random re-matching, where only the group identity of one’s partner is known. Treatments differ by whether information about …

Firing Threats And Tenure In Virtual Organizations: Incentives Effects And Impression Management, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job …

Disfluent Fonts Don’T Help People Solve Math Problems, Andrew Meyer, Shane Frederick, Terence C. Burnham, Juan D. Guevera Pinto, Ty W. Boyer, Linden J. Ball, Gordon Pennycook, Rakefet Ackerman, Valerie A. Thompson, Jonathon P. Schuldt

ESI Publications

Prior research suggests that reducing font clarity can cause people to consider printed information more carefully. The most famous demonstration showed that participants were more likely to solve counterintuitive math problems when they were printed in hard-to-read font. However, after pooling data from that experiment with 16 attempts to replicate it, we find no effect on solution rates. We examine potential moderating variables, including cognitive ability, presentation format, and experimental setting, but we find no evidence of a disfluent font benefit under any conditions. More generally, though disfluent fonts slightly increase response times, we find little evidence that they activate …

Cyber-Shilling In Automobile Auctions: Evidence From A Field Experiment, David Grether, David Porter, Matthew Shum

ESI Publications

We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the "price grid," or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent group of buyers suggesting that they are "cyber-shills" working on behalf of sellers. These patterns do not appear in the New York auctions.

Why Supply Chain Collaboration Fails: The Socio-Structural View Of Resistance To Collaboration Strategies, Stanley E. Fawcett, Matthew W. Mccarter, Amydee M. Fawcett, G. Scott Webb, Gregory Magnan

ESI Publications

Purpose

The relational view posits that supply chain integration can be a source of competitive advantage. Few firms, however, successfully co-create value to attain supernormal relational rents. We therefore elaborate theory regarding the reasons why collaboration strategies fail.

Design/methodology/approach

This study employs a quasi-longitudinal, multi-case interview methodology to explore the reasons why collaboration strategies fail to deliver intended results. We interviewed managers at 49 companies in Period 1 and managers at 57 companies in Period 2. Fifteen companies participated in both rounds of interviews.

Findings

This paper builds and describes a taxonomy of relational resistors. We then explore how sociological …

The Effect Of Earned Vs. House Money On Price Bubble Formation In Experimental Asset Markets, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Praveen Kujal, David Porter

ESI Publications

Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.

Risky Business: An Analysis Of Teacher Risk Preferences, Daniel H. Bowen, Stuart Buck, Cary Deck, Jonathan N. Mills, James V. Shuls

ESI Publications

A range of proposals aim to reform teacher compensation, recruitment, and retention. Teachers have generally not embraced these policies. One potential explanation for their objections is that teachers are relatively risk averse. We examine this hypothesis using a risk-elicitation task common to experimental economics. By comparing preferences of new teachers with those entering other professions, we find that individuals choosing to teach are significantly more risk averse. This suggests that the teaching profession may attract individuals who are less amenable to certain reforms. Policy-makers should take into account teacher risk characteristics when considering reforms that may clash with preferences.

Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak-Link Contest?, Cary Deck, Li Hao, David Porter

ESI Publications

Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival. This is particularly important in aggressor–defender contests. This paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor's action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender's win rate; prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors’ decisions that is not being exploited by defenders; and …

The Role Of The Decision-Making Regime On Cooperation In A Workgroup Social Dilemma: An Examination Of Cyberloafing, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Matthew W. Mccarter

ESI Publications

A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, …

Experimental Evolution And Economics, Terence C. Burnham, Aimee Dunlap, David W. Stephens

ESI Publications

This is a theory paper that advocates experimental evolution as a novel approach to study economic preferences. Economics could benefit because preferences are exogenous, axiomatic, and contentious. Experimental evolution allows the empirical study of preferences by placing organisms in designed environments and studying their genotype and phenotype over multiple generations. We describe a number of empirical studies on different aspects of preferences. We argue that experimental evolution has the potential to improve economics.

Peer Pressure And Moral Hazard In Teams: Experimental Evidence, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

Team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both in the lab and in the field despite the moral hazard in teams problem identified by Holmström (1982). In a newly developed virtual workplace, we show that, in line with Holmström, moral hazard in teams is indeed pervasive. Subsequently, we find strong evidence for the conjecture of Kandel and Lazear (1992) that peer pressure may resolve the moral hazard in teams problem. Organizations equipped with a very weak form of peer monitoring (anonymous and without physical proximity, verbal threats or face-to-face interactions) perform as well as those using individual incentives.

