Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Economic Theory Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Chapman University

Discipline
Keyword
Publication Year
Publication
Publication Type
File Type

Articles 631 - 660 of 678

Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory

The Attack And Defense Of Weakest-Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta Jan 2010

The Attack And Defense Of Weakest-Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker‟s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender‟s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single random target is attacked — more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of …


Durability, Re-Trading And Market Performance, John Dickhaut, Shengle Lin, David Porter, Vernon Smith Jan 2010

Durability, Re-Trading And Market Performance, John Dickhaut, Shengle Lin, David Porter, Vernon Smith

ESI Working Papers

Key differential structural characteristics of environments studied in previous market experiments have documented large divergences in their observed performance, particularly discrepancies in their convergence to expected equilibrium outcomes. We investigate why this should be so.


Inflammation And Infection Do Not Promote Arterial Aging And Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors Among Lean Horticulturalists, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jeffrey Winking, Daniel Eid Rodriguez, Sarinnapha Vasunilashorn, Jung Ki Kim, Caleb Finch, Eileen M. Crimmins Aug 2009

Inflammation And Infection Do Not Promote Arterial Aging And Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors Among Lean Horticulturalists, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jeffrey Winking, Daniel Eid Rodriguez, Sarinnapha Vasunilashorn, Jung Ki Kim, Caleb Finch, Eileen M. Crimmins

ESI Publications

Background: Arterial aging is well characterized in industrial populations, but scantly described in populations with little access to modern medicine. Here we characterize health and aging among the Tsimane, Amazonian forager-horticulturalists with short life expectancy, high infectious loads and inflammation, but low adiposity and robust physical fitness. Inflammation has been implicated in all stages of arterial aging, atherogenesis and hypertension, and so we test whether greater inflammation associates with atherosclerosis and CVD risk. In contrast, moderate to vigorous daily activity, minimal obesity, and low fat intake predict minimal CVD risk among older Tsimane.

Methods and Findings: Peripheral arterial …


A Bioeconomic Approach To Marriage And The Sexual Division Of Labor, Michael Gurven, Jeffrey Winking, Hillard Kaplan, Christopher Von Rueden, Lisa Mcallister Apr 2009

A Bioeconomic Approach To Marriage And The Sexual Division Of Labor, Michael Gurven, Jeffrey Winking, Hillard Kaplan, Christopher Von Rueden, Lisa Mcallister

ESI Publications

Children may be viewed as public goods whereby both parents receive equal genetic benefits yet one parent often invests more heavily than the other.We introduce a microeconomic framework for understanding household investment decisions to address questions concerning conflicts of interest over types and amount of work effort among married men and women. Although gains and costs of marriage may not be spread equally among marriage partners, marriage is still a favorable, efficient outcome under a wide range of conditions. This bioeconomic framework subsumes both cooperative and conflictive views on the sexual division of labor. We test hypotheses concerning marriage markets, …


The Alliance Formation Puzzle And Capacity Constraints, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock Jan 2009

The Alliance Formation Puzzle And Capacity Constraints, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances.


Competition For Fdi With Vintage Investment And Agglomeration Advantages, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock Jan 2009

Competition For Fdi With Vintage Investment And Agglomeration Advantages, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Countries compete for new FDI investment, whereas stocks of FDI generate agglomeration benefits and are potentially subject to extortionary taxation. We study the interaction between these aspects in a simple vintage capital framework with discrete time and an infinite horizon, focussing on Markov perfect equilibrium. We show that the equilibrium taxation destabilizes agglomeration advantages. The agglomeration advantage is valuable, but is exploited in the short run. The tax revenue in the equilibrium is substantial, and higher on “old” FDI than on “new” FDI, even though countries are not allowed to use discriminatory taxation. If countries can provide fiscal incentives for …


A Correspondence-Theoretic Approach To Dynamic Optimization, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera Jan 2009

A Correspondence-Theoretic Approach To Dynamic Optimization, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This paper introduces a method of optimization in infinite-horizon economies based on the theory of correspondences. The proposed approach allow us to study time-separable and non-time-separable dynamic economic models without resorting to fixed point theorems or transversality conditions. When our technique is applied to the standard time-separable model it provides an alternative and straightforward way to derive the common recursive formulation of these models by means of Bellman equations.


