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Articles 91 - 120 of 170
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
How Does Childbirth Alter Intrahousehold Resource Allocation?: Evidence From Japan, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
How Does Childbirth Alter Intrahousehold Resource Allocation?: Evidence From Japan, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
Exploiting unique panel data that include direct measurements of resource allocation within households, we investigated the impact of childbirth on intrahousehold allocation for married Japanese couples. Based on a collective model of the household, we developed reduced-form and structural-form estimation equations that allow us to focus on private goods to track the changes in intrahousehold resource allocation. We found one additional child is associated with a reduction in the wife's private expenditure share by at least two percentage points. This may be because she substitutes more say in decisions on the children for her own private expenditure share.
A Note On Separability And Intra-Household Resource Allocation In A Collective Household Model, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
A Note On Separability And Intra-Household Resource Allocation In A Collective Household Model, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper shows that it is possible to track the changes in the distribution of power within a couple by focusing on the changes in the pattern of private consumption when the consumption decisions are efficient and private consumption is separable from public consumption in individual preferences. We first show that the separability of private consumption from public consumption at the individual level carries over to the household level. Hence, changes in public consumption only matters through a change in the residual budget available for private consumption. When the consumption decisions within the household is efficient, private consumption decisions can …
Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan
Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan
Research Collection School Of Economics
Central place theory is a key building block of economic geography and an empirically plausible description of city systems. This paper provides a rationale for central place theory via a dynamic programming formulation of the social planner's problem of city hierarchy. We show that there must be one and only one immediate smaller city between two neighboring larger-sized cities in any optimal solution. If the fixed cost of setting up a city is a power function, then the immediate smaller city will be located in the middle, confirming the locational pattern suggested by Christaller [4] . We also show that …
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We extend the Arrow–Fisher–Hanemann–Henry (AFHH) and Dixit–Pindyck (DP) option values to a game situation. By reinterpreting the AFHH option value as a change in the surplus from conservation because of the prospect of future information, we deal with a conceptual difficulty associated with the AFHH option value in the presence of strategic interactions. We then introduce the DP option value into a game situation. We show that the equivalence between the expected value of information and the DP option value in the standard model does not hold under strategic interactions.
Ex Post Destruction In The Hold-Up Problem, Huan Wang, Juyuan Zhang, Yi Zhang
Ex Post Destruction In The Hold-Up Problem, Huan Wang, Juyuan Zhang, Yi Zhang
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate whether or not ex post destruction can solve the hold-up problem. After clarifying the difference between ex post destruction and nontrade when negotiation breaks down, we show that the option of ex post destruction is not sufficient to enhance ex ante efficiency. In particular, only if the information about the spitefulness of the supplier is coarse enough, will the option of ex post destruction alleviate the inefficiency of underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem.
Grandparents As Guards: A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Inheritance And Post Marital Residence In A World Of Uncertain Paternity, Brishti Guha
Grandparents As Guards: A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Inheritance And Post Marital Residence In A World Of Uncertain Paternity, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
I unify the following (1) men face paternal uncertainty while women do not face maternal uncertainty, (2) putative fathers and paternal kin care about true paternity, (3) paternity confidence is systematically lower in matrilocal cultures than in patrilocal ones, (4) inheritance tends to be patrilineal in high paternity confidence cultures and matrilineal in low confidence ones, and (5) most societies with patrilineal inheritance were patrilocal while most societies with matrilineal inheritance were matrilocal. I model the co-evolution of inheritance patterns and post-marital residence patterns - and their relationship with paternity uncertainty. Using a game theoretic model, I examine how a …
Schooling, Political Participation, And The Economy, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor
Schooling, Political Participation, And The Economy, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate how the link between individual schooling and political participation is a ected by country characteristics. Using individual survey data, we nd that political participation is more responsive to schooling in land-abundant countries, and less responsive in human capital-abundant countries, even while controlling for country political institutions and cultural attitudes. We propose an explanation that centers on how individuals allocate the use of their human capital. A relative abundance of land (used primarily in the least skill-intensive sector) or a scarcity of aggregate hu- man capital increases both the level of political participation and its responsiveness to schooling, by …
An Evolutionary Analysis Of Turnout With Conformist Citizens, Massimiliano Landi, Mauro Sodini
An Evolutionary Analysis Of Turnout With Conformist Citizens, Massimiliano Landi, Mauro Sodini
Research Collection School Of Economics
We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, the population's size or the groups' composition are also done.
