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Articles 31 - 45 of 45
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson
Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this article we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. To test a hypothesis of Demsetz's, we vary across two treatments the external benefits of migrating. We find that self-selection has a powerful effect on establishing conventions of property and begetting increases in wealth through exchange and specialization. We also find support for the Demsetz hypothesis.
Binding Promises And Cooperation Among Strangers, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Binding Promises And Cooperation Among Strangers, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
Experimental Markets With Frictions, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Experimental Markets With Frictions, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Decentralized and impersonal exchange is fundamental to contemporary economies, where many interactions take place among individuals with low levels of information about their counterpart. We review the experimental literature about markets with frictions, where strangers interact in pairs formed at random in economies of indefinite duration. We focus on the impact of communication on the efficiency of the outcome and report results of a new experiment.
Cooperative Strategies In Anonymous Economies: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Cooperative Strategies In Anonymous Economies: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory.
Did I Do That? Group Positioning And Asymmetry In Attributional Bias, Brian Gunia, Brice Corgnet
Did I Do That? Group Positioning And Asymmetry In Attributional Bias, Brian Gunia, Brice Corgnet
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
A laboratory experiment examined whether one structural feature of groups—members’ physical positioning—may produce asymmetry in their perceived contribution to a task. In particular, we investigated asymmetry in group members’ (often excessive) claims of credit for collective tasks ("the self-serving attributional bias"). Consistent with the availability account of this bias, group members located in the middle of a group, with easy visual access to their partners’ contributions, demonstrated less bias than outside members (who demonstrated bias consistent with prior research)—but no less satisfaction. Further analyses suggested that these results reflected bias reduction among middle members and did stem from visual availability. …
Multi-Player Bargaining With Endogenous Capacity, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk
Multi-Player Bargaining With Endogenous Capacity, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, characterized by no costly delays and heterogeneous sale prices. In equilibrium constraining capacity is a bargaining tactic the seller uses to improve a weak bargaining position. With capacity constraints, sale prices approach the outcome of an auction as bargaining costs vanish. The framework provides a building block for price formation in models …
Team Formation And Self‐Serving Biases, Brice Corgnet
Team Formation And Self‐Serving Biases, Brice Corgnet
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
There is extensive evidence which indicates that people learn positively about themselves. We build on this finding to develop a model of team formation. We show that under complete information learning positively about oneself prevents efficient team formation. Agents becoming overconfident tend to ask for an excessive share of the group outcome. Positive learning generates divergence in workers' beliefs and hampers efficient team formation. Interestingly, in a context of incomplete information regarding the partner's ability, extensive learning biases may reduce the divergence in agents' beliefs and facilitate efficient team formation as a result. We apply our model to coauthorship and …
Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson
Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This article uses a laboratory experiment to examine the question of whether justice and fairness are different motivational forces in the dictator game. "Justice" and "fairness" are often used interchangeably because their meanings and usages are so closely linked, despite their distinct connotations. Using four different treatments, our experimental design investigates the subtle differences between the two social concepts to explicate generosity in the dictator game. The results indicate that justice, not fairness, legitimizes property rights in the dictator game.
Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari
Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment.
Oxytocin Increases Generosity In Humans, Paul J. Zak, Angela Stanton, Sheila Ahmadi
Oxytocin Increases Generosity In Humans, Paul J. Zak, Angela Stanton, Sheila Ahmadi
Business Faculty Articles and Research
Human beings routinely help strangers at costs to themselves. Sometimes the help offered is generous-offering more than the other expects. The proximate mechanisms supporting generosity are not well-understood, but several lines of research suggest a role for empathy. In this study, participants were infused with 40 IU oxytocin (OT) or placebo and engaged in a blinded, one-shot decision on how to split a sum of money with a stranger that could be rejected. Those on OT were 80% more generous than those given a placebo. OT had no effect on a unilateral monetary transfer task dissociating generosity from altruism. OT …
Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello
Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This article explores the Monetary Models.
Currency Competition In A Fundamental Model Of Money, Gabriele Camera, Ben Craig, Christopher Waller
Currency Competition In A Fundamental Model Of Money, Gabriele Camera, Ben Craig, Christopher Waller
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study how two fiat monies, one safe and one risky, compete in a decentralized trading environment. The currencies' equilibrium values, their transaction velocities and agents' spending patterns are endogenously determined. We derive conditions under which agents holding diversified currency portfolios spend the safe currency first and hold the risky one for later purchases. We also examine when the reverse spending pattern is optimal. Traders generally favor dealing in the safe currency, unless trade frictions and the currency risk is low. As risk increases or trading becomes more difficult, the transaction velocity and value of the safe money increases.
Jack Of All Trades Or Master Of One? Specialization, Trade And Money, Gabriele Camera, Robert R. Reed, Christopher Waller
Jack Of All Trades Or Master Of One? Specialization, Trade And Money, Gabriele Camera, Robert R. Reed, Christopher Waller
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We consider a model of decentralized exchange where individuals choose the set of goods they produce. Specialization involves producing a smaller set of goods and doing it more proÞciently. In doing so, agents reduce production costs, but also reduce the ease of trading their output. We derive the equilibrium degree of specialization and examine how it is affected by underlying fundamentals. Due to the existence of a hold-up problem, individuals specialize too little relative to the social optimum. Introducing money leads to more specialization relative to barter and increases welfare.
Money And Price Dispersion, Gabriele Camera, Dean Corbae
Money And Price Dispersion, Gabriele Camera, Dean Corbae
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We relax restrictions on the storage technology in a prototypical monetary search model to study price dispersion. When multiple units of currency can be stored, buyers and sellers enter matches with potentially different willingness to buy or sell. Across the distribution of possible bilateral matches, prices will generally differ even though agents have identical preferences and technologies. We provide existence conditions for a particularly simple equilibrium pattern of exchange and prices. We prove that in the limiting case where search frictions are eliminated, equilibrium prices are uniform. We also prove that a higher initial money stock raises the average price …
Futures Contracting And Dividend Uncertainty In Experimental Asset Markets, David P. Porter, Vernon L. Smith
Futures Contracting And Dividend Uncertainty In Experimental Asset Markets, David P. Porter, Vernon L. Smith
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Prices in experimental asset markets tend to bubble and then crash to dividend value at the end of the asset's useful life. Explanations for this phenomenon are (1) that participants cannot form reliable future price expectations or (2) dividend risk aversion. We report the results of experiments to test these hypotheses. In one experimental series, a futures market is introduced so that participants can obtain information on future share prices. In another series of experiments, the per-period dividend is known with certainty. The futures market treatment had little effect on the character of bubble. The certain dividend treatment had little …