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Articles 181 - 210 of 212

Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

Target Saving In An Overlapping Generations Model, Ashok S. Guha, Brishti Guha Jan 2008

Target Saving In An Overlapping Generations Model, Ashok S. Guha, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

We examine a model in which the utility function has been engineered so that it is optimal for consumers to aim for a fixed target level of retirement resources. In this case consumption displays excess sensitivity to current income as well as perfect old age insurance. In an overlapping generations model, this leads naturally to multiple and unstable equilibria. Under static expectations, it also leads to a well-defined dynamics, including possible historical traps, implosions involving ever-diminishing capital stock and ever-increasing interest rates, and the feasibility of optimal one-time interventions.

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Forecasting The Car Penetration Rate (Cpr) In China: A Nonparametric Approach, Sainan Jin, Liangjun Su Sep 2007

Forecasting The Car Penetration Rate (Cpr) In China: A Nonparametric Approach, Sainan Jin, Liangjun Su

Research Collection School Of Economics

With strong economic growth, the auto industry has made great breakthroughs in recent years and has become a backbone industry in China, while cars play an increasingly important role, and are now the principal part of the auto industry. Both China's government and academic circles take strong interest in the prediction of CPR (i.e. car penetration rate or cars per thousand people), which will be the main guidance for the future industry policy. We summarize the existing problems in recent research and propose to use nonparametric methods to estimate the CPR and its elasticity with respect to GDP per capita …

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Dynamic Treatment Effect Analysis Of Tv Effects On Child Cognitive Development, Fali Huang Sep 2007

Dynamic Treatment Effect Analysis Of Tv Effects On Child Cognitive Development, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

We investigate whether TV watching at ages 6-7 and 8-9 affects cognitive development measured by math and reading scores at ages 8-9 using a rich childhood longitudinal sample from NLSY79. Dynamic panel data models are estimated to handle the unobserved child-specific factor, endogeneity of TV watching, and dynamic nature of the causal relation. A special emphasis is put on the last aspect where TV watching affects cognitive development which in turn affects the future TV watching. When this feedback occurs, it is not straightforward to identify and estimate the TV effect. We adopt estimation methods available in the biostatistics literature …

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On The Segmentation Of Markets, Nicolas Laurent Jacquet, Serene Tan Sep 2007

On The Segmentation Of Markets, Nicolas Laurent Jacquet, Serene Tan

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.

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To Trust Or To Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis, Fali Huang Aug 2007

To Trust Or To Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon by endogenizing agent trustworthiness as a response to potential returns. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper over time, agents acquire lower trustworthiness, which may actually drive up the overall governance cost in society. Across societies, those giving employees lower weights in choosing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust. These results are consistent with the …

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Does Tv Affect Child Cognitive Development?, Fali Huang, Myoung-Jae Lee Aug 2007

Does Tv Affect Child Cognitive Development?, Fali Huang, Myoung-Jae Lee

Research Collection School Of Economics

We investigate whether TV watching at ages 6-7 and 8-9 affects cognitive development measured by math and reading scores at ages 8-9 using a rich childhood longitudinal sample from NLSY79. Dynamic panel data models are estimated to handle the unobserved child-specific factor, endogeneity of TV watching, and dynamic nature of the causal relation. A special emphasis is put on the last aspect where TV watching affects cognitive development which in turn affects the future TV watching. When this feedback occurs, it is not straightforward to identify and estimate the TV effect. We adopt estimation methods available in the biostatistics literature …

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Open Vs Sealed Bid Auctions: Testing For Revenue Equivalence Under Singapore's Vehicle Quota System, Roberto S. Mariano, Winston T. H. Koh, Yiu Kuen Tse Jan 2007

Open Vs Sealed Bid Auctions: Testing For Revenue Equivalence Under Singapore's Vehicle Quota System, Roberto S. Mariano, Winston T. H. Koh, Yiu Kuen Tse

