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Articles 331 - 360 of 621
Full-Text Articles in Other Economics
Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith
Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith
ESI Working Papers
"In this paper I want to begin with the neoclassical supply and demand model of markets (SDM), whose static equilibrium consequences predicted outcomes far more accurately than were anticipated in laboratory experimental tests of the theory actuated by Jevons (1862, 1871; Smith, 1962). The observed predictive accuracy of SDM was not anticipated because complete information on supply and demand was widely believed, thought and taught to be a necessary condition for finding equilibrium. 1 Jevons’ model required him to have complete information in any particular market, as he only articulated a model of market optimal outcomes, and no model of …
Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram
Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
Comparison Of Country/Economies At Stage Of Development With Movement In Rankings Of Countries On Global Competitiveness, Pradip K. Shukla, M. P. Shukla, Y. P. Shukla, A. P. Shukla
Comparison Of Country/Economies At Stage Of Development With Movement In Rankings Of Countries On Global Competitiveness, Pradip K. Shukla, M. P. Shukla, Y. P. Shukla, A. P. Shukla
Business Faculty Articles and Research
With close to 200 countries in the world today, these countries are at various stages of development from less developed to more develop; these stages are often labeled in a rising numerical sequence such as Stage 1 to 3. Countries in the world compete in a global economy to benefit their domestic firms and citizens. As countries move to a higher stage of economic development they offer more global competitiveness for global businesses seeking new markets for sales, offshore outsourcing, and investments.
“The World Economic Forum is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. The Forum engages the foremost political, business …
Big Data In Economics, Matthew Harding, Jonathan Hersh
Big Data In Economics, Matthew Harding, Jonathan Hersh
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Big Data refers to data sets of much larger size, higher frequency, and often more personalized information. Examples include data collected by smart sensors in homes or aggregation of tweets on Twitter. In small data sets, traditional econometric methods tend to outperform more complex techniques. In large data sets, however, machine learning methods shine. New analytic approaches are needed to make the most of Big Data in economics. Researchers and policymakers should thus pay close attention to recent developments in machine learning techniques if they want to fully take advantage of these new sources of Big Data.
Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power, Tom Campbell, Nathaniel T. Wilcox
Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power, Tom Campbell, Nathaniel T. Wilcox
ESI Working Papers
From 1960 to 2015, Federal District Court opinions involving challenges to Executive Branch authority show that U.S. Federal District Court judges (trial judges) support such authority less as they age, with a sharp decline beginning near age 57. We argue that District judges know that elevation to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to ‘cooperate’ with the Executive, with advancing age. Political variables (and other variables) introduced as extra regressors do not reverse our main results. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their Circuit courts, District judges in the eleven State Circuits …
Traveling With Joel, Peter Mclaren
Traveling With Joel, Peter Mclaren
Education Faculty Articles and Research
"Kovel’s contributions to a critique of psychiatry, of political theory and of the ruination of the biosphere have been pathfinding, highly revered, and reviewed and debated in highly prestigious journals and publications such as The New York Times. His work with revolutionaries around the globe (including sojourns in Nicaragua during the Sandinista revolution as just one of many examples), and his achievements alongside some of the leading political activists worldwide have secured for Kovel a premier place in the history of the left. But notoriety is not what drives Kovel’s work. What drives Kovel’s work is a relentless struggle for …
Partners Or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, And The Choice Of Scale Of Interaction, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Partners Or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, And The Choice Of Scale Of Interaction, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
ESI Working Papers
We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an “intertemporal cooperation game” either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could be higher. Theoretically, a norm of mutual support is sufficient to maximize efficiency through large-scale cooperation. Empirically, absent a monetary system, participants were reluctant to interact on a large scale; and when they did, efficiency plummeted compared to partnerships because cooperation collapsed. This failure was reversed only when a stable monetary system endogenously emerged: the institution of money mitigated strategic uncertainty problems.