Central Place Theory And City Size Distribution, Wen-Tai Hsu
Central Place Theory And City Size Distribution, Wen-Tai Hsu
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper proposes a theory of city size distribution via a hierarchy approach rather than the popular random growth process. It does so by formalizing central place theory using an equilibrium entry model and specifying the conditions under which city size distribution follows a power law. Central place theory describes the way in which a hierarchical city system with different layers of cities serving differently sized market areas is formed from a uniformly populated space. The force driving the city size differences in this model is the heterogeneity in economies of scale across goods. The city size distribution under a …
Gambling On Genes: Ambiguity Aversion Explains Investment In Sisters' Children, Brishti Guha
Gambling On Genes: Ambiguity Aversion Explains Investment In Sisters' Children, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Many men invest in their sisters’ children instead of their wives’. Existing theories addressing such behavior depend on the level of paternity probability in such men’s societies being implausibly low. I link this anthropologically observed investment behavior with the experimentally observed phenomenon that some individuals are ambiguity averse. Arguing that men’s decisions are made under ambiguity, I show that an increase in ambiguity aversion results in investment in sisters’, rather than wives’, children. I show that this can happen even under risk neutrality. I also consider the special cases of a SEU maximizer and of extreme ambiguity aversion in the …
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
Love And Money By Parental Match-Making: Evidence From Urban Couples In China, Fali Huang, Ginger Jin, Lixin Collin Xu
Love And Money By Parental Match-Making: Evidence From Urban Couples In China, Fali Huang, Ginger Jin, Lixin Collin Xu
Research Collection School Of Economics
Parental involvement in marriage matchmaking may distort the optimal spouse choice because parents are willing to substitute love for money. The rationale is that the joint income of married children can be shared among extended family members more easily than mutual attraction felt by the couple themselves, and as a result, the best spouse candidate in the parents' eyes can differ from what is optimal to the individual, even though parents are altruistic and care dearly about their children's welfare. We find supporting evidence for this prediction using a unique sample of urban couples in China in the early 1990s.
Finding Dynamic Treatment Effects Under Anticipation: Spanking Effects On Behavior, Myoung-Jae Lee, Fali Huang
Finding Dynamic Treatment Effects Under Anticipation: Spanking Effects On Behavior, Myoung-Jae Lee, Fali Huang
Research Collection School Of Economics
The dynamic treatment effect literature considers multiple treatments administered over time, with some treatments affected by interim outcomes. But the literature overlooks the possibility of individuals acting in anticipation of future treatments. This lack of anticipation aspect may not matter in the drug–response relationships which motivated the literature. But human beings (or animals with some intelligence) do not just respond to current and past treatments, but also ‘reflect and anticipate’ future treatments. For example, a punishment or reward is likely to prompt forward looking. Even if no personal punishment or reward is involved, people may take action in anticipation of …
Is Specialization Desirable In Committee Decision Making?, Ruth Ben-Yashar, Winston T. H. Koh, Shmuel Nitzan
Is Specialization Desirable In Committee Decision Making?, Ruth Ben-Yashar, Winston T. H. Koh, Shmuel Nitzan
Research Collection School Of Economics
Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers. Specialization (in the context of project or public policy selection) means that the decision of each committee member is based on a narrow area, which typically results in the acquirement and use of relatively high expertise in that area. When the committee members’ expertise is already determined, specialization only means that the decision of each committee member is based solely on his/her relatively high …
A Note On Separability And Intra-Household Resource Allocation In A Collective Household Model, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
A Note On Separability And Intra-Household Resource Allocation In A Collective Household Model, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a collective model of a household in which each member has a utility function satisfying the weak separability condition. We show that the separability at the individual level carries over to the household level and that the allocation of private goods in any Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported as a Pareto-efficient allocation of private sub-problem. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto weight for the private sub-problem to move in the same direction as the household Pareto weight.
Pirates And Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?, Brishti Guha
Pirates And Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Motivated by the Somali fishermen–pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to …
Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?, Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito
Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?, Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito
Research Collection School Of Economics
In a joint project involving two players of a two-round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other's efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency, multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency elimites the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players' efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.
Custodes Invicem Custodiunt: Commitment Through Competition, Madhav S. Aney, Giovanni Ko
Custodes Invicem Custodiunt: Commitment Through Competition, Madhav S. Aney, Giovanni Ko
Research Collection School Of Economics
How can specialists in violence, such as the military or the police, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition between these agents as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation. In our model, even if specialists in violence could expropriate all output costlessly, it is attractive to protect producers from predators. This is because there is a marginal defensive advantage and consequently defense is an effective way to potentially eliminate other specialists in violence, reducing competition and leading to higher future payoffs. Hence, producers can offer transfers to specialists in violence that make defense …
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We extend the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry (AFHH) and Dixit-Pindyck (DP) option values to game situations. By reinterpreting the AFHH option value as a change in the surplus from conservation because of the prospect of future information, we deal with the conceptual difficulty associated with the AFHH option value in the presence of strategic interactions. We then introduce the DP option value into a game situation. We show that the equivalence between the expected value of information and the DP option value in the standard model does not hold under strategic interactions.
