Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

International Economics Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in International Economics

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Aug 2006

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …


Reviewed Work: Understanding Institutional Diversity By Elinor Ostrom, Jonathan G.S. Koppell Jul 2006

Reviewed Work: Understanding Institutional Diversity By Elinor Ostrom, Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

No abstract provided.


Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Mar 2006

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …


A Short-Run Johansen Industry Model For Common-Pool Resources: Planning A Fishery's Industrial Capacity To Curb Overfishing, Kristiaan Kerstens, Niels Vestergaard, Dale Squires Dec 2005

A Short-Run Johansen Industry Model For Common-Pool Resources: Planning A Fishery's Industrial Capacity To Curb Overfishing, Kristiaan Kerstens, Niels Vestergaard, Dale Squires

Niels Vestergaard

Current methods for assessing capacity and its utilisation in fisheries operate at the firm-level, but neglect industry capacity. Here, we introduce the Johansen-Färe measure of plant capacity of the firm into a multi-output, frontier-based version of the short-run Johansen industry model. The model determines firm capacity utilisation such that current industry outputs are maintained, while minimising the use of fixed inputs at industry level and assuming abundant variable inputs. Policy extensions relevant to combating overfishing include tightening quotas, seasonal closures, linking economic and plant capacity, decommissioning schemes and area closures, implementation issues and equity considerations. The application to the Danish …


Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism, Lars Gårn Hansen, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard, Urs Steiner Brandt Dec 2005

Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism, Lars Gårn Hansen, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard, Urs Steiner Brandt

Niels Vestergaard

To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.