'To Sell Or Not To Sell': Licensing Versus Selling By An Outside Innovator, Swapnendu Banerjee, Sougata Poddar
'To Sell Or Not To Sell': Licensing Versus Selling By An Outside Innovator, Swapnendu Banerjee, Sougata Poddar
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling …
Marital Violence And Fertility In A Relatively Egalitarian High-Fertility Population, Jonathan Stieglitz, Benjamin C. Trumble, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
Marital Violence And Fertility In A Relatively Egalitarian High-Fertility Population, Jonathan Stieglitz, Benjamin C. Trumble, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
ESI Publications
Ultimate and proximate explanations of men’s physical intimate partner violence (IPV) against women have been proposed. An ultimate explanation posits that IPV is used to achieve a selfish fitness-relevant outcome, and predicts that IPV is associated with greater marital fertility. Proximate IPV explanations contain either complementary strategic components (for example, men’s desire for partner control), non-strategic components (for example, men’s self-regulatory failure), or both strategic and non-strategic components involving social learning. Consistent with an expectation from an ultimate IPV explanation, we find that IPV predicts greater marital fertility among Tsimané forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia (n = 133 marriages, 105 women). This …
Correction To: 'Greater Wealth Inequality, Less Polygyny: Rethinking The Polygyny Threshold Model', Cody T. Ross, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Seung-Yun Oh, Samuel Bowles, Bret Beheim, John Bunce, Mark Caudell, Gregory Clark, Heidi Colleran, Carmen Cortez, Patricia Draper, Russell D. Greaves, Michael Gurven, Thomas Headland, Janet Headland, Kim Hill, Barry Hewlett, Hillard Kaplan, Jeremy Koster, Karen Kramer, Frank Marlowe, Richard Mcelereath, David Nolin, Marsha Quinlan, Robert Quinlan, Caissa Revilla-Minaya, Brooke Scelza, Ryan Schacht, Mary Shenk, Ray Uehara, Eckart Voland, Kai Willführ, Bruce Winterhalder, John Ziker, Christopher Von Rueden
Correction To: 'Greater Wealth Inequality, Less Polygyny: Rethinking The Polygyny Threshold Model', Cody T. Ross, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Seung-Yun Oh, Samuel Bowles, Bret Beheim, John Bunce, Mark Caudell, Gregory Clark, Heidi Colleran, Carmen Cortez, Patricia Draper, Russell D. Greaves, Michael Gurven, Thomas Headland, Janet Headland, Kim Hill, Barry Hewlett, Hillard Kaplan, Jeremy Koster, Karen Kramer, Frank Marlowe, Richard Mcelereath, David Nolin, Marsha Quinlan, Robert Quinlan, Caissa Revilla-Minaya, Brooke Scelza, Ryan Schacht, Mary Shenk, Ray Uehara, Eckart Voland, Kai Willführ, Bruce Winterhalder, John Ziker, Christopher Von Rueden
ESI Publications
No abstract provided.
Greater Wealth Inequality, Less Polygyny: Rethinking The Polygyny Threshold Model, Cody T. Ross, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Seung-Yun Oh, Samuel Bowles, Bret Beheim, John Bunce, Mark Caudell, Gregory Clark, Heidi Colleran, Carmen Cortez, Patricia Draper, Russell D. Greaves, Michael Gurven, Thomas Headland, Janet Headland, Kim Hill, Barry Hewlett, Hillard Kaplan, Jeremy Koster, Karen Kramer, Frank Marlowe, Richard Mcelreath, David Nolin, Marsha Quinlan, Robert Quinlan, Caissa Revilla-Minaya, Brooke Scelza, Ryan Schacht, Mary Shenk, Ray Uehara, Eckart Voland, Kai Willführ, Bruce Winterhalder, John Ziker, Christopher Von Rueden
Greater Wealth Inequality, Less Polygyny: Rethinking The Polygyny Threshold Model, Cody T. Ross, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Seung-Yun Oh, Samuel Bowles, Bret Beheim, John Bunce, Mark Caudell, Gregory Clark, Heidi Colleran, Carmen Cortez, Patricia Draper, Russell D. Greaves, Michael Gurven, Thomas Headland, Janet Headland, Kim Hill, Barry Hewlett, Hillard Kaplan, Jeremy Koster, Karen Kramer, Frank Marlowe, Richard Mcelreath, David Nolin, Marsha Quinlan, Robert Quinlan, Caissa Revilla-Minaya, Brooke Scelza, Ryan Schacht, Mary Shenk, Ray Uehara, Eckart Voland, Kai Willführ, Bruce Winterhalder, John Ziker, Christopher Von Rueden
ESI Publications
Monogamy appears to have become the predominant human mating system with the emergence of highly unequal agricultural populations that replaced relatively egalitarian horticultural populations, challenging the conventional idea—based on the polygyny threshold model—that polygyny should be positively associated with wealth inequality. To address this polygyny paradox, we generalize the standard polygyny threshold model to a mutual mate choice model predicting the fraction of women married polygynously. We then demonstrate two conditions that are jointly sufficient to make monogamy the predominant marriage form, even in highly unequal societies. We assess if these conditions are satisfied using individual-level data from 29 human …
Sleep Variability And Nighttime Activity Among Tsimane Forager‐Horticulturalists, Gandhi Yetish, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
Sleep Variability And Nighttime Activity Among Tsimane Forager‐Horticulturalists, Gandhi Yetish, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
ESI Publications
Objectives
A common presumption in sleep research is that “normal” human sleep should show high night‐to‐night consistency. Yet, intra‐individual sleep variation in small‐scale subsistence societies has never been studied to test this idea. In this study, we assessed the degree of nightly variation in sleep patterns among Tsimane forager‐horticulturalists in Bolivia, and explored possible drivers of the intra‐individual variability.