Research Collection School Of Economics

Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we study if revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched from a sealed-bid format (May 1990 to June 2001) to an open bidding format since July 2001. Our econometric analysis indicates the change in auction format led to a change in bidding behavior. On average, the quota license premium under the open bidding format is about US$1000 (about 7.5% of the Category E license price in June 2001) lower, compared to the forecast level that would have prevailed if there had been no change in the auction …

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Lottery Rather Than Waiting-Line Auction, Winston T. H. Koh, Zhenlin Yang, Lijing Zhu Oct 2006

Lottery Rather Than Waiting-Line Auction, Winston T. H. Koh, Zhenlin Yang, Lijing Zhu

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper investigates the allocative efficiency of two non-price allocation mechanisms – the lottery (random allocation) and the waiting-line auction (queue system) – for the cases where consumers possess identical time costs (the homogeneous case), and where time costs are correlated with time valuations (the heterogeneous case). We show that the relative efficiency of the two mechanisms depends critically on a scarcity factor (measured by the ratio of the number of objects available for allocation over the number of participants) and on the shape of the distribution of valuations. We show that the lottery dominates the waiting-line auction for a …

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What Matter For Child Development?, Fali Huang Oct 2006

What Matter For Child Development?, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper estimates production functions of child cognitive and social development using a panel data of nine-year old children each with over two hundred home and school inputs as well as family background variables. A tree regression method is used to conduct estimation under various speci…cations. A small subset of inputs is found consistently important in explaining variances of child development results, including the number of books a child has at various ages and how often a mother reads to child by age …ve, while the e¤ects of race and maternal employment are negligible when detailed inputs are controlled.

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Expectations, Animal Spirits, And Evolutionary Dynamics, Angelo Antoci, Massimiliano Landi, Pier Luigi Sacco Mar 2006

Expectations, Animal Spirits, And Evolutionary Dynamics, Angelo Antoci, Massimiliano Landi, Pier Luigi Sacco

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider a (deterministic) evolutionary model where players have dynamic expectations about the strategy distribution. We provide a global analysis of the co-evolution of play and expectations for a generic two-by-two game. Besides the the typical indeterminacy of the evolutionary dynamics, we find some other ones: for any initial strategy configuration the dynamics can converge to any asymptotically stable fixed point, for different initial values of the expectations. Moreover, starting from the same initial pair of strategy configuration and values of expectations, the dynamics may lead to different asymptotically stable fixed points for different parameters of the expectations.

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Strategy Meets Evolution: Games Suppliers And Producers Play, Brishti Guha Feb 2006

Strategy Meets Evolution: Games Suppliers And Producers Play, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Final goods producers, who may be intrinsically honest (a behavioral type) or opportunistic (strategic), play a repeated game of imperfect information with suppliers of an input of variable (and non-verifiable) quality. Returns to cheating are increasing in the proportion of intrinsically honest producers. If producers compete for another scarce input, adverse selection reduces this proportion enough to enforce universal honesty, whether at a high or a low quality equilibrium. This mechanism limits the proportion of behavioral types in the population of producers over a wide range of parameters: despite their inability to compete with opportunists, they are not wholly wiped …

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Homeostasis And Well Being, Malcolm Dowling, Chin Fang Yap Feb 2006

Homeostasis And Well Being, Malcolm Dowling, Chin Fang Yap

Research Collection School Of Economics

The paper suggests that maintenance of a homeostatic equilibrium provides a rationale for many actions of economic agents. Homeostatic equilibrium has physical, economic, emotional, psychological and environmental dimensions. The characteristics of this equilibrium include feelings of safety, trust, connectedness with friends, family and community, and a predictable and welcoming social and work environment. Individuals generally make decisions that help them move toward and achieve this state of equilibrium. Departure from homeostasis reduces well being and stimulates agents to take actions that will return them to a state of homeostasis. This hypothesis is tested with probit analysis using sample responses from …

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Future Targets And Multiple Equilibria, Ashok S. Guha, Brishti Guha Oct 2005

Future Targets And Multiple Equilibria, Ashok S. Guha, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria may obtain in an overlapping generations model where consumers save to reach a fixed target. Existence and uniqueness conditions are discussed. The model displays excess consumption sensitivity to current income and perfect old-age insurance.