Public Spending On Education And The Incentives For Student Achievement, William Blankenau, Gabriele Camera Jan 2009

Public Spending On Education And The Incentives For Student Achievement, William Blankenau, Gabriele Camera

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We build a model where homogeneous workers can accumulate human capital by investing in education. Schools combine public resources and individual effort to generate productive skills. If skills are imperfectly compensated, then in equilibrium students may under-invest in effort. We examine the effect on human capital accumulation of three basic education finance policies. Increased tuition subsidies may not be beneficial because they increase enrollment but they may lower the incentives for student achievement, hence the skill level. Policies directed at enhancing the productivity of education or making degrees more informative are more successful at improving educational outcomes.


A Neuroeconomic Theory Of The Decision Process, John Dickhaut, Aldo Rustichini, Vernon L. Smith Jan 2009

A Neuroeconomic Theory Of The Decision Process, John Dickhaut, Aldo Rustichini, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Publications

We develop a neuronal theory of the choice process (NTCP), which takes a subject from the moment in which two options are presented to the selection of one of the two. The theory is based on an optimal signal detection, which generalizes the signal detection theory by adding the choice of effort as optimal choice for a given informational value of the signal for every effort level and a cost of effort. NTCP predicts the choice made as a stochastic choice: That is, as a probability distribution over two options in a set, the level of effort provided, the error …


Exchange And Specialisation As A Discovery Process, Sean Crockett, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson Jan 2009

Exchange And Specialisation As A Discovery Process, Sean Crockett, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In this article we study the performance of an economy that can support specialisation if the participants develop and follow some system of exchange. We define a closed economy in which the participants must discover the ability to exchange, implement it, and ascertain what they are comparatively advantaged in producing. Many of our participants demonstrate the ability to find comparative advantage, capture gains from trade and effectively choose production that is consistent with the choices of others. We explore various treatments to provide insight into the conditions that foster the growth of specialisation and exchange within this weak institutional framework.


Recordkeeping Alters Economic History By Promoting Reciprocity, Sudipta Basu, John Dickhaut, Gary Hecht, Kristy Towry, Gregory Waymire Jan 2009

Recordkeeping Alters Economic History By Promoting Reciprocity, Sudipta Basu, John Dickhaut, Gary Hecht, Kristy Towry, Gregory Waymire

ESI Publications

We experimentally demonstrate a causal link between recordkeeping and reciprocal exchange. Recordkeeping improves memory of past interactions in a complex exchange environment, which promotes reputation formation and decision coordination. Economies with recordkeeping exhibit a beneficially altered economic history where the risks of exchanging with strangers are substantially lessened. Our findings are consistent with prior assertions that complex and extensive reciprocity requires sophisticated memory to store information on past transactions. We offer insights on this research by scientifically demonstrating that reciprocity can be facilitated by information storage external to the brain. This is consistent with the archaeological record, which suggests that …


Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, Vernon Smith Jan 2009

Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, Vernon Smith

ESI Working Papers

In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the “price system.” The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took …


Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson Jan 2009

Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this paper we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. We find that the absence of property rights clearly decreases wealth in our environment and that interest in establishing property rights is a key determinant of the decision to migrate to a new region. Theft is nearly eliminated among migrants, resulting in strong growth, and non-migrants …


The Multiple Dimensions Of Male Social Status In An Amazonian Society, Christopher Von Rueden, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan Jun 2008

The Multiple Dimensions Of Male Social Status In An Amazonian Society, Christopher Von Rueden, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan

ESI Publications

"In all human societies, individuals differ in social status depending upon their age and personal ability (Sahlins, 1958; Service, 1971). In laboratory-based small group studies, status hierarchies emerge spontaneously (Bass, 1954; Campbell et al., 2002; Kalma, 1991). Even among “egalitarian” foragers, who are characterized by widespread resource sharing (Kaplan & Gurven, 2005; Winterhalder, 1986) and some degree of status-leveling (Cashdan, 1980), certain individuals consume more resources, get the best pick of mates, and take a more central role in group decision-making (Boehm, 1999; Trigger, 1985; Wiessner, 1996). Whether implicit or overt, classification by social status is a human universal. While …


Economics Works! Experiments In High School Classrooms, Stephen L. Jackstadt, Paul Johnson, Bart J. Wilson Apr 2008

Economics Works! Experiments In High School Classrooms, Stephen L. Jackstadt, Paul Johnson, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Economic experiments are a unique form of active learning. Students apply the scientific method by testing hypotheses and discovering for themselves how markets work. The authors conducted teacher training courses in experimental economics over a three-year period and conducted surveys to track teachers' adoption of classroom experiments. This paper discusses the survey results and describes how the training was revised accordingly. The primary conclusion of this article is that classroom experiments must be compatible with the school environment; that is, they should emphasize non-monetary incentives and hand-run experiments as well as be explicitly tied to school curricula.


