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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comment on deficiency charge in installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Further comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.
Import Quotas And Entry Deterrence, Neil Campbell
Import Quotas And Entry Deterrence, Neil Campbell
Neil Campbell
Using a simple version of the Milgrom and Roberts entry deterrence model, it is shown that adjusting a quota so that a greater volume of imports is allowed, can facilitate entry into the domestic industry. That is, the easing of a quota, can cause the domestic incumbent to shift from deterring entry to accommodating entry.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on one-part vs. three-part bidding in energy market. For ISO New England.
Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
The Impact Of Omitting Promotion Variables On Simulation Experiments, David A. Weiskopf
The Impact Of Omitting Promotion Variables On Simulation Experiments, David A. Weiskopf
David A Weiskopf
No abstract provided.
Measuring Market Power In Bilateral Oligopoly: The Wholesale Market For Beef, John Schroeter, Azzeddine Azzam, Mingxia Zhang
Measuring Market Power In Bilateral Oligopoly: The Wholesale Market For Beef, John Schroeter, Azzeddine Azzam, Mingxia Zhang
Azzeddine Azzam
Econometric methods for assessing the degree of market power typically rely on a maintained hypothesis of price-taking behavior on one side of the market or the other. In the analysis of bilateral oligopoly, however, one would like to leave open the question of whether buyers or sellers (or both) behave competitively while allowing for the possible exercise of market power on either side. In this paper, we address the problem of measuring market power in bilateral oligopoly. This requires that we first distinguish among three candidate equilibrium concepts: bilateral price-taking, seller price-taking, and buyer price-taking. Choosing among them comes down …
Import Competition And Worker Productivity In Unionized Firms, Neil Campbell, Neil Vousden
Import Competition And Worker Productivity In Unionized Firms, Neil Campbell, Neil Vousden
Neil Campbell
This paper analyzes the effects of trade and labor market liberalization on wages and worker productivity/effort in a domestic unionized firm with firm-union bargaining over wages and effort. It is shown that both types of liberalization will induce a 'cold shower effect' (a rise in effort) if the union's objective function is more heavily weighted towards employment. However, the welfare effects of the two policies can differ markedly. The paper also identifies a separate productivity cost of production associated with the distortionary effect of protection on worker effort.