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The Case Of The Errant Executive: Management, Control And Firm Size In Corporate Cheating, Brishti Guha Sep 2005

The Case Of The Errant Executive: Management, Control And Firm Size In Corporate Cheating, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a repeated game with asymmetric information and stochastic market outcomes. The manager determines whether or not outsiders are cheated; the board, whose objectives differ from those of outside shareholders, attempts to control the manager through compensation contracts and dismissal threats Since compensation determines the manager’s incentive to cheat, firms competing for outside capital publicly announce their managerial contracts. However, secret renegotiation between firm and manager is still possible: so outsiders guard against being cheated by limiting their total stake in any …

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Honesty And Intermediation: Corporate Cheating, Auditor Involvement And The Implications For Development, Brishti Guha Sep 2005

Honesty And Intermediation: Corporate Cheating, Auditor Involvement And The Implications For Development, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

We examine self-enforcing honesty in firm-investor relations in an imperfect public information game. Minimum firm size requirements and moral hazard limit ability to raise outside capital, yielding a floor on personal wealth required to enter entrepreneurship. Credible auditing could create efficiency gains. We propose mandatory disclosure of audit fees and an interpretation of international differences in shareholding patterns. We endogenize auditor-firm collusion and extortion by auditors. We embed our game-theoretic analysis in a general equilibrium model to generate unique equilibria that trace the impact of the distribution of wealth on the existence of the market and consequences for development.

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The Auditor And The Firm: A Simple Model Of Corporate Cheating And Intermediation, Brishti Guha Sep 2005

The Auditor And The Firm: A Simple Model Of Corporate Cheating And Intermediation, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

We apply a game-theoretic model to the analysis of the recent spate of corporate scandals in which firms have cheated their investors, often with the aid of external auditors. We characterize the different types of equilibria that obtain for different parameter ranges in an auditor’s absence (the parameters we consider being early signal accuracy – a measure of transparency – and withdrawal costs – a measure of the liquidity of investments). We also analyze whether and under what conditions the presence of an informed auditor could lead to an improvement in the sense of honest behavior replacing cheating as the …

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Games Suppliers And Producers Play: Upstream And Downstream Moral Hazard With Unverifiable Input Quality, Brishti Guha Sep 2005

Games Suppliers And Producers Play: Upstream And Downstream Moral Hazard With Unverifiable Input Quality, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer given a framework of bilateral moral hazard with variable but non-verifiable input quality. Given the inability of third parties to verify input quality, each party has an incentive to cheat the other by making a false claim about input quality. We derive the contract which (a) induces honest behavior and brings about the Pareto superior first-best outcome for the widest possible range of exogenous parameters, and (b) maximizes the Nash product of both parties’ payoffs subject to incentive compatibility. An interesting feature of the …

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Optimal Sequential Decision Architectures And The Robustness Of Hierarchies And Polyarchies, Winston T. H. Koh Jun 2005

Optimal Sequential Decision Architectures And The Robustness Of Hierarchies And Polyarchies, Winston T. H. Koh

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies collective decision making in the context of a project selection model. We derive the optimal decision architecture in the presence of marginal decision costs, and investigate the circumstances under which the hierarchy and polyarchy emerge as optimal sequential architectures. Our analysis extends previous results on optimal organizational decision-making to a sequential setting, and further demonstrates the fragility of the hierarchy and polyarchy as optimal architectures.

