Economic History Commons^™

Korea: Bank Recapitalization Fund, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, a number of foreign governments enacted stabilization measures to protect their domestic economies in the wake of the global credit crunch. The Bank Recapitalization Fund (the Fund), announced by the South Korean government on December 18, 2008, and implemented on February 15, 2009, was one such intervention intended to assist Korean commercial banks in strengthening their capital bases and thus restore normal lending practices between banks and nonfinancial institutions. Invoking its authority under Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea …

Korean Capital Injections: Kdic 1997, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

After the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, international banks reduced their exposures to Korean financial institutions, rating agencies downgraded Korea’s sovereign rating, and the Korean won lost half its value. The government guaranteed all financial institution deposits and provided emergency liquidity support to the financial sector, but these measures did not restore market confidence. In December, Korea sought an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-by Arrangement. As part of the IMF program, the Korean National Assembly consolidated financial sector supervision into a new Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and broadened the scope of the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC). …

Japan Provision Of Subordinated Loans, Shiro Kawana

Journal of Financial Crises

During the international financial turmoil associated with the Global Financial Crisis, Japan’s financial institutions remained relatively sound because their exposure to overseas structured credit products was limited. Restructuring in the aftermath of Japan’s own banking crisis in the late 1990s also contributed to making Japanese banks resilient to external shocks. Nonetheless, Japanese banks’ profitability was at risk. Due to the large amount of stockholdings, major banks had large market risks which might significantly worsen their capital ratios. The increasing volatility of stock prices could make banks conscious of capital constraints in the future and could trigger an adverse feedback loop …

Financial Functions Stabilization Act, Vaasavi Unnava

Journal of Financial Crises

In 1990, the asset-pricing bubble in Japan peaked and began a steady decline. Over the next seven years, a series of bank failures induced the Japanese government to introduce the first of a series of capital injections in 1998, 1999, and 2004. The capital injection of 1998, authorized by the Financial Functions Stabilization Act, made ¥13 trillion ($103 billion) available to financial institutions that applied. By the end of the injection window, 21 banks and trusts applied for and received ¥1.8 trillion ($13.5 billion) in subordinated debt and loans and preferred shares. While there were no limits on compensation for …

Prompt Recapitalization Act, Vaasavi Unnava

Journal of Financial Crises

In 1997, Japan’s banks were in crisis due to hundreds of billions of dollars of non-performing real estate loans. In response, the government performed three rounds of capital injections in 1998, 1999, and the early 2000s. The capital injection of 1999, authorized by the Prompt Recapitalization Act, made as much as ¥25 trillion ($208 billion) available to financial institutions that applied, regardless of their capitalization. By the end of the injection window, 32 banks and trusts applied for and received ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6 billion) total in preferred shares and subordinated debts. The Act required banks to submit and adhere to …

Italy (2008) Capital Injections, Manuel León Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

In response to the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis, in October 2008, the Italian government announced urgent measures to guarantee financial stability and the flow of credit. The Italian government targeted three areas of support: (1) bank recapitalizations, (2) liquidity access, and (3) expansion of guarantees on bank deposits. This case study exclusively examines the Italian bank recapitalization scheme introduced in December 2008 in line with European Union State Aid rules.

The four Italian banks recapitalized in 2009 under the scheme were Banco Popolare (€1.45 billion), Banca Popolare di Milano (€500 million), Credito Valtellinese (€200 million), and Banca Montepaschi di Siena …

Israeli Bank Shares Arrangement (Hesder Hamenayot Habankayot), Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

From 1980 to 1983, Israeli consumer prices more than doubled every year and the shekel lost more than 50% of its value annually. This high inflation and currency devaluation posed an extraordinary challenge for Israel’s biggest banks. They needed to grow their capital bases to keep up with the rising market value of their assets, but investors needed protection against the continually declining value of the local currency. Banks’ solution was to regularly issue new, nonvoting shares in extraordinary amounts while ensuring investors a high return by regularly buying their own shares to manipulate prices. The government tacitly supported the …

Ireland 2009 Recapitalization Program For Financial Institutions, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

