Behavioral Economics Commons^™

Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on one-part vs. three-part bidding in energy market. For ISO New England.

Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Review Of The Reserves And Operable Capability Markets: New England's Experience In The First Four Months, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I review the performance of the operating reserves and the operable capability markets in New England. The review covers the first four months of operation from May 1 to August 31, 1999. The review is based on my knowledge of the market rules and their implementation by the ISO, and the market data during this period, including bidding, operating, and settlement information. In the review, I (1) identify the potential market flaws with these markets, (2) look at the performance of the markets to see if the potential problems have materialized, (3) evaluate the ISO's short-term remedies for these market …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Summary of review of reserves and operable capability markets. For ISO New England.

Impacts Of Strike Replacement Banks In Canada, Peter Cramton, Morley Gunderson, Joseph Tracy

Peter Cramton

In the labor relations area no issue generates as much controversy and division between labor and management as does the legislative ban on replacement workers. In the United States, the issue of a ban on permanent replacement workers has come before Congress four times since 1988, although the only action taken has been an executive order in 1995, banning the government from doing business with firms that use permanent replacements (Cramton and Tracy 1998). In Canada, where labor matters are under provincial jurisdiction, legislative bans on permanent replacement workers exist in most jurisdictions (except New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince …

The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages, Peter Cramton, Morley Gunderson, Joseph Tracy

Peter Cramton

Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to March 1993, we find that wages and strikes are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and firms better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to higher strike costs both by increasing the frequency and duration of strikes.

The Role Of The Iso In U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review Of Restructuring In California And Pjm, Peter Cramton, Lisa Cameron

Peter Cramton

Several regions of the U.S. have sought to restructure the electric power industry by separating the potentially competitive generation sector from the natural monopoly functions of electricity transmission and distribution. Under this restructuring scheme, a central authority, which we will refer to as the independent system operator (ISO), is given control over both the transmission system and the spot market for electricity. The ISO's role in managing the spot market is relatively uncontroversial. This is because the spot market takes place in real time and requires continuous physical adjustments to electricity supply and demand subject to complex constraints, such as …

Information Sharing And Tacit Collusion In Laboratory Duopoly Markets, Timothy N. Cason, Charles F. Mason

Charles F Mason

No abstract provided.

The Distributional Effects Of Carbon Regulation, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr

Peter Cramton

We examine the distributional effects of carbon regulation. An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.

An Experimental Analysis Of Subgame Perfect Play: The Entry Deterrence Game, Charles F. Mason, Clifford Nowell

Charles F Mason

No abstract provided.

Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams

Peter Cramton

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Reply to comments on review of rules. For ISO New England.

The Efficiency Of The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising about $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions efficient? Did they award the licenses to the firms best able to turn the spectrum into valuable services for consumers? There is substantial evidence that the FCC's simultaneous ascending auction worked well. It raised large revenues. It revealed critical information in the process of bidding and gave bidders the flexibility to adjust strategies in response to new information. As a result, similar licenses sold …

Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams

Peter Cramton

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values …

A Review Of Iso New England's Proposed Market Rules, Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

For ISO New England.

A Review Of Iso New England's Proposed Market Rules, Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key tradeoffs among alternative designs. We believe that the wholesale electricity market in New England can begin on December 1, 1998. However, improvements are needed for long-run success. We have identified four major recommendations:

* Switch to a multi-settlement system.

* Introduce demand-side bidding.

* Adopt location-based transmission congestion pricing, especially for the import/export interfaces.

* Fix the pricing …

Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowing efficient aggregations of items. Alternatively, the information may be used by bidders to establish and enforce collusive outcomes. Ex ante asymmetries and weak competition favor a sealed-bid design. In other cases, an ascending auction is likely to perform …

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Package Bidding, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of licenses), and the computational complexity problem (which arises from the fact that the number of possible combinations of licenses is much larger than the number of licenses). Package bidding offers the possibility of an improvement over individual-license bidding only when there are strong complementarities and the pattern of those complementarities varies across bidders. Package bidding works satisfactorily …

Auctioning Securities, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction (Ausubel 1996) have important theoretical advantages for sellers. In a setting without private information, these auctions achieve the maximal revenue as a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies. In contrast, the pay-your-bid, uniform-price, and standard ascending-bid auction admit a multiplicity of equilibria that yield low revenues for the seller. We show how these results extend to a setting where …

The Use Of Replacement Workers In Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989, Peter Cramton, Joseph Tracy

Peter Cramton

It is argued in many circles that a structural change occurred in U.S. collective bargaining in the 1980s. Strike incidence declined, dispute incidence increased, and the composition of disputes shifted away from strikes and toward holdouts. We investigate the extent to which the hiring of replacement workers can account for these changes. For a sample of over 300 major strikes since 1980, we estimate the likelihood of replacements being hired. We find that the risk of replacement is lower for bargaining units with more experienced workers, and declines during tight labor markets. The composition of disputes shifts away from strikes …

Auctions And Takeovers, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Under Delaware law (the predominant corporate law in the US), when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's board of directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company." (Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 173). The target's board may not use defensive tactics that destroy the auction process and must attempt to seek higher bids. Similarly, the Williams Act requires takeover bids to remain open for at least 20 business days on the grounds that the delay facilitates auctions. This preference …

Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

In most states, ratepayers will compensate utilities for their stranded costs. As a result, these costs must be measured as accurately as possible, in a manner that is easily understood by all concerned parties. We describe the options for measuring stranded costs and argue that a simultaneous ascending auction is the best approach.

Package Bidding For Spectrum Licenses, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

The FCC was an innovator in adopting the rules of the simultaneous ascending-price auction for its sales of spectrum licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design improvements suggested in our first report), there are two inherent limitations in any design that seeks to assign and price the licenses individually. First, such designs create strategic incentives for bidders interested in multiple licenses that are substitutes to reduce their demands for some of the licenses in order to reduce the final prices of the others; this is the …

Auction Design Enhancements For Non-Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the auction where important improvement can be achieved within the basic rules structure. These are restricting collusion among bidders and reducing the time taken to …

Auction Design For Standard Offer Service, Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.

Reply Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

For Antigone and Devco.

Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

For Antigone and Devco.

The Fcc Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.