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- Global Financial Crisis (29)
- Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (23)
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- Chrysler (14)
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- Reserve requirements (14)
- General Motors (13)
- Ad hoc emergency liquidity (12)
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- TARP (10)
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- Subprime CDO (9)
- Bail-in (8)
- Liquidity (8)
- Asset purchase programs (7)
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- Manufacturing (7)
- Bankrupcty (6)
- Debt-in-possession financing (6)
- Federal Reserve (6)
- International Monetary Fund (6)
- Leadership (6)
- Medium-term debt (6)
- Residental mortgage-backed securities (6)
- UAW (6)
- Ad hoc capital injection (5)
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Articles 151 - 180 of 201
Full-Text Articles in Economic History
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance To Ally Financial (Formerly Gmac), Riki Matsumoto, Kaleb B. Nygaard
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance To Ally Financial (Formerly Gmac), Riki Matsumoto, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, GMAC was a $200 billion company providing financing to General Motors customers. As the Global Financial Crisis entered a critical stage in early 2008, GMAC’s funding strategy and liquidity position were adversely affected by the significant disruption in credit markets and the broader economic downturn. This reduced access to financing, which impacted GMAC’s ability to provide automotive wholesale inventory and retail financing to General Motors and Chrysler. In late 2008 and early 2009 GM and Chrysler underwent a complex restructuring process. To restore liquidity to GMAC’s auto finance business, the Federal Reserve agreed to expedite GMAC’s conversion to …
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors Through Bankruptcy, Kaleb B. Nygaard
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors Through Bankruptcy, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Journal of Financial Crises
As the Global Financial Crisis worsened in 2008, credit markets tightened and a broader economic downturn developed, hitting the auto industry particularly hard. The crisis intensified a decade-long decline of the largest US auto manufacturers. Because of its size and importance to the economy, the US government decided to provide assistance to General Motors (GM) to sustain it while it developed plans for its long-term viability. Congress declined to authorize funding for the auto manufacturers, but in December 2008, Treasury provided a bridge loan to GM under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) to sustain the company until the Obama …
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans, Alexander Nye
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans, Alexander Nye
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis, America’s Big Three automakers neared their breaking point. Two of them, General Motors (GM) and Chrysler, asked Congress for funding to prevent uncontrolled bankruptcies. Policymakers realized these uncontrolled bankruptcies would damage the manufacturing sector. Congress considered but failed to pass a framework conditioning short-term financing on the companies’ producing acceptable restructuring plans. With the companies warning that they could not survive the coming presidential transition, on December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush announced the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) under the authority of the Emergency Economic Stability Act (EESA) …
Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs, June Rhee, Junko Oguri, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs, June Rhee, Junko Oguri, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
This paper surveys 36 broad-based capital injection (BBCI) programs and attempts to identify some best (and worst) practices. We argue that it is crucial to distinguish between programs implemented during acute (“panic”) and chronic (“debt overhang”) phases of a crisis, where the goals of program design should be different. In an acute phase, programs should be designed to influence the behavior of bank counterparties, while in chronic phases, the focus should be on bank behavior itself. With this framing, we identify seven themes to guide program design, and provide many illustrative examples for the policymaker’s tool kit.
Lessons Learned: Lewis "Lee" Sachs, Yasemin Esmen
Lessons Learned: Lewis "Lee" Sachs, Yasemin Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Lewis “Lee” Sachs was counselor to Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner and head of the Obama administration’s Financial Crisis Response Team in the US Department of the Treasury. Mr. Sachs led the development and coordination of the Obama administration’s Financial Stability Plan to stabilize the financial system during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC). He was tasked with continued coordination with the outgoing Bush administration, as well as putting together a team to develop further restructuring plans and oversee their execution. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Sachs.
Lessons Learned: Jenni Lecompte, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Jenni Lecompte, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Jenni LeCompte was deputy assistant secretary in charge of public affairs operations at the Treasury Department during the Global Financial Crisis and later became assistant secretary, public affairs. She coordinated communications, served as a spokesperson, and advised Secretary Timothy Geithner during the crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Ms. LeCompte.
Lessons Learned: Neel Kashkari, Yasemin Esmen
Lessons Learned: Neel Kashkari, Yasemin Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Neel Kashkari was the Interim Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Stability between October 2008 and May 2009. He oversaw the architecture and administration of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during this time. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Kashkari.
Lessons Learned: Phillip Swagel, Yasemin Esmen
Lessons Learned: Phillip Swagel, Yasemin Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Phillip Swagel was Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the U.S. Treasury between 2006 and 2009. During this time, he advised Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson as his chief economist, served as a member of the TARP Investment Committee, and played an important part in the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Swagel.