At the November 2008 height of the Global Financial Crisis, Ireland’s Department of Finance announced a willingness to inject capital into the six largest banks. This announcement followed the issuance of a blanket guarantee of those banks’ liabilities in September 2008. After broadly designing the potential investments in 2008, the Irish government came to agreements with Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks in February 2009 to inject €3.5 billion ($4.5 billion) in each bank in exchange for preferred equity stakes. The government funded the investments from the funds of the National Pensions Reserve Fund, something it would secure the …

Indonesia Joint Recapitalization Of 1999, Vaasavi Unnava, Ariel Smith

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government implemented a joint recapitalization program in 1999 to aid some of its private banks struggling with the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis. Nine banks were eligible, and seven ultimately participated. The program was voluntary; in order to participate, bank managers had to pass a test proving that they were competent enough to run their bank and create a three-year plan for the bank’s operations subject to independent assessment. All of the bank participants were able to return to the 4% minimum capital adequacy ratio by the end of the program.

Hungary Recapitalization Scheme, Alec Buchholtz

Journal of Financial Crises

In the midst of the global financial crisis in October 2008, the Magyar Namzeti Bank (MNB), the Hungarian national bank, noticed a selloff of government securities by foreign banks and a large depreciation in the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint (HUF) in FX markets. Hungarian banks experienced liquidity pressure due to margin calls on FX swap contracts, prompting the MNB and Minister of Finance to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB) and the World Bank. The IMF and ECB approved the Hungarian government’s (the State) requests in late 2008 to create a €19 …

The Hungarian Bank Recapitalization Program, Junko Oguri

Journal of Financial Crises

Hungary implemented a number of new policies from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, shifting from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Despite the top-down market reforms, Hungary lacked the knowledge to build a fully functional financial system. Eventually, an economic turmoil caused by the collapse of eastern markets and fragility in the financial system led to the banking crisis of 1992–1993, revealing the undercapitalization of the financial system. The government implemented the recapitalization, or “bank consolidation,” as part of a stabilization program. It injected capital into banks in three stages—in December 1993, May 1994, and December …

Hong Kong Contingent Bank Capital Facility (Cbcf), David Tam, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

On October 14, 2008, Hong Kong’s financial secretary announced the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) would use Hong Kong’s Exchange Fund to provide standby capital to banks if needed. The Contingent Bank Capital Facility (CBCF) was available until the end of 2010 to shore up depositor and investor confidence in the local banking sector and commenced in parallel with a broader set of announced measures including a consumer bank deposit guarantee. Twenty-three locally incorporated “Authorized Institutions” were eligible to access CBCF capital upon request. The provisioning of CBCF capital would be accompanied by enhanced oversight from the HKMA. The Hong …

Greece (2008) – Capital Injections, Manuel León Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis (2007–09), the Greek government announced a €28 billion ($36 billion) government package. Greek Law 3723/2008, “Enhancement of Liquidity in the Economy in Response to the Impact of the International Financial Crisis,” was passed and approved under European Union State Aid rules. The Greek law provided for three voluntary programs: recapitalizations (€5 billion), guarantees (€15 billion), and securities (€8 billion). This case study exclusively examines the recapitalization program. In this program, the Greek government acquired convertible preferred shares in banks in order to build and maintain banks’ Tier 1 capital …

France Société De Prise De Participation De L’État (Sppe), Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

As the Global Financial Crisis deepened, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and ensuing contagion began affecting the French economy and financial system. France experienced declines in major economic indicators such as GDP, household consumption, and investment. In addition, the ensuing credit crunch in financial markets resulted in the seizing up of various lending markets. Due to conservative business practices, a consolidated market structure, and a sound regulatory framework, the French banks were relatively better situated than their European counterparts to weather the crisis. However, the French authorities instituted a precautionary recapitalization scheme in order to “restore …