Aging And Inflammation In Two Epidemiological Worlds, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jeffrey Winking, Caleb Finch, Eileen M. Crimmins Feb 2008

Aging And Inflammation In Two Epidemiological Worlds, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jeffrey Winking, Caleb Finch, Eileen M. Crimmins

ESI Publications

Humans evolved in a world with high levels of infection resulting in high mortality across the life span and few survivors to advanced ages. Under such conditions, a strong acute-phase inflammatory response was required for survival; however, inflammatory responses can also promote chronic diseases of aging. We hypothesize that global historical increases in life span at older ages are partly explained by reduced lifetime exposure to infection and subsequent inflammation. To begin a test of this hypothesis, we compare C-reactive protein (CRP); levels in two populations with different epidemiological environments: the Tsimane of Bolivia and persons in the United States. …


Experimental Gasoline Markets, Cary A. Deck, Bart J. Wilson Jan 2008

Experimental Gasoline Markets, Cary A. Deck, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Zone pricing in wholesale gasoline markets is a contentious topic in the public policy debate. With a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the competitive effects of zone pricing on consumers, retail stations, and refiners vis-à-vis the proposed policy prescription of uniform wholesale pricing to retailers. We also examine the issue of divorcement and the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon. The former is the legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated, and the latter is the perception that retail gasoline prices rise faster than they fall in response to random walk movements in the world price for oil.


Another Example Of A Credit System That Coexists With Money, Gabriele Camera, Yiting Li Jan 2008

Another Example Of A Credit System That Coexists With Money, Gabriele Camera, Yiting Li

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study an economy in which exchange occurs pairwise, there is no commitment, and anonymous agents choose between random monetary trade or deterministic credit trade. To accomplish the latter, agents can exploit a costly technology that allows limited recordkeeping and enforcement. An equilibrium with money and credit is shown to exist if the cost of using the technology is sufficiently small. Anonymity, record-keeping and enforcement limitations also permit some incidence of default, in equilibrium.


High Stakes Behavior With Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences With Holt-Laury Gambles, John Dickhaut, Daniel Houser, Jason A. Aimone, Dorina Tila, Cathleen Johnson Jan 2008

High Stakes Behavior With Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences With Holt-Laury Gambles, John Dickhaut, Daniel Houser, Jason A. Aimone, Dorina Tila, Cathleen Johnson

ESI Working Papers

A continuing goal of experiments is to understand risky decisions when the decisions are important. Often a decision’s importance is related to the magnitude of the associated monetary stake. Khaneman and Tversky (1979) argue that risky decisions in high stakes environments can be informed using questionnaires with hypothetical choices (since subjects have no incentive to answer questions falsely.) However, results reported by Holt and Laury (2002, henceforth HL), as well as replications by Harrison (2005) suggest that decisions in “high” monetary payoff environments are not well-predicted by questionnaire responses. Thus, a potential implication of the HL results is that studying …


Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut Jan 2008

Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut

ESI Working Papers

This article develops a method for drawing samples from which it is impossible to infer any quantile or moment of the underlying distribution. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is impossible for the subjects, essentially because it is impossible for the experimenter. We describe our method mathematically, illustrate it in simulations, and then test it in a laboratory experiment. Our technique does not withhold sampling information, does not assume that the subject is incapable of making statistical inferences, is replicable across experiments, and requires …


Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers?, Ryan Oprea, David Porter, Chris Hibbert, Robin Hanson, Dorina Tila Jan 2008

Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers?, Ryan Oprea, David Porter, Chris Hibbert, Robin Hanson, Dorina Tila

ESI Working Papers

We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices. Although prices only partially aggregate information, they signicantly improve the forecasts of third parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by observers. Although we find evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to influence the beliefs of observers, we find no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result.


