Behavioral Economics Commons^™

Sunk Or Dunk?: An Empirical Analysis Of The Effect Of Sunk Cost Fallacy In Professional Basketball, Hailey Dicicco

Business and Economics Presentations

This project is divided into two sections. The first section is a comparison between the NBA and WNBA, using performance metrics from game statistics. I researched the history of women in sports and specifically read about how women first became integrated into the game of soccer. In the regression for section one, we used a few selected performance metrics and minutes in order to observe any relationships between specific skills and minutes. We also focused on the difference between the leagues in terms of what game stats are more or less significant.

In the second section of this paper, we …

Revenue Incentives And Referee Propensity To Make Foul Calls In The Nba Finals, Daniel Fallon-Cyr

CMC Senior Theses

In this study I examine foul calls by NBA referees alongside the difference in aggressiveness of twelve NBA basketball teams as they compete for the Championship Title. I aim to identify referee biases that increase the likelihood of the NBA Finals ending in a later game due to league revenue incentives. My data consists of 91 individual NBA Finals games played between the 2001 and 2016 NBA Finals. After controlling for changes in play as well as the difference in aggressiveness, I find that NBA referee’s foul calls are more dependent on a call on the opposing team in situations …

Can Nba Teams Benefit From Losing?, Ryan P. Hallisey

Honors Scholar Theses

It has been speculated that franchises in the NBA (national basketball association) lose on purpose because of the benefits that coincide with a team having a poor overall record. Teams that perform the worst are given the highest draft selections in the following season's rookie player draft, thus theoretically improving their chances of becoming a more winning team. Previous economists have used various methodology to prove that NBA teams do in fact lose on purpose; or tank. This paper builds upon this previous methodology to examine the direct impact, negative or positive, that losing on purpose has had on various …

Tournament Incentives, League Policy, And Nba Team Performance Revisited, Joseph Price, Brian P. Soebbing, David Berri, Brad R. Humphreys

Faculty Publications

Taylor and Trogdon found evidence of shirking under some, but not all, draft lottery systems used in three different National Basketball Association (NBA) seasons. The authors use data from all NBA games played from 1977 to 2007 and a fixed effects model to control for unobservable team and season heterogeneity to extend this research. The authors find that NBA teams were more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season during the seasons where the incentives to finish last were the largest.