Finland’S 1992 Capital Injection, Kaleb B. Nygaard

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector during the 1980s and subsequent massive credit expansion, a banking crisis in Finland caused a sharp contraction in the economy in the early 1990s. To prevent the collapse of the banking system, the government offered FIM 8 billion in capital injections. Parliament appropriated the funds in the spring of 1992 and terms were defined in June 1992. The program was open to all banks, in proportion to their size, regardless of their solvency. In the fall of 1992, FIM 7.9 billion was deployed to 56 cooperative banks and 22 savings banks of …

Danish Capital Injections Scheme 2009 (Dk Gfc), Priya Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

Both the international financial system and Denmark were experiencing challenges in 2007 and 2008, and they came to a head in Denmark when Roskilde Bank experienced liquidity pressures in June 2008. As it became clear that Roskilde Bank was insolvent and no private solutions would be found, and as the global financial crisis worsened leading to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Danish government decided to take stronger action. To ensure the short-term survival of Roskilde Bank, the national bank issued a non-limited credit facility. After it passed a deposit guarantee scheme in 2008 and established a Financial Stability Company, …

Austria: Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz (Finstag), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the adoption of a joint framework by euro area countries in response to the intensifying financial crisis in October 2008, Austria enacted a package of measures including the Financial Market Stability Act (Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz, or FinStaG). In addition to permitting nationalization under certain circumstances, FinStaG allowed the Austrian government to use six specific measures to recapitalize credit institutions operating in Austria and Austrian insurance companies. According to FinStaG, €15 billion ($22 billion) could be used for this purpose, though this amount was later increased. Eight institutions received support through FinStaG, and the government granted capital and liquidity support totaling €21 …

A Lot On My Plate: Family Dishware Serving Up A History Of Global Commercialization, Grace Thanasiu

Student Projects from the Archives

The “Hearthside” shaped plate was created by the Homer Laughlin China Company sometime between 1963 and 1973. My family owns such a plate, and ours originally belonged to a set of plates that was “purchased” by my grandmother, Mary Ruhlin, with books and books full of redemption stamps. Redemption stamps were literal stamps that stores distributed to customers, who could later redeem them for cash or merchandise at affiliated redemption centers that partnered with grocery stores and businesses; redemption stamps functioned as a precursor to the modern loyalty card! The need for a reputable pottery company like Homer Laughlin to …

A Literature Review On The Issue Of Comparing And Contrasting The Fed’S Actions In Response To Covid-19 And The Great Recession, Julian Meyerstrom

Undergraduate Research Symposium

As researchers and economists begin to evaluate and study the effect that the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has had on the world and its financial institutions, many have focused exclusively on the pandemic and the unique impacts that a global shutdown has had. Economic events of this scale rarely occur, therefore when one does occur it is important to understand what happened and how the economic institutions reacted. The last great economic event to require direct involvement from the FED was the Great Recession in 2008. In most ways these two events are wholly distinct, happening for different reasons and impacting …

Financial Factors And The Propagation Of The Great Depression, Gustavo S. Cortes, Bryan Taylor, Marc D. Weidenmier

Business Faculty Articles and Research

We investigate the role of forward-looking financial factors in propagating the Great Depression. We find that a new hand-collected bank stock index is better at predicting the onset of the Great Depression than the aggregate stock market or failed bank deposits. The bank stock index explains almost one-third of the fluctuations in industrial production after five years. Analysis disaggregated at each Federal Reserve district shows that bank stocks capture forward-looking information about debt defaults and credit. Our results suggest that future studies of the credit channel during the Great Depression should incorporate bank stocks to better identify the impact of …

Greening The Archive: The Social Climate Of Cotton Manufacturing In The "Samuel Oldknow Papers, 1782-1924", Bernadette Myers, Melina Moe

Journal of Contemporary Archival Studies

This article re-examines the records and correspondence of Samuel Oldknow, a late eighteenth century textile manufacturer, within the context of the environmental humanities. Oldknow’s papers, a portion of which are held at Columbia University, are most often used by economic historians to date the beginnings of the factory wage labor system. We highlight, instead, the environmental implications of Oldknow’s cotton enterprise by juxtaposing documents related to the global reach of Oldknow’s empire with evidence of his transformation of the local landscape of northern England. This process of re-scaling captures a sense of what we call the “social climate” of the …