Culture Sometimes Matters: Intra-Cultural Variation In Pro-Social Behavior Among Tsimane Amerindians, Michael Gurven, Arianna Zanolini, Eric Schniter Sep 2007

Culture Sometimes Matters: Intra-Cultural Variation In Pro-Social Behavior Among Tsimane Amerindians, Michael Gurven, Arianna Zanolini, Eric Schniter

ESI Publications

Agent-centered models usually consider only individual-level variables in calculations of economic costs and benefits. There has been little consideration of social or cultural history on shaping payoffs in ways that impact decisions. To examine the role of local expectations on economic behavior, we explore whether village affiliation accounts for the variation in dictator game offers among the Tsimane of the Bolivian Amazon independently of other factors that could confound such an effect. Our analysis shows that significant differences in altruistic giving exist among villages, village patterns are recognized by residents, and offers likely reflect variation in social expectations rather than …


Rationality In Economics: Constructivist And Ecological Forms, Vernon L. Smith Jan 2007

Rationality In Economics: Constructivist And Ecological Forms, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Publications

Chapter 1: Rediscovering the Scottish Philosophers


Matching And Anonymity, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello Jan 2006

Matching And Anonymity, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of deterministic bilateral matching processes and studies systematically their properties. In particular, it formalizes a link between matching and informational constraints by developing a notion of anonymity that is based on the agents' matching histories. It also explains why and how various matching processes generate different degrees of "informational isolation" in the economy. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach to modeling matching frameworks by discussing the classical turnpike model of Townsend.


Free Riding In Noncooperative Entry Deterrence With Differentiated Products, Dan Kovenock, Suddhasatwa Roy Jan 2005

Free Riding In Noncooperative Entry Deterrence With Differentiated Products, Dan Kovenock, Suddhasatwa Roy

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for products that are differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium may Pareto dominate the entry equilibrium. Hence, "coordination failure" underinvestment in entry prevention can occur. However, as claimed, the overinvestment result of Gilbert and Vives remains robust to moderate amounts of product differentiation. We also show that coordination failure underinvestment arises in a wide variety of entry deterrence models and does not rely on assumptions regarding …


Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries Jan 2005

Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.


Auction Markets For Evaluations, Cary Deck, Bart J. Wilson Jan 2005

Auction Markets For Evaluations, Cary Deck, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

When the value of a product or service is uncertain, outcomes can be inefficient. A market for evaluations can theoretically increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided. This paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test the performance of four market mechanisms to provide product evaluations. The mechanisms considered are derived from the oft studied uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock auction, and Dutch clock auction. Our results indicate for this nonrivalrous product that (i) each of these institutions improves social welfare and (ii) the performances of the four mechanisms …


On Patent Licensing In Spatial Competition, Sougata Poddar, Uday Bhanu Sinha May 2004

On Patent Licensing In Spatial Competition, Sougata Poddar, Uday Bhanu Sinha

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We consider the issue of patent licensing in a linear city framework where firms are located at the end points of the city and compete in price. We consider three types of licensing arrangements, namely, auction, fixed fee, royalty; and focus on the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee. Contrary to the findings in the existing literature, first we show offering royalty is the best for the patentee when the patentee is an outsider for both drastic and non-drastic innovation. For insider patentee, offering no-license is the best when the innovation is drastic, …


The Distribution Of Money And Prices In An Equilibrium With Lotteries, Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller Jan 2004

The Distribution Of Money And Prices In An Equilibrium With Lotteries, Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We construct a tractable ‘fundamental’ model of money with equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible ‘tokens’ and can offer lotteries on monetary transfers. By studying a simple trading pattern, we can analytically characterize the monetary distribution. Interestingly, such distributions match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price heterogeneity.


Rjvs In Product Innovation And Cartel Stability, Luca Lambertini, Sougata Poddar, Dan Sasaki Jan 2003

Rjvs In Product Innovation And Cartel Stability, Luca Lambertini, Sougata Poddar, Dan Sasaki

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We characterise the interplay between firms' decision in product development undertaken through a research joing venture (RJV), and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. Participant firms in an RJV face a trade-off between saving the costs of product innovation by developing similar products to one another, e.g. by sharing most of the basic components of their products, and investing higher initial efforts in product innovation in order to develop more distinct products. We prove that the more the fims' products are distinct and thus less substitutable, the easier their collusion is to sustain in the marketing supergame, either in …