Methods
We actigraphically recorded sleep among 120 Tsimane adults (67 female), aged 18–91, for an average of 4.9 nights per person using the Actigraph GT3X and Philips Respironics Actiwatch 2. We assessed intra‐individual variation using intra‐class correlations and average deviation from …
Equilibrium Wage Rigidity In Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
Equilibrium Wage Rigidity In Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
ESI Working Papers
Matching frictions and downward wage rigidity emerge as equilibrium phenomena in a twosided labor market where firms sustain variable wage adjustment costs. Firms post wages to attract workers and matches are endogenous. Reducing the wage relative to the wage previously posted is costly to the firm, where the cost is proportional to the size of the proposed cut. Shocks to the firm’s profitability may yield an equilibrium wage above what the firm would offer absent proportional adjustment costs. Wage cuts can be partial or full, immediate or delayed, and are non-linear in the shock size. Importantly, wages are sticky even …
Land Assembly With Taxes, Not Takings, Mark Desantis, Matthew W. Mccarter, Abel Winn
Land Assembly With Taxes, Not Takings, Mark Desantis, Matthew W. Mccarter, Abel Winn
ESI Publications
We use a novel tax mechanism – ‘rejected offer reassessment’ (ROR) – in laboratory experiments to discourage seller holdout and facilitate land assembly. Under this mechanism, if a landowner rejects a developer’s offer, his taxable property value is reassessed to be equal to the rejected offer, increasing his taxes. We find that, relative to a control treatment, ROR discourages the magnitude of seller holdout (but not its frequency) and increases the rate of successful land assembly by almost 60%. It also increases the gains from trade by 22.1% relative to the control treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant.
A Portable Method Of Eliciting Respect For Social Norms, Erik O. Kimbrough, Alexander Vostroknutov
A Portable Method Of Eliciting Respect For Social Norms, Erik O. Kimbrough, Alexander Vostroknutov
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Recent models of prosociality suggest that cooperation in laboratory games may be better understood as resulting from concern for social norms than from prosocial preferences over outcomes. Underlying this interpretation is the idea that people exhibit heterogeneous respect for shared norms. We introduce a new, abstract task to elicit a proxy for individual norm-following propensity by asking subjects to choose from two actions, where one is costly. We instruct subjects that “the rule is” to take the costly action. Their willingness to incur such a cost reveals respect for norms. We show that choices in this task are similar across …
Karl Marx And Liberation Theology: Dialectical Materialism And Christian Spirituality In, Against, And Beyond Contemporary Capitalism, Peter Mclaren, Petar Jandrić
Karl Marx And Liberation Theology: Dialectical Materialism And Christian Spirituality In, Against, And Beyond Contemporary Capitalism, Peter Mclaren, Petar Jandrić
Education Faculty Articles and Research
This paper explores convergences and discrepancies between liberation theology and the works of Karl Marx through the dialogue between one of the key contemporary proponents of liberation theology, Peter McLaren, and the agnostic scholar in critical pedagogy, Petar Jandrić. The paper briefly outlines liberation theology and its main convergences with the works of Karl Marx. Exposing striking similarities between the two traditions in denouncing the false God of money, it explores differences in their views towards individualism and collectivism. It rejects shallow rhetorical homologies between Marx and the Bible often found in liberation theology, and suggests a change of focus …
Trends And Disparities In Leave Use Under California's Paid Family Leave Program: New Evidence From Administrative Data, Sarah H. Bana, Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater
Trends And Disparities In Leave Use Under California's Paid Family Leave Program: New Evidence From Administrative Data, Sarah H. Bana, Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We use novel administrative data to study trends and disparities in usage of California's first-in-the-nation paid family leave (PFL) program. We show that take-up for both bonding with a new child and caring for an ill family member increased over 2005–2014. Most women combine PFL with maternity leave from the State Disability Insurance system, resulting in leaves longer than 6 weeks. Most men take less than the full 6 weeks of PFL. Individuals in the lowest earnings quartile and in small firms are the least likely to take leave. There are important differences in take-up across industries, especially for men.
