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Economic Theory

Chapman University

Repeated games

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Full-Text Articles in Macroeconomics

Game-Theoretic Foundations Of Monetary Equilibrium, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré Apr 2014

Game-Theoretic Foundations Of Monetary Equilibrium, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

According to theory, money supports trade in a world without enforcement and, in particular, in large societies, where gift-exchange is unsustainable. It is demonstrated that, in fact, monetary equilibrium breaks down in the absence of adequate enforcement institutions and it collapses as societies that lack external enforcement grow large. This unique result is derived by unveiling the existence of a tacit enforcement assumption in the literature that explains the advantages from monetary exchange, and by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games and social norms.


The Coordination Value Of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari Jan 2014

The Coordination Value Of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

What institutions can sustain cooperation in groups of strangers? Here we study the role of monetary systems. In an experiment, subjects sometimes needed help and sometimes could incur a cost to help an anonymous counterpart. In the absence of money, the intertemporal exchange of help, which could be supported by a norm of community punishment of defectors, did not emerge. Introducing intrinsically worthless tokens substantially altered patterns of behavior. Monetary trade emerged, which increased predictability of play and promoted cooperation when strangers could trade help for a token.