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Corruption Across Countries And Regions: Some Consequences Of Local Osmosis, Raaj Sah Mar 2005

Corruption Across Countries And Regions: Some Consequences Of Local Osmosis, Raaj Sah

Research Collection School Of Economics

Large and persistent differences in corruption across comparable countries is a challenging research issue. Even more intriguing are such differences across regions within the same country, because the typically considered socioeconomic and governance characteristics are generally more similar across such regions than across different countries. This paper's principal theme is that individuals’ perceptions of their environments are influenced by the realities that they have faced in the past; these perceptions affect their current and future actions; which in turn influence the current and future realities. An articulation and analysis of these dynamics yields significant observations concerning individuals’ behavior and societal …

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Household Demand, Network Externality Effects And Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Winston T. H. Koh Mar 2005

Household Demand, Network Externality Effects And Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Winston T. H. Koh

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper examines the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination when network externality effects are present in the consumption of a durable good. We conduct our study in two settings. In a model with two household types, utilities are dependent on the cumulative proportion of households that have purchased the durable good. Next, in a model with a continuum of household types, we extend the analysis to the case where households consume both a durable good and a stream of non-durable goods. We show that in both settings, the presence of network externalities facilitates a sales strategy with intertemporal price discrimination.

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Household Demand, Network Externality Effects And Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Winston T. H. Koh Feb 2005

Household Demand, Network Externality Effects And Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Winston T. H. Koh

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper examines the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination when network externality effects are present in the consumption of a durable good. We conduct our study in two settings. In a model with two household types, utilities are dependent on the cumulative proportion of households that have purchased the durable good. Next, in a model with a continuum of household types, we extend the analysis to the case where households consume both a durable good and a stream of non-durable goods. We show that in both settings, the presence of network externalities facilitates a sales strategy with intertemporal price discrimination. …

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Expectations Formation And Forecasting Of Vehicle Demand: An Empirical Study Of The Vehicle Quota Auctions In Singapore, Sing-Fat Chu, Winston T. H. Koh, Yiu Kuen Tse Jun 2004

Expectations Formation And Forecasting Of Vehicle Demand: An Empirical Study Of The Vehicle Quota Auctions In Singapore, Sing-Fat Chu, Winston T. H. Koh, Yiu Kuen Tse

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies expectations formation and forecasting of vehicle demand in Singapore under the vehicle quota system. Under the system, a car buyer must first bid for a vehicle license in monthly auctions in order to purchase a new car. We construct an econometric model to test the hypothesis that past bid distributions of the license auctions contain information that car buyers can use to update their expectations about the intensity of market demand, forecast license premiums and formulate their bidding strategies in future auctions. Our empirical analysis indicates that past bid distributions have a good degree of predictive power …

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Expectations Formation And Forecasting Of Vehicle Demand: An Empirical Study Of The Vehicle Quota Auctions In Singapore, Sing-Fat Chu, Winston T. H. Koh, Yiu Kuen Tse Jun 2004

Expectations Formation And Forecasting Of Vehicle Demand: An Empirical Study Of The Vehicle Quota Auctions In Singapore, Sing-Fat Chu, Winston T. H. Koh, Yiu Kuen Tse

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies the expectations formation and forecasting of vehicle demand in Singapore under the vehicle quota system. Under the system, a car buyer must first bid for a vehicle license in monthly auctions in order to purchase a new car. We construct an econometric model to test the hypothesis that past bid distributions of the license auctions contain information that car buyers can use to update their expectations about the intensity of market demand, forecast the license premiums and formulate their bidding strategies in future auctions. Our empirical analysis indicates that past bid distributions have a good degree of …

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Social Trust And Economic Governance, Fali Huang Apr 2004

Social Trust And Economic Governance, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

The paper investigates the dynamic relationship between social trust and economic governance using a principal-agent model with stochastic returns. To mitigate the inherent moral hazard problem both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are useful. The cooperative tendency of an agent measures his intrinsic discipline against shirking, the distribution of which characterizes social trust in society. The economic governance methods include direct monitoring and efficiency wage. The main results are the following. An agent with a higher cooperative tendency needs less monitoring and a lower wage to make effort, which brings higher profit for the principal. But competition among principals for more …