Impulsive Behavior In Competition: Testing Theories Of Overbidding In Rent-Seeking Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
Impulsive Behavior In Competition: Testing Theories Of Overbidding In Rent-Seeking Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
Contests are commonly used in the workplace to motivate workers, determine promotion, and assign bonuses. Although contests can be very effective at eliciting high effort, they can also lead to inefficient effort expenditure (overbidding). Researchers have proposed various theories to explain overbidding in contents, including mistakes, systematic biases, the utility of winning, and relative payoff maximization. Using an eight-part experiment, we test and find significant support for the existing theories. Also, we discover some new explanations based on cognitive ability and impulsive behavior. Out of all explanations examined, we find that impulsivity is the most important factor explaining overbidding in …
Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study On The “Cooling” Effect Of The Strategy Method On Agent Resentment, Jing L. Davis
Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study On The “Cooling” Effect Of The Strategy Method On Agent Resentment, Jing L. Davis
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This study investigates whether agents’ resentment of controls in a gift-exchange game can be effectively mitigated using the strategy method where agents’ effort choices are elicited contingent on all possible contract choices by principals. The results suggest that allowing agents to contemplate contract choices prospectively results in less resentment and that agents exert higher effort than without this “cooling” process.
Preference Conformism: An Experiment, Enrique Fatas, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona
Preference Conformism: An Experiment, Enrique Fatas, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether people’s preferences change to become more alike. Such preference conformism would be worrying for an economics that takes individual preferences as given (‘de gustibus es non disputandum’). So the test is important. But it is also difficult. People can behave alike for many reasons and the key to the design of our test, therefore, is the control of the other possible reasons for observing apparent peer effects. We find evidence of preference conformism in the aggregate and at the individual level (where there is heterogeneity). It appears also to be …
Goal Setting In The Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives For Strong Performance, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Roberto Hernán-González
Goal Setting In The Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives For Strong Performance, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Roberto Hernán-González
ESI Publications
We study a principal–agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents' performance. Agents' performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal–agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. The pervasive use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.
A Theory Of Focal Points In 2x2 Games, Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
A Theory Of Focal Points In 2x2 Games, Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
ESI Publications
Since the classic work of Schelling, the notion of a focal point has been widely applied to explain coordinated behavior. However, focal points remain largely outside the formal apparatus of game theory. This paper develops a model of play in 2 × 2 games where payoff differences determine what strategy players will perceive as “salient” and choose to play. The model uniquely predicts which outcome will emerge for virtually the entire class of 2 × 2 normal form games. For the subset of such games involving coordination and asymmetric payoffs, payoff differences identify focal outcomes and strategies in the same …
Clarity Trumps Content: An Experiment On Information Acquisition In Beauty Contests, Sanjay Banerjee, Hong Qu, Ran Zhao
Clarity Trumps Content: An Experiment On Information Acquisition In Beauty Contests, Sanjay Banerjee, Hong Qu, Ran Zhao
Accounting Faculty Articles and Research
We provide experimental evidence that under strong beauty contest incentives, players ignore signals from an information source with high content if the source has low clarity. Instead, they acquire equally costly signals from a source with higher clarity despite its lower content. Content measures how precisely an information source identifies an economic situation, whereas clarity measures how precisely the source content is commonly interpreted. Low clarity impairs players' ability to coordinate. When signals are provided exogenously, our experimental results are less severe than theoretical predictions, but consistent with level-2 reasoning in a cognitive behavioral model. When players acquire signals endogenously, …
Sex Differences In Political Leadership In An Egalitarian Society, Christopher Von Rueden, Sarah Alami, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
Sex Differences In Political Leadership In An Egalitarian Society, Christopher Von Rueden, Sarah Alami, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