Lessons Learned: James Wigand, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: James Wigand, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
A finance specialist and longtime Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) executive, James Wigand served as Deputy Director, Franchise and Asset Marketing, at the FDIC from 1997 to 2010, a period encompassing the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Wigand oversaw the resolution of all insured-depository institutions during the crisis, arranging acquisitions of troubled banks or liquidating them. He also acted as liaison between the chairman and board of directors of the FDIC. In 2010, in the aftermath of the crisis, Wigand was named director of the newly created Office of Complex Financial Institutions at the FDIC, an office formed under the …
Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Diane Ellis served as Deputy Director, Insurance and Research, at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. during the financial crisis of 2007-09. The FDIC played a critical role in stabilizing financial conditions and establishing confidence in the financial markets by guaranteeing newly issued debt on a temporary basis for banks and thrifts as well as financial holding companies and eligible bank affiliates. The agency also fully guaranteed certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts. Ellis played an important role in implementing the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program that proved so critical in stemming the crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview …
Hungary: Magyar Reorganizációs És Követeléskezelő Zrt (Mark Zrt.), Mallory Dreyer
Hungary: Magyar Reorganizációs És Követeléskezelő Zrt (Mark Zrt.), Mallory Dreyer
Journal of Financial Crises
Hungary saw a surge in commercial real estate (CRE) lending prior to the Global Financial Crisis. By 2014, the banking sector was saddled with a high ratio of nonperforming CRE loans and repossessed property, though Hungarian banks remained solvent with high capital adequacy ratios. The central bank of Hungary, the MNB, announced the creation of an asset management company, Magyar Reorganizációs és Követeléskezelő Zrt. (MARK), to purchase nonperforming CRE assets from Hungarian banks on a voluntary basis, to clear their balance sheets and allow for increased lending. MARK was fully-owned by the MNB, which provided MARK’s share capital and a …
Asset Management Corporation Of Nigeria (Amcon): Asset Management, Pascal Ungersboeck, Corey N. Runkel
Asset Management Corporation Of Nigeria (Amcon): Asset Management, Pascal Ungersboeck, Corey N. Runkel
Journal of Financial Crises
Nigeria experienced the Global Financial Crisis as a dramatic decline in the price of crude oil and a burst stock market bubble. These losses were compounded by a high level of margin lending, resulting in large numbers of nonperforming loans (NPLs) for Nigerian banks. The government established the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) in July 2010 to purchase NPLs and inject capital in insolvent banks. In three purchases between December 2010 and December 2011, AMCON acquired loans with face value ₦4.02 trillion ($26.8 billion) for ₦1.76 trillion. As a result, NPLs in Nigerian banks fell from a peak of …
National Asset Management Agency (Nama), Alexander Nye
National Asset Management Agency (Nama), Alexander Nye
Journal of Financial Crises
After the Irish property boom peaked in 2007, Ireland’s banks faced declining share prices and increasing liquidity pressures. When in the aftermath of the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, Ireland’s banks lost access to liquidity from abroad, it triggered a banking crisis in the country. In spite of various responses by the Irish government, the financial viability of Ireland’s banks (as well as the government’s fiscal position) continued to deteriorate in early 2009. The Irish government attributed the problem to impaired real estate assets sitting on bank balance sheets, which made it difficult for markets to believe that government’s …
Colombia: Central De Inversiones Sa (Cisa), Lily S. Engbith, Manuel Leon Hoyos
Colombia: Central De Inversiones Sa (Cisa), Lily S. Engbith, Manuel Leon Hoyos
Journal of Financial Crises
Colombia began 1999 amidst a deep recession, caused in part by financial and trade sector liberalization and exacerbated by an unexpectedly sudden appreciation of the peso. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) amounted to more than 14% of total loans, up from 8% in 1998. Colombian authorities thus decided to implement a three-year economic recovery program in late 1999. As part of the government’s strategy, banks slated for recapitalization were compelled to transfer or write off their NPL portfolios to Central de Inversiones SA (CISA), a public special purpose vehicle acquired by the deposit guarantee fund Fogafín in September 2000 for the management …
China: 1999 Asset Management Corporations, Lily S. Engbith
China: 1999 Asset Management Corporations, Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
Chinese financial authorities began to liberalize their economy in the 1970s, though it would take two more decades to realize a solution to the massive non-performing loan (NPL) problem faced by state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). In order to remove and dispose of bad assets left over from the policy-lending era of the former command economy, the State Council created four public asset management corporations (AMCs) between April and October of 1999. The AMCs, under the administration of the Ministry of Finance, were responsible for the acquisition, management, and disposal of NPLs from their assigned state-owned commercial bank. In addition to …
The Resolution And Collection Corporation Of Japan, Mallory Dreyer
The Resolution And Collection Corporation Of Japan, Mallory Dreyer
Journal of Financial Crises
