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Articles 61 - 90 of 113
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Electricity Market Design: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Peter Cramton
Electricity Market Design: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.
An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in multiple-item auctions. Large bidders reduce demand for additional items and so sometimes lose to smaller bidders with lower values. We demonstrate this inefficiency in an auction model which allows interdependent values. We also establish that the ranking of the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions is ambiguous in both revenue and efficiency terms. …
Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Comments On Alternative Policy Options For Managing Capacity And Mitigating Congestion And Delay At Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton
Comments On Alternative Policy Options For Managing Capacity And Mitigating Congestion And Delay At Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Recommending auctions to manage congestion at LaGuardia.
A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments in support of wireless number portability. For Leap Wireless.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on proposed changes to how the energy clearing price is calculated. For ISO New England.
Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr
Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr
Peter Cramton
An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), …
Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.
Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Further comments on the CMRS spectrum cap. For Leap Wireless.
Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Peter Cramton
Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comment on modifications to installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Wt Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration Of Peter Cramton,", Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Further comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on the impact of fronts in the C and F Block Broadband PCS auction.
The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders after the auction; and (2) the seller can commit to not sell the withheld goods after the auction. We examine how the optimal auction problem changes when these assumptions are relaxed. In sharp contrast to the no resale assumption, we assume perfect resale: all gains from trade are exhausted in resale. In a multiple object model with independent signals, we …
Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.
Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comment on deficiency charge in installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Further comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on one-part vs. three-part bidding in energy market. For ISO New England.