Crowding-Out Effect Of The Current Food Stamp Subsidy Scheme, Yi Zhang
Crowding-Out Effect Of The Current Food Stamp Subsidy Scheme, Yi Zhang
Research Collection School Of Economics
We construct a model to illustrate that the current food stamp subsidy scheme fails to achieve its stated aim due to the crowding-out effect. More specifically, if the household income is sufficiently low, only a corner solution exists, and a full subsidy is needed.
Preferences, Prisoners And Private Information: Was Socrates Rational At His Trial?, Brishti Guha
Preferences, Prisoners And Private Information: Was Socrates Rational At His Trial?, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern.
Pirates And Traders: Some Economics Of Pirate-Infested Seas, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Pirates And Traders: Some Economics Of Pirate-Infested Seas, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.
Double-Edged Transparency In Teams, Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito
Double-Edged Transparency In Teams, Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito
Research Collection School Of Economics
In a team project with significant complementarities between various players' individual tasks, news of early success by some encourages others to push ahead with their own tasks while lack of success has the opposite effect. This ex-post disparity in incentives created gives rise to two differing implications, ex ante, for an ideal team transparency. Sometimes it is better to commit to complete secrecy within the team of the various participants' interim progress as it mitigates the negative effect of failures. In some other situations, commitment to full disclosure is better as players are then encouraged to be proactive by exerting …
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to …
Group Reputation, Anonymous Matching, And External Monitoring In A Model Of Corruption, Huan Wang, Yi Zhang
Group Reputation, Anonymous Matching, And External Monitoring In A Model Of Corruption, Huan Wang, Yi Zhang
Research Collection School Of Economics
We explore what group reputation is and model its formation and evolution. Based solely on group signals, we define a player’s group reputation as the belief that others have about the characteristics of the group the player belongs to. A model of group reputation of civil servants with anonymous matching and external monitoring is constructed to characterize the strategic behavior of potential bribers and civil servants, the corresponding levels of corruption, possible anti-corruption policies, and the effects of these policies. Our results indicate that as there are two types of corruption behavior of civil servants: accepting bribes and dereliction of …
Sex Ratios, Divorce Laws And The Marriage Market, Brishti Guha
Sex Ratios, Divorce Laws And The Marriage Market, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
We show how an interaction between the skewness of the sex ratio and the jump in divorce rates after a liberalization in divorce laws can obtain in a model of marriage market matching with non-transferable utility. This model is partly motivated by a significant cross-country correlation between these two variables. We also find that men’s hopes or fears about women’s marriage market odds are self-confirming under mutual consent, resulting in multiple equilibria. The multiplicity vanishes with a more skewed sex ratio or a liberalization of divorce laws. Our work sheds some light on the possible implications of divorce liberalization and …
Patrilocal Exogamy As A Monitoring Mechanism: How Inheritance And Residence Patterns Co-Evolve, Brishti Guha
Patrilocal Exogamy As A Monitoring Mechanism: How Inheritance And Residence Patterns Co-Evolve, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Economists have modeled inheritance norms assuming the pattern of post-marital residence is exogenous. We model the co-evolution of these two institutions, examining how patrilineal inheritance and patrilocal exogamy reinforced each other in a patrilineal-patrilocal equilibrium. We also derive conditions for a matrilineal-matrilocal equilibrium. The endogenous choice of the old to monitor the sexual behavior of the young women who reside with them, thereby affecting the paternity confidence of the young women’s husbands and hence their incentives, is crucial. Our model fits the data on the relationship between inheritance, residence patterns and paternity confidence, and on the importance of paternity uncertainty.
Advertising Collusion In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea M. Lee
Advertising Collusion In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea M. Lee
Research Collection School Of Economics
We analyze non-price advertising by retail firms, when the firms are privately informed about their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which lower-cost firms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed consumers rationally employ an advertising search rule in which they buy from the highest-advertising firm since lower-cost firms also select lower prices. In a repeated advertising game, colluding firms face a trade-off: the use of advertising can promote productive efficiency, but only if sufficient current or future advertising expenses are incurred. At one extreme, if firms pool at zero advertising, …