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Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization

A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton Sep 2000

A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Comparative Advantage In Production And Trade In Nigeria., Emmanuel U. Ukeje Jul 2000

Comparative Advantage In Production And Trade In Nigeria., Emmanuel U. Ukeje

Bullion

The Nigerian economy is generally large and very diverse. The country is endowed with a highly productive agricultural base and generally favourable climatic conditions, which provide the potential for intensive production, both for domestic consumption and for exports. This paper reviews the production and trade pattern in Nigeria with a view to identifying major structural changes with regard to the relative comparative advantage enjoyed by the sectors, the other parts of the paper focuses on some theoretical and conceptual issues. The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 focuses on some theoretical and conceptual issues. Section …


Development In The Petroleum Sub-Sector And Their Impacts On Nigerian Economy., I. P. Ojinnaka Jul 2000

Development In The Petroleum Sub-Sector And Their Impacts On Nigerian Economy., I. P. Ojinnaka

Bullion

The development of the petroleum industry has had both negative and positive impacts on the Nigerian economy. Two schools of thought can be examined. First, that positive impacts outweigh the negative, and secondly, the inverse. The paper will examined the impacts and analyzed the positive ones. From the approach of the study it is clear that the petroleum industry has had both negative and positive impacts on the Nigerian economy. Nigeria without petroleum could be like any other country without oil or gas, that is, import dependent. However, Nigeria with oil is the best thing that could have happened to …


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Jul 2000

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comment on deficiency charge in installed capability market. For ISO New England.


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Jun 2000

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Jun 2000

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.


Import Quotas And Entry Deterrence, Neil Campbell May 2000

Import Quotas And Entry Deterrence, Neil Campbell

Neil Campbell

Using a simple version of the Milgrom and Roberts entry deterrence model, it is shown that adjusting a quota so that a greater volume of imports is allowed, can facilitate entry into the domestic industry. That is, the easing of a quota, can cause the domestic incumbent to shift from deterring entry to accommodating entry.


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton May 2000

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on installed capability market. For ISO New England.


Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz May 2000

Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Peter Cramton

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …


Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz Apr 2000

Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Apr 2000

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on one-part vs. three-part bidding in energy market. For ISO New England.


Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien Mar 2000

Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton Feb 2000

Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


The Impact Of Omitting Promotion Variables On Simulation Experiments, David A. Weiskopf Jan 2000

The Impact Of Omitting Promotion Variables On Simulation Experiments, David A. Weiskopf

David A Weiskopf

No abstract provided.


Measuring Market Power In Bilateral Oligopoly: The Wholesale Market For Beef, John Schroeter, Azzeddine Azzam, Mingxia Zhang Dec 1999

Measuring Market Power In Bilateral Oligopoly: The Wholesale Market For Beef, John Schroeter, Azzeddine Azzam, Mingxia Zhang

Azzeddine Azzam

Econometric methods for assessing the degree of market power typically rely on a maintained hypothesis of price-taking behavior on one side of the market or the other. In the analysis of bilateral oligopoly, however, one would like to leave open the question of whether buyers or sellers (or both) behave competitively while allowing for the possible exercise of market power on either side. In this paper, we address the problem of measuring market power in bilateral oligopoly. This requires that we first distinguish among three candidate equilibrium concepts: bilateral price-taking, seller price-taking, and buyer price-taking. Choosing among them comes down …


Import Competition And Worker Productivity In Unionized Firms, Neil Campbell, Neil Vousden Dec 1999

Import Competition And Worker Productivity In Unionized Firms, Neil Campbell, Neil Vousden

Neil Campbell

This paper analyzes the effects of trade and labor market liberalization on wages and worker productivity/effort in a domestic unionized firm with firm-union bargaining over wages and effort. It is shown that both types of liberalization will induce a 'cold shower effect' (a rise in effort) if the union's objective function is more heavily weighted towards employment. However, the welfare effects of the two policies can differ markedly. The paper also identifies a separate productivity cost of production associated with the distortionary effect of protection on worker effort.