Though the Japanese real estate and stock market bubble burst in the early 1990s, the ensuing financial crisis in Japan did not reach a systemic level until 1997, when four large financial institutions failed in a single month. Because of their heavy exposure to real estate and equity markets, Japanese banks had a nonperforming loan (NPL) problem, which was prolonged, and private sector estimates of the scale of the NPL problem differed significantly from the official estimates. In response, the Japanese government created multiple asset management companies; the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) was the result of the merger of …
Kyrgyz Republic’S Debt Resolution Agency, Debra, Sharon M. Nunn
Kyrgyz Republic’S Debt Resolution Agency, Debra, Sharon M. Nunn
Journal of Financial Crises
In the mid-1990s, the largest state-owned banks in the Kyrgyz Republic faced insolvency and a concomitant large stock of nonperforming loans, a problem stemming from the former Soviet Union’s policy of directed credit to loss-making institutions. The government established DEBRA, a debt resolution agency and asset management company. DEBRA could liquidate or restructure a bank and take on its assets in the process, or just take on a bank’s nonperforming assets. DEBRA received the assets in exchange for government securities. Staff attempted to resolve the debt by collection, restructuring, writing off, or liquidating the assets. Officials initially established DEBRA with …
Kazakhstan’S Rehabilitation Bank, Sharon M. Nunn
Kazakhstan’S Rehabilitation Bank, Sharon M. Nunn
Journal of Financial Crises
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan officials made market-oriented stabilization reforms to its previously Soviet-planned economy, including removing most price constraints, privatizing various state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and taking steps to prevent the collapse of its banking system. As part of its efforts, Kazakhstan created the Rehabilitation Bank (RB) in 1995 to absorb the large number of non-performing assets from state-owned banks while also assuming a corresponding amount of the institutions’ liabilities, essentially “shrinking their portfolios” (Implementation Completion Report 1998). The RB, established with a four-year mandate, either liquidated the debtors or required the firms to restructure. …
Swedish Amcs: Securum And Retriva, Mallory Dreyer
Swedish Amcs: Securum And Retriva, Mallory Dreyer
Journal of Financial Crises
With the liberalization of the Swedish banking system in the 1980s, there was a rapid credit expansion, and real estate prices soared. When the Swedish economy began to weaken, real estate prices began to decline, and finance companies faced difficulties. Swedish banks were not insulated from financial pressures, and Nordbanken, a majority state-owned bank, declared large credit losses in 1990. The Swedish government’s response was initially ad hoc and targeted to specific banks, but in 1992, the government announced an open-ended guarantee of all bank liabilities. The crisis response also included a bank restructuring program and the establishment of targeted …
Czech And Slovak Federative Republic: Consolidation Bank (Kob), Lily S. Engbith
Czech And Slovak Federative Republic: Consolidation Bank (Kob), Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent Velvet Revolution in 1989, the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) began the complex transition from a centrally controlled command economy to a market-based economy. The transition necessitated the removal of non-performing loans from state-owned banks’ balance sheets, a task assigned by the Ministry of Finance to the newly formed Consolidation Bank (Konsolidační Banka, hereafter “KOB”). Established on February 25, 1991, the KOB was specifically mandated to acquire and restructure what were known as “TOZ” loans, unsecured debt with no amortization schedules and unsustainably high interest rates. The …
Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust (Npart), Riki Matsumoto
Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust (Npart), Riki Matsumoto
Journal of Financial Crises
The Ghanaian financial sector was in severe distress in 1985 after a decade of high and variable rates of inflation, low economic growth, and financial policies ill-suited to the country’s goals. Ghana, with World Bank support, implemented a Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) between 1988-1997. To comply with the FINSAP, the Government established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) as a temporary public asset management company under Provisional National Defence Council Law 242 on February 28, 1990, with an initial 6-year statutory life, for the purpose of: 1) facilitating the restructuring and recapitalization of major state-owned banks; 2) expediting the …
Senegal Société Nationale De Recouvrement (Snr), Corey N. Runkel
Senegal Société Nationale De Recouvrement (Snr), Corey N. Runkel
Journal of Financial Crises
In the late 1980s, Senegal embarked on a comprehensive set of reforms to its banking sector. The reforms comprised changes to management, supervision, and lending standards after loose central bank refinancing standards had let the nonperforming loans (NPLs) caused by drought and public enterprise mismanagement linger on bank balance sheets. In the process, the country attempted to recover NPLs worth hundreds of billions of francs. Senegal closed several state-controlled banks, transferring bad assets and certain liabilities to a new asset management company, the Société Nationale de Recouvrement (SNR). The SNR’s debt recoveries would reimburse depositors in the liquidated banks and …
Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme, Sean Fulmer
Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme, Sean Fulmer
Journal of Financial Crises
