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Articles 301 - 309 of 309
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Dynamic Bargaining With Transaction Costs, Peter Cramton
Dynamic Bargaining With Transaction Costs, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
A buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations. The seller's valuation is common knowledge, but the buyer's valuation is known only by the buyer. Impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources: the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining. Equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade, delayed trade, or immediate termination, depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs. This contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs, and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs.
Shrewd Bargaining On The Moral Frontier: Toward A Theory Of Morality In Practice, Peter Cramton, J Gregory Dees
Shrewd Bargaining On The Moral Frontier: Toward A Theory Of Morality In Practice, Peter Cramton, J Gregory Dees
Peter Cramton
From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. When grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about one’s settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases …
Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz
Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz
Peter Cramton
This paper focuses on certain mechanisms that govern the sale of corporate assets. Under Delaware law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target’s Board of Directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company.’’ The Delaware courts’ preference for auctions follows from two premises. First, a firm’s managers should maximize the value of their shareholders’ investment in the company. Second, auctions maximize shareholder returns. The two premises together imply that a target’s board should conduct an auction when at least …
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Peter Cramton
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection results in either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome. However, if the cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by the member firms, then the incentive problem can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.
Nonrandom Mixing Models Of Hiv Transmission, Peter Cramton, Edward H. Kaplan, A. David Paltiel
Nonrandom Mixing Models Of Hiv Transmission, Peter Cramton, Edward H. Kaplan, A. David Paltiel
Peter Cramton
Models of HIV transmission and the AIDS epidemic generally assume random mixing among those infected with HIV and those who are not. For sexually transmitted HIV, this implies that individuals select sex partners without regard to attributes such as familiarity, attractiveness, or risk of infection. This paper formulates a model for examining the impact of nonrandom mixing on HIV transmission. We present threshold conditions that determine when HIV epidemics can occur within the framework of this model. Nonrandom mixing is introduced by assuming that sexually active individuals select sex partners to minimize the risk of infection. In addition to variability …
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Peter Cramton
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …
Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, Peter Cramton
Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of sequential bargaining games in which the players’ time preferences are described by known and fixed discount rates. I begin by characterizing the class of perfect bargaining mechanisms, which satisfy the desirable properties of incentive compatibility (i.e., each player reports his type truthfully), individual rationality (i.e., every potential player wishes to play the game), and sequential rationality (i.e., it is never common knowledge that the mechanism induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism). It is shown that ex post efficiency is unobtainable by any incentive-compatible and individually …
Bargaining With Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton
Bargaining With Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others’ preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behavior of agents when commitment is not possible. Since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable, they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached. This need for learning, due to incomplete information about preferences, results in bargaining inefficiencies: trade often occurs after costly …
The Logic Of Protest Action, Herman L. Boschken
The Logic Of Protest Action, Herman L. Boschken
Herman L. Boschken
In recent years, there has been a noticeable growth in political protest involving groups of widely diverging interests. The rising incidence of protest seems paradoxical to the apparent growth of affluence in society. This paper attempts to resolve this paradox by contending that most forms of protest are a function of the degree of separation between (a) the values and goals of those controlling collective decision processes and (b) the diversity of interests and aspirations in segmented society at large. Through protest action, disenfranchised groups are able to impose "external" costs on "establishment" regimes that lead to alteration of the …