ESI Publications
We test the contribution of sex differences in physical formidability, education, and cooperation to the acquisition of political leadership in a small-scale society. Among forager-farmers from the Bolivian Amazon, we find that men are more likely to exercise different forms of political leadership, including verbal influence during community meetings, coordination of community projects, and dispute resolution. We show that these differences in leadership are not due to gender per se but are associated with men’s greater number of cooperation partners, greater access to schooling, and greater body size and physical strength. Men’s advantage in cooperation partner number is tied to …
Your Money Or Your Time? Experimental Evidence On Overbidding In All-Pay Auctions, Adriana Breaban, Charles N. Noussair, Andreea Victoria Popescu
Your Money Or Your Time? Experimental Evidence On Overbidding In All-Pay Auctions, Adriana Breaban, Charles N. Noussair, Andreea Victoria Popescu
ESI Working Papers
Competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest. Those who spend the most time become more likely to obtain the prize. We model this competition as an all-pay auction under incomplete information, and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time. In the experiment, subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time. However, they can bid, in terms of time, to leave early. The auction has an allpay structure so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within …
Experimental Evidence On The Cyclicality Of Investment, Cortney S. Rodet, Andrew Smyth
Experimental Evidence On The Cyclicality Of Investment, Cortney S. Rodet, Andrew Smyth
ESI Working Papers
We report laboratory experiments investigating the cyclicality of investment. In our setting, optimal investment is counter-cyclical because investment costs fall following market downturns. However, we do not observe counter-cyclical investment. Instead, heuristic investment models where firms invest a fixed percentage of their liquidity, or a fixed percentage of anticipated market demand, better fit our data on average than does optimal investment. We also report a control treatment without cost changes and a treatment with asymmetric investment liquidity. Both of these extensions support our main result.
Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin, Andrew Smyth
Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin, Andrew Smyth
ESI Working Papers
We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon, yet our data do not support this prediction. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, but we find no significant difference empirically. When controlling for risk and gender, we actually find significantly higher long-run expenditure in some indefinite contests relative to finite contests. Finally, theory predicts no difference in cooperation across indefinitely repeated winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests. We find significantly less cooperation …
Low Perceived Control Over Health Is Associated With Lower Treatment Uptake In A High Mortality Population Of Bolivian Forager-Farmers, Sarah Alami, Jonathan Stieglitz, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
Low Perceived Control Over Health Is Associated With Lower Treatment Uptake In A High Mortality Population Of Bolivian Forager-Farmers, Sarah Alami, Jonathan Stieglitz, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven
ESI Publications
Indigenous people worldwide suffer from higher rates of morbidity and mortality than neighboring populations. In addition to having limited access to public health infrastructure, indigenous people may also have priorities and health perceptions that deter them from seeking adequate modern healthcare. Here we propose that living in a harsh and unpredictable environment reduces motivation to pursue deliberate, costly action to improve health outcomes. We assess whether variation in Health Locus of Control (HLC), a psychological construct designed to capture self-efficacy with respect to health, explains variation in treatment uptake behavior among Tsimane Amerindians (N=690; age range: 40–89 years; 55.8% female; …
Testing The Boundaries Of The Double Auction: The Effects Of Complete Information And Market Power, Erik O. Kimbrough
Testing The Boundaries Of The Double Auction: The Effects Of Complete Information And Market Power, Erik O. Kimbrough
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We report boundary experiments testing the robustness of price convergence in double auction markets for non-durable goods in which there is extreme earnings inequality at the competitive equilibrium (CE). Following up on a conjecture by Smith (1976a), we test whether the well-known equilibrating power of the double auction institution is robust to the presence of complete information about traders’ values and costs and the presence of symmetric market power. We find that complete information is insufficient to impede convergence to CE prices; however, introducing market power consistently causes prices to deviate from the CE, whether or not subjects possess complete …
The Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman Sheremeta
The Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win …