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Social Trust, Cooperation, And Human Capital, Fali Huang Jan 2004

Social Trust, Cooperation, And Human Capital, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

The importance of social trust on economic growth has been suggested by many empirical works. This paper formalizes the concept of social trust and studies its formation process in a game theoretic setting. It provides plausible explanations for a wide range of empirical and experimental findings. The main results of the paper are as follows. For utility-maximizing players, cooperation arises in one-period prisoner’s dilemmas if and only if there is social trust. The amount of social trust in a given game is determined by the distribution of players’ cooperative tendency. Cooperative tendency is in essence a component of human capital …

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Congestion Control And Vehicle Ownership Restriction: The Choice Of An Optimal Quota Policy, Winston T. H. Koh Jan 2004

Congestion Control And Vehicle Ownership Restriction: The Choice Of An Optimal Quota Policy, Winston T. H. Koh

Research Collection School Of Economics

Singapore introduced a vehicle quota system (VQS) in 1990 as part of its overall policy to control urban congestion. While the VQS has reduced the annual growth rate of the vehicle population to about 3 per cent, it has created uncertainty in the cost of vehicle ownership due to the fluctuations in licence prices. This paper discusses three issues relating to the optimal design of a VQS: licence transferability, sub-categorisation, and the choice of an auction format. The analysis shows that licence transferability is not unambiguously desirable, sub-categorisation is highly regressive, and an open auction format results in less aggressive …

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Open Versus Sealed-Bid Auctions: Testing For Revenue Equivalence Under Singapore's Vehicle Quota System, Winston T. H. Koh, Roberto S. Mariano, Yiu Kuen Tse Aug 2003

Open Versus Sealed-Bid Auctions: Testing For Revenue Equivalence Under Singapore's Vehicle Quota System, Winston T. H. Koh, Roberto S. Mariano, Yiu Kuen Tse

Research Collection School Of Economics

Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we study if revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched from a sealed-bid format (May 1990 to June 2001) to an open bidding format since July 2001. Our econometric analysis indicates the change in auction format led to a change in bidding behavior. On average, the quota license premium under the open bidding format is about US$1,000 (about 7.5% of the Category E license price in June 2001) lower, compared to the forecast level that would have prevailed if there had been no change in the auction …

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The Shapley-Shubik Index, The Donation Paradox And Ternary Games, Vincent C. H. Chua, H. C. Huang Jun 2003

The Shapley-Shubik Index, The Donation Paradox And Ternary Games, Vincent C. H. Chua, H. C. Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case as long as the number of players in the game exceeds three. This undermines the attractiveness of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of a priori voting power.

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The General Dominance Of Lottery Over Waiting-Line Auction, Winston T. H. Koh, Zhenlin Yang, Lijing Zhu Sep 2002

The General Dominance Of Lottery Over Waiting-Line Auction, Winston T. H. Koh, Zhenlin Yang, Lijing Zhu

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper examines the allocative efficiency of two popular non-price allocation mechanisms — the lottery (random allocation) and the waiting-line auction (queue system) — for the cases where consumers possess identical time costs (the homogeneous case), and where time costs are correlated with time valuations (the heterogeneous case). We show that the relative efficiency of the two mechanisms depends critically on the scarcity factor (measured by the ratio of the number of objects available for allocation over the number of participants) and on the shape of the distribution of valuations. We obtain a set of analytical results showing that the …

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Optimal Organizational Design In A Dichotomous-Choice Project Selection Model, Winston T. H. Koh Jul 2002

Optimal Organizational Design In A Dichotomous-Choice Project Selection Model, Winston T. H. Koh

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies collective decision making in the context of a project selection model. We derive the optimal decision architecture when marginal decision costs are present, and investigate the circumstances under which the hierarchy and polyarchy exist as optimal sequential architectures. Our analysis extends previous results on optimal committee decision-making to a sequential setting, and further demonstrates the fragility of the hierarchy and polyarchy as optimal architectures.

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