The Cultural Transmission Of Trust Norms: Evidence From A Lab In The Field On A Natural Experiment, Elira Karaja, Jared Rubin

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune. From 1775–1919, these villages were arbitrarily assigned to opposite sides of the Austrian and Ottoman/Russian border despite being located seven kilometers apart. This plausibly exogenous border assignment affected local institutions and late-18th century migration in a manner that likely also affected trust. Conditional on trust norms being affected by these centuries-old historical circumstances, our experimental design tests the degree to which such norms are transmitted intergenerationally. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that participants on the Austrian side that also have family roots in the village are indeed …

Conjectures Of English And Uk Economic Surplus, Investment, Tax Revenues And Deficit Amounts From The 13th To The 19th Century, Thomas E. Lambert

Faculty and Staff Scholarship

This paper attempts to estimate trends in the levels of economic surplus, public and private investment, and national government surpluses and deficits from accumulated capital income, taxation, and rents estimated by different economic historians for England and the UK. The data support historical accounts that income per capita growth begins to increase around the 1600s in Britain perhaps due to the level of capital, tax, and land income achieving an adequate threshold amount. According to some historians, this would also be about the time of capitalism’s ascent as the dominant economic system in England. Even then, dramatic increases in investment …

The Baran Ratio, Investment, And British Economic Growth And Development, Thomas E. Lambert

Faculty and Staff Scholarship

Investment in capital, new technology, and agricultural techniques has not been considered an endeavor worthwhile in a medieval economy because of a lack of strong property rights and no incentive on the part of lords and barons to lend money to or grant rights to peasant farmers. Therefore, the medieval economy and standards of living at that time often have been characterized as non-dynamic and static due to insufficient investment in innovative techniques and technology. Paul Baran’s concept of the economic surplus is applied to investment patterns during the late medieval, mercantile, and early capitalist stages of economic growth in …

Lessons Learned: Neel Kashkari, Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Neel Kashkari was the Interim Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Stability between October 2008 and May 2009. He oversaw the architecture and administration of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during this time. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Kashkari.

Lessons Learned: Phillip Swagel, Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Phillip Swagel was Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the U.S. Treasury between 2006 and 2009. During this time, he advised Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson as his chief economist, served as a member of the TARP Investment Committee, and played an important part in the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Swagel.

Lessons Learned: James Wigand, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

A finance specialist and longtime Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) executive, James Wigand served as Deputy Director, Franchise and Asset Marketing, at the FDIC from 1997 to 2010, a period encompassing the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Wigand oversaw the resolution of all insured-depository institutions during the crisis, arranging acquisitions of troubled banks or liquidating them. He also acted as liaison between the chairman and board of directors of the FDIC. In 2010, in the aftermath of the crisis, Wigand was named director of the newly created Office of Complex Financial Institutions at the FDIC, an office formed under the …

Lessons Learned: Arthur Murton, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Arthur Murton joined the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in 1986 as a financial economist and rose through the ranks to become Director of the Division of Insurance and Research, a post he held from 1995 to 2013 and which he steered through the financial crisis of 2007-09. Murton participated in the important interagency discussions held on Columbus Day weekend in 2008 that led to the establishment of breakthrough programs that proved critical in stabilizing financial markets. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on an interview with Mr. Murton about his crisis experience.

Lessons Learned: Michael Krimminger, Charles Euchner, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Michael Krimminger was Special Advisor for Policy and General Counsel at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation during the global financial crisis. In that role, he provided legal and policy advice on the writing and implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, including its systemically important financial institution provisions, living wills, capital markets and capital, and structured finance requirements. He is now a partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Krimminger.

Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Diane Ellis served as Deputy Director, Insurance and Research, at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. during the financial crisis of 2007-09. The FDIC played a critical role in stabilizing financial conditions and establishing confidence in the financial markets by guaranteeing newly issued debt on a temporary basis for banks and thrifts as well as financial holding companies and eligible bank affiliates. The agency also fully guaranteed certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts. Ellis played an important role in implementing the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program that proved so critical in stemming the crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview …