Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (451)
- Business (345)
- Economic Policy (339)
- Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation (336)
- Finance and Financial Management (335)
-
- Public Administration (319)
- Economic History (296)
- Finance (253)
- Policy History, Theory, and Methods (227)
- Macroeconomics (225)
- Public Policy (143)
- Law (129)
- Banking and Finance Law (120)
- Growth and Development (71)
- Public Economics (71)
- Law and Economics (49)
- Political Economy (42)
- Public Affairs (35)
- International Economics (28)
- Political Science (20)
- Corporate Finance (18)
- Administrative Law (14)
- International Relations (14)
- Bankruptcy Law (11)
- Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (10)
- Insurance (8)
- European Law (7)
- Organizational Behavior and Theory (7)
- Keyword
-
- Global Financial Crisis (91)
- Capital injection (32)
- Federal Reserve (29)
- Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (26)
- Market liquidity (23)
-
- Restructuring (22)
- TARP (17)
- Liquidity (16)
- Capital injections (15)
- Reserve requirements (15)
- Chrysler (14)
- Account guarantees (13)
- Bank of England (13)
- Broad-based emergency liquidity (13)
- General Motors (13)
- Lehman Brothers (13)
- Resolution (13)
- Ad hoc emergency liquidity (12)
- Blanket guarantee (12)
- Nonperforming loans (12)
- Wholesale funding (12)
- Asian Financial Crisis (11)
- Asset management companies (11)
- Broad-based (11)
- European Union (11)
- FDIC (11)
- Lender of last resort (11)
- Liquidity rules (11)
- Recapitalization (11)
- Commercial paper (10)
- Publication Year
Articles 361 - 390 of 471
Full-Text Articles in Economics
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac–Module F: Federal Reserve’S Large-Scale Asset Purchase (Lsap) Program, Daniel Thompson, Adam Kulam
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac–Module F: Federal Reserve’S Large-Scale Asset Purchase (Lsap) Program, Daniel Thompson, Adam Kulam
Journal of Financial Crises
By late 2008, the secondary mortgage markets were suffering high default rates, causing mortgage lending to slow and the value of mortgage securities to plummet. The Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate, and the government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, yet credit in housing and other financial markets remained tight. On November 25, the Fed announced its intent to purchase up to $500 billion in agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and $100 billion in agency debt to reduce the cost and increase the availability of mortgage credit, which would support housing markets and improve conditions in financial …
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing And Economic Recovery Act Of 2008, Daniel Thompson
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing And Economic Recovery Act Of 2008, Daniel Thompson
Journal of Financial Crises
As the U.S. housing crisis worsened in 2007, and through 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) headed towards insolvency. At the same time, contractions in private securitization resulted in these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) purchasing nearly half of all new mortgages. In July, the government passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) to provide a more effective regulator and to address public uncertainty regarding whether the government would back the GSEs’ assets and liabilities. HERA provided Treasury and the newly formed Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) …
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’S Gse Mbs Purchase Program, Michael Zanger-Tishler, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’S Gse Mbs Purchase Program, Michael Zanger-Tishler, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
As the housing crisis escalated during the second half of 2007, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), occupied an increasingly central role in the secondary mortgage market, purchasing a greater percentage of new mortgages as private securitization rapidly contracted. As their importance in this market grew, the two GSEs also began to suffer billion-dollar losses, inciting concerns that they might not be able to stay solvent throughout the remainder of the crisis. On September 6, 2008, fearing the systemic consequences of the two firms’ failures, the …
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module C: Gse Credit Facility, Emily Vergara
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module C: Gse Credit Facility, Emily Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2007 and 2008, the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and the deterioration of the housing market more generally precipitated a crisis at the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), which together held or guaranteed $5.3 trillion in mortgage assets. Over the course of two years, both entities suffered high losses and saw their liquidity positions deteriorate as the market perceived their rapid decline. On September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), pursuant to the authority of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, took Fannie …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
Starting in mid-2007, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing collateral calls from counterparties looking to protect their positions in credit default swap (CDS) contracts that AIG had written on residential and commercial collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (US COP 2010, 28-30). Per these agreements, the AIG parent company was responsible for insuring the value of the CDOs against the risk of a negative credit event, such as default (GAO 2011, 5; US COP 2010, 29-30). AIG’s immediate need for liquidity on September 16, largely driven by a securities lending program and those collateral calls, prompted the Federal Reserve to lend the …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing difficulty in returning cash collateral to counterparties looking to terminate, rather than roll over, their securities lending agreements, in part because the company had invested the collateral in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which were becoming illiquid. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided liquidity to the company, including through the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF), which allowed for the repayment of cash collateral but did not address the falling values of the RMBS. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II (ML II), a …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion credit line to AIG to address its liquidity stresses, but AIG’s balance sheet remained under pressure. The insurance giant was projected to report large third-quarter losses and was at risk of being downgraded by major credit rating agencies. For these reasons, in early November 2008, the US Treasury invested $40 billion of Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds into AIG in exchange for 4 million shares of AIG Series D preferred stock and a warrant to purchase AIG common stock. The investment helped repay a …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, American International Group (AIG) was among the largest insurance corporations in the world and maintained a profitable securities lending program. However, AIG invested much of the cash collateral received from counterparties in residential mortgage-backed securities, whose value began to collapse rapidly and unexpectedly, creating liquidity strain for AIG when borrowers returned their securities. Because of these strains, credit downgrades, and losses, in September, the company sought assistance from the Federal Reserve which, on October 6, 2008, approved the establishment of the Securities Borrowing Facility by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). The FRBNY agreed to loan …
Stress Tests And Policy, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Stress Tests And Policy, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Ten years after the Federal Reserve’s crisis-era bank stress test, it is time to recalibrate the stress tests for “peacetime.” Outside of a crisis, supervisors should tailor stress tests to focus on their comparative advantages by taking a macroprudential focus, with severe scenarios that enable them to learn about emerging risks in both traditional and shadow banking sectors. In peacetime, also, supervisors should emphasize risk- management practices and be wary of forcing rapid changes in capital levels for individual banks, while linking stress-test results with countercyclical capital buffers across the system.
Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Ron Borzekowski was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Board when he was detailed to join the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as a senior researcher and later became deputy to research director Greg Feldberg. The 10-member bipartisan commission, charged with investigating and determining the causes of the crisis, held more than 19 hearings, and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2009 to Jan. 2011. It issued a 662-page report explaining why the crisis came about and the roles of financial institutions, government, and the public. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Mr.Borzekowski.
Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg, Sandra Ward, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg, Sandra Ward, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Greg Feldberg was a senior supervisory financial analyst at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve experienced in regulating large banks when he was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) where he worked from 2010-11, becoming its Director of Research. The FCIC was a bipartisan commission charged with investigating the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Feldberg shared thoughts about some of the challenges faced by the commission and why its report is important. This "Lessons Learned" is based on an interview with Mr. Feldberg.
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Christopher Seefer was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to serve as the commission’s director of investigations. The 10-member bipartisan commission wascharged with investigating and determining the cause of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC). The commission held over 19 hearings and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2010 to January 2011 and produced a662-page report that attempted to explain why the crisis came about and the roles of government and private enterprises in the crisis.This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Seefer.
Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Gary Cohen joined the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in December 2009 to serve as its general counsel at the request of commission chairman Phil Angelides. The FCIC was a 10-member bipartisan group convened by Congress to investigate the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Cohen had a wide-ranging and ad hoc position that included advising commissioners and staffers on administrative matters and protocols. In addition, he assisted in document requests and compelling witnesses to testify and, on occasion, in conducting interviews and public hearings. He played an instrumental role in editing the commission’s final report. This “Lessons …
Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Wendy Edelberg served initially as Director of Research at the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) before eventually being named Executive Director. Established in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the FCIC was a bipartisan panel of six Democrats and four Republicans charged with determining the causes of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Edelberg built the organization from the ground up, hiring staff, instituting operating procedures, establishing guidelines, managing communications, and reporting to the commissioners. This "Lesson Learned" is based on an interview with Ms. Edelberg.
Lessons Learned: Phil Angelides, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Phil Angelides, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Phil Angelides chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) established by Congress in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 with the purpose of understanding what precipitated the crisis so that any future crises might be averted. The 10-member bipartisan commission, known as the “Angelides Commission” after its chair, convened in September 2010. Meeting in a span of 15 months and holding 19 public hearings and interviewing more than 700 people, the commission submitted its findings in January 2011. The commission concluded that the crisis was avoidable, the “result of human actions, inactions, and misjudgments.” The report included …
Monetization Of Fiscal Deficits And Covid-19: A Primer, Aidan Lawson, Greg Feldberg
Monetization Of Fiscal Deficits And Covid-19: A Primer, Aidan Lawson, Greg Feldberg
Journal of Financial Crises
Monetization—also known as “money-financed fiscal programs” or “money-printing”—occurs when a government finances itself by issuing currency or other non-interest-bearing liabilities, such as bank reserves. It poses real risks—potentially excessive inflation and encroachment on central-bank independence—and some paint it as a relic of a bygone era. The onset of the COVID-19 crisis, however, forced governments to spend heavily to combat the considerable economic and public health impacts. As government deficits climbed, monetization re-entered the conversation as a way to avoid the massive debt burdens that some nations may face. This paper describes how monetization works, provides key historical examples, and examines …
Lessons Learned: Lorie Logan, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Lorie Logan, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Lorie Logan is executive vice president in the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the System Open Market Account (SOMA) manager pro tem for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), and head of Market Operations, Monitoring, and Analysis (MOMA).
Lessons Learned: Donald Kohn, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Donald Kohn, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Kohn, an economist, is a 40-year veteran of the Federal Reserve System. He served as a member of the Board of Governors, and was vice chair, from 2002-2010, which included the years of the global financial crisis (GFC).
The United Kingdom's Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), June Rhee
The United Kingdom's Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), June Rhee
Journal of Financial Crises
The key structures of housing finance in the UK in the years leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 consisted of retail deposits, secondary market funding and wholesale interbank lending. Although retail deposits were the major funder of UK mortgages, secondary market funding, which included covered bonds and residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), accounted for 31% of UK mortgage lending in 2006. In 2007, the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market triggered a financial shock, and the shock quickly traveled beyond national borders. Regardless of differences in the UK mortgage market, investors’ concern over the prospects of the …
The United Kingdom's Credit Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), Christian M. Mcnamara
The United Kingdom's Credit Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), Christian M. Mcnamara
Journal of Financial Crises
The September 15, 2008, bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers resulted in a collapse of wholesale funding markets that threatened the ability of UK financial institutions to continue funding themselves. By the end of the month, two leading UK banks—HBOS and Bradford & Bingley—had to be rescued, and there was a real risk that the entire financial system could collapse. Faced with the need to stabilize the system, UK regulators on October 8 introduced a package of measures that included a £250 billion Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) aimed at providing banks with access to needed funding. Under the Guarantee Scheme, …
Sweden's Guarantee Scheme (Sweden Gfc), Lily S. Engbith, Kevin Kiernan
Sweden's Guarantee Scheme (Sweden Gfc), Lily S. Engbith, Kevin Kiernan
Journal of Financial Crises
Although Sweden was not as directly impacted by the Global Financial Crisis as some other economies, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, prompted Swedish authorities to take preemptive measures to protect domestic banks and financial institutions. One such program, announced on October 20, 2008, and implemented on October 29, 2008, was designed to preserve credit extension to businesses and households through what became known as the Swedish Guarantee Scheme. Per the terms of the Scheme, new short- and medium-term debt of maturities ranging from 90 days to five years issued by eligible banks would be guaranteed by the Swedish …
The Spanish Guarantee Scheme For Credit Institutions (Spain Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Spanish Guarantee Scheme For Credit Institutions (Spain Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
Given Spanish banks’ heavy investment in the housing and construction markets in the lead-up to the global financial crisis (GFC), the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, impelled the government to implement stabilization measures to calm, recapitalize, and restructure its domestic banking sector. The Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (the Guarantee Scheme) was one of the first interventions to be enacted, announced by Spain’s Ministry of Economy and Finance on October 13, 2008, by Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 on “Urgent Economic and Financial Measures in relation to the Concerted Action Plan of …
The Portuguese Guarantee Scheme (Portugal Gfc), Julia A. Arnous
The Portuguese Guarantee Scheme (Portugal Gfc), Julia A. Arnous
Journal of Financial Crises
By October 2008, Portuguese banks’ access to liquidity was severely restricted due to strains in international wholesale markets. On October 12-13, 2008, the Portuguese government notified the European Commission of a guarantee scheme intended to promote solvent credit institutions’ access to liquidity as part of the European policy response to the acute financial crisis aiming to achieve and maintain financial stability. Under the scheme, the Portuguese government guaranteed financing agreements and banks’ issuance of non-subordinated short- and medium-term debt. To obtain a guarantee under the Scheme, banks paid a fee based on the maturity of the debt and a risk …
The Polish Guarantee Scheme (Poland Gfc), Manuel Leon Hoyos
The Polish Guarantee Scheme (Poland Gfc), Manuel Leon Hoyos
Journal of Financial Crises
Faced with the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, Poland implemented a scheme of State support for financial institutions. In view of a potential global credit crunch, it aimed at improving short- and medium-term liquidity of domestic financial institutions. The scheme came into force on March 13, 2009, and was approved by the European Commission under European Union State Aid rules on September 25, 2009. The scheme enabled the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of the State Treasury, to provide support in the form of Treasury guarantees on newly issued bank debt and the exchange of Treasury bonds for less liquid …
The Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments around the world sought to implement stabilization measures in order to calm and protect their domestic markets. While not directly exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Kingdom of the Netherlands announced the creation of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) on October 13, 2008, to boost confidence in interbank lending markets and to ensure the flow of credit to Dutch households and companies. In establishing this program, the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA) committed €200 billion to support the issuance …
The State Guarantee Of External Debt Of Korean Banks (South Korea Gfc), Lily S. Engbith
The State Guarantee Of External Debt Of Korean Banks (South Korea Gfc), Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy of September 15, 2008, a number of foreign governments enacted stabilization measures in order to bolster their currencies and inject much-needed liquidity into domestic markets. As part of its effort, the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance announced a series of government interventions that included a three-year guarantee of foreign debt issued (including extensions of maturity) by domestic banks between October 20, 2008, and June 30, 2009. This opt-in program was introduced as a preemptive step in ensuring that Korean financial institutions would retain competitive access to external funding in the wake of the global …
Ireland's Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme (Ireland Gfc), Claire Simon
Ireland's Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme (Ireland Gfc), Claire Simon
Journal of Financial Crises
Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Irish banks found themselves unable to roll over their significant foreign borrowings on the interbank lending market. With the banks facing a liquidity crisis, the Irish government decided to issue a blanket guarantee of all liabilities of six banks through the Credit Institutions Financial Support Scheme (CIFS). As the crisis worsened, and it became clear that Irish banks were facing a solvency—not just liquidity—crisis, the Irish government was forced to provide additional support to the financial system, which took the form of capital injections and a national asset management company for …
The Italian Guarantee Scheme (Italy Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Italian Guarantee Scheme (Italy Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and its severe impact on global credit markets impelled governments around the world to enact stabilization measures to calm and protect their domestic economies. The Italian Republic, while not directly affected by the US subprime mortgage crisis, preemptively implemented emergency procedures and programs to ensure the stability of their banking system. Announced with the passage of Decree-Law No. 157 on October 13, 2008, and legally enforced under Law 190/2008 of December 4, 2008, the Italian Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) was aimed at protecting institutions whose interbank lending abilities had the …
The Hungarian Guarantee Scheme (Hungary Gfc), Alec Buchholtz
The Hungarian Guarantee Scheme (Hungary Gfc), Alec Buchholtz
Journal of Financial Crises
In the midst of the global financial crisis, in October 2008, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), the Hungarian national bank, noticed a selloff of government securities by foreign banks and a large depreciation in the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint (HUF) in foreign exchange (FX) markets. Hungarian banks experienced liquidity pressures due to margin calls on FX swap contracts, prompting the MNB and Minister of Finance to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the World Bank. The IMF and ECB approved Hungary’s requests in late 2008 to create a €20 billion …