As the Latin American sovereign debt crisis spread through the continent during the early 1980s, foreign investors began to abandon Uruguay out of fear that it would devalue its currency like Argentina did in March 1981. Five small- to medium-sized commercial banks in Uruguay faced solvency crises as a result. Although the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) decided that a full, direct intervention into the failed banks was not necessary due to their size, the CBU arranged for the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions, while assuming the non-performing portfolios of the failed banks to facilitate the transaction. …
Spain: Deposit Guarantee Fund Asset Management, Manuel León Hoyos
Spain: Deposit Guarantee Fund Asset Management, Manuel León Hoyos
Journal of Financial Crises
The global oil shock in 1973-74 occurred at a time when Spain was embarking on a liberalization of its financial system that resulted in many new entrants, particularly small- and medium-sized institutions. The banking crisis that followed from 1977-85 affected 52 of the country’s 110 banks, most of them of small- and medium-sized, that comprised over 20% of bank deposits. Spain established the Deposit Guarantee Fund in November 1977 to provide limited deposit insurance, and, in March 1978, established a Banking Corporation to take control of and reorganize troubled banks. However, because the Banking Corporation lacked the legal authority to …
An Inferentially Robust Look At Two Competing Explanations For The Surge In Unauthorized Migration From Central America, Nick Santos
Dissertations
The last 8 years have seen a dramatic increase in the flow of Central American apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol. Explanations for this surge in apprehensions have been split between two leading hypotheses. Most academic scholars, immigrant advocates, progressive media outlets, and human rights organizations identify poverty and violence (the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis) in Central America as the primary triggers responsible. In contrast, while most government officials, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm admit poverty and violence may underlie some decisions to migrate, they instead blame lax U.S. immigration …
Lessons Learned: Robert Hoyt, Esq., Yasemin Esmen
Lessons Learned: Robert Hoyt, Esq., Yasemin Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Robert Hoyt was General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Treasury between 2006 and 2009. He oversaw legal aspects of policies implemented to manage the crisis, including the rescues of Bear Stearns, AIG, and the U.S. Auto industry, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the failure of Lehman Brothers, as well as the creation and implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP.) This Lessons Learned is based on a phone interview with Mr. Hoyt.
The United Kingdom's Credit Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), Christian M. Mcnamara
The United Kingdom's Credit Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), Christian M. Mcnamara
Journal of Financial Crises
The September 15, 2008, bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers resulted in a collapse of wholesale funding markets that threatened the ability of UK financial institutions to continue funding themselves. By the end of the month, two leading UK banks—HBOS and Bradford & Bingley—had to be rescued, and there was a real risk that the entire financial system could collapse. Faced with the need to stabilize the system, UK regulators on October 8 introduced a package of measures that included a £250 billion Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) aimed at providing banks with access to needed funding. Under the Guarantee Scheme, …
Sweden's Guarantee Scheme (Sweden Gfc), Lily S. Engbith, Kevin Kiernan
Sweden's Guarantee Scheme (Sweden Gfc), Lily S. Engbith, Kevin Kiernan
Journal of Financial Crises
Although Sweden was not as directly impacted by the Global Financial Crisis as some other economies, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, prompted Swedish authorities to take preemptive measures to protect domestic banks and financial institutions. One such program, announced on October 20, 2008, and implemented on October 29, 2008, was designed to preserve credit extension to businesses and households through what became known as the Swedish Guarantee Scheme. Per the terms of the Scheme, new short- and medium-term debt of maturities ranging from 90 days to five years issued by eligible banks would be guaranteed by the Swedish …
The Spanish Guarantee Scheme For Credit Institutions (Spain Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Spanish Guarantee Scheme For Credit Institutions (Spain Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
Given Spanish banks’ heavy investment in the housing and construction markets in the lead-up to the global financial crisis (GFC), the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, impelled the government to implement stabilization measures to calm, recapitalize, and restructure its domestic banking sector. The Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (the Guarantee Scheme) was one of the first interventions to be enacted, announced by Spain’s Ministry of Economy and Finance on October 13, 2008, by Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 on “Urgent Economic and Financial Measures in relation to the Concerted Action Plan of …
The Italian Guarantee Scheme (Italy Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Italian Guarantee Scheme (Italy Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and its severe impact on global credit markets impelled governments around the world to enact stabilization measures to calm and protect their domestic economies. The Italian Republic, while not directly affected by the US subprime mortgage crisis, preemptively implemented emergency procedures and programs to ensure the stability of their banking system. Announced with the passage of Decree-Law No. 157 on October 13, 2008, and legally enforced under Law 190/2008 of December 4, 2008, the Italian Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) was aimed at protecting institutions whose interbank lending abilities had the …