Language And Cooperation In Hominin Scavenging, Bart J. Wilson, Samuel R. Harris

ESI Working Papers

Bickerton (2009, 2014) hypothesizes that language emerged as the solution to a scavenging problem faced by proto‐humans. We design a virtual world to explore how people use words to persuade others to work together for a common end. By gradually reducing the vocabularies that the participants can use, we trace the process of solving the hominin scavenging problem. Our experiment changes the way we think about social dilemmas. Instead of asking how does a group overcome the selfinterest of its constituents, the question becomes, how do constituents persuade one another to work together for a common end that yields a …

Sharing As Risk Pooling In A Social Dilemma Experiment, Todd L. Cherry, E. Lance Howe, James J. Murphy

ESI Working Papers

In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. In this paper, we describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We test whether risk can be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk …

Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this empirical puzzle in a controlled laboratory environment so as to isolate possible confounding factors encountered in the field. In line with the principal-agent model, we find that principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite lesser pay for performance. We show that this result can be accounted for by introducing agents’ loss aversion in …

The Cognitive Basis Of Social Behavior: Cognitive Reflection Overrides Antisocial But Not Always Prosocial Motives, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e. those who rely more heavily …

Dynamic Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim

ESI Working Papers

The directed search model (Peters, 1984) is static; its dynamic extensions typically restrict strategies, often assuming price or match commitments. We lift such restrictions to study equilibrium when search can be directed over time, without constraints and at no cost. In equilibrium trade frictions arise endogenously, and price commitments, if they do exist, are self-enforcing. In contrast to the typical model, there exists a continuum of equilibria that exhibit trade frictions. These equilibria support any price above the static price, including monopoly pricing in arbitrarily large markets. Dispersion in posted prices can naturally arise as temporary or permanent phenomenon despite …

Generalizations Of The General Lotto And Colonel Blotto Games, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with …

The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: A Replication Study, James J. Murphy, Nomin Batmunkh, Ben Nilson, Samantha Ray

ESI Working Papers

Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we attempted to replicate their results, however, we found no evidence of that social comparisons affected donation decisions. Most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang and Croson also found were not influenced by social information.

On The Merit Of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact With Incentive Setting, Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang, Angela Sutan

ESI Working Papers

Influence costs models predict that organizations should limit managerial discretion to deter organizational members from engaging in wasteful politicking activities. We test this conjecture in a controlled, yet realistic, work environment in which we allow employees to influence managers’ decisions about rewards. We find that influence activities are pervasive and significantly lower organizational performance. Organizational performance suffers because principals offer weaker incentives when influence activities are allowed than when they are not. Importantly, we show that equal pay incentive schemes perform better when influence activities are available than when they are not. Our results thus support the idea that prevalent …

When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler

ESI Working Papers

We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find no cross-cultural differences in giving when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, but when uninformed, Americans give less than Spanish. Culture and information not only affect individual giving, but also the determinants of giving and the beliefs about how income inequality arises. Beliefs partially moderate cross-cultural differences in giving.

Competition Between And Within Universities: Theoretical And Experimental Investigation Of Group Identity And The Desire To Win, Zhuoqiong Charlie Chen, David Ong, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We study how salient group identity, created through competition between students from different universities, as well as differences in the value of winning impact competitive behavior. Our experiment employs a simple all-pay auction within and between two university subject pools. We find that when competing against their peers, students within the lower tier university bid more aggressively than students within the top-tier university. Also, students from the lower tier university, in particular women, bid more aggressively when competing against students from the top-tier university. These findings, interpreted through a theoretical model incorporating both group identity and differential value of winning, …

Revisiting Information Aggregation In Asset Markets: Reflective Learning & Market Efficiency, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

The ability of markets to aggregate disperse information leading to prices that reflect the fundamental value of an asset is key to assessing the often-debated efficiency of markets. We study information aggregation in the experimental environment originally created by Plott and Sunder (1988). Contrary to the current belief, we find that markets do not aggregate information. The model that best describes our data, as well as data on information aggregation subsequent to Plott and Sunder (1988), is prior information (Lintner, 1969). That is, traders use their private information but fail to use market prices to infer other traders’ information. We …

An Experiment On Retail Payments Systems, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Stefania Bortolotti

ESI Working Papers

We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adoption and use of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The design allows us to assess the behavioral impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. In the experiment, buyers and sellers faced a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers’ economic incentives played a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but cannot fully explain their adoption …

The Effects Of Make And Take Fees In Experimental Markets, Vince Bourke, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

We conduct a series of experiments to examine the effects of the make and take fee structure currently used by equity exchanges in the U.S. We examine the effects of these fees on measures of market quality (allocative efficiency, trading volume, book depth, and the bid-ask spread). With the exception of increased book depth, we document no significant effects of make and take fees relative to a baseline case in which trading fees are assessed on both sides of a transaction.