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Articles 2881 - 2910 of 3476
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Duopoly With Differentiated Products And Entry Barriers, Kofi O. Nti, Martin Shubik
Duopoly With Differentiated Products And Entry Barriers, Kofi O. Nti, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Product differentiated duopoly with a potential entrant facing a single period fixed cost entry barriers is modeled as a noncooperative game. In addition to characterizing the equilibrium solutions and relating them to entry costs and product differentiation, a comparison of price and quantity competition shows that entry conditions are qualitatively sensitive to the strategic variables used in a given industry. Quantity competition appears to be more favorable for entry than price competition. The use of threats and other exclusionary tactics, such as limit pricing, decisively determine the outcome when entry costs are moderate.
Society, Land, Love Or Money (A Strategic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik
Society, Land, Love Or Money (A Strategic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Equilibria Of A Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game Of Timing, Carolyn Pitchik
Equilibria Of A Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game Of Timing, Carolyn Pitchik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of an equilibrium point (as well as for the existence of a dominating equilibrium point) in a two-person non-zero sum game of timing.
Characteristic Functions And The Tail Behavior Of Probability Distributions, Peter C.B. Phillips
Characteristic Functions And The Tail Behavior Of Probability Distributions, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The theory of Fourier transforms of generalized functions is used to extract general formulas for the tail behavior of a probability distribution from the behavior of its characteristic function in the locality of the origin. The theory is applied to develop asymptotic formula for the tails of the stable distributions.
A Market Value Approach To Approximate Equilibria, Robert M. Anderson
A Market Value Approach To Approximate Equilibria, Robert M. Anderson
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider the market value of excess demand as a measure of disequilibrium. We show that, in a fixed exchange economy, there exist approximate equilibria whose measures of disequilibrium depend only on the endowments and not on the preferences. A related bound on the norm of excess demand, depending on the endowments and the approximate equilibrium price, is also obtained. We show the existence of allocations which are nearly competitive, as measured by the largest proportion of demand given up at the allocation by any trader. We use these results to obtain, for very general sequences of exchange economies, allocations …
The Adequacy Of Savings, Laurence Kotlikoff, Avia Spivak, Lawrence H. Summers
The Adequacy Of Savings, Laurence Kotlikoff, Avia Spivak, Lawrence H. Summers
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
National Savings, Economic Welfare, And The Structure Of Taxation, Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff
National Savings, Economic Welfare, And The Structure Of Taxation, Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
On The Consistency Of Non-Linear Fiml, John J. Beggs
On The Consistency Of Non-Linear Fiml, John J. Beggs
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Person Game, Ludo Van Der Heyden
Person Game, Ludo Van Der Heyden
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Additively Decompable Quasiconvex Functions, Gerard Debreu, Tjalling C. Koopmans
Additively Decompable Quasiconvex Functions, Gerard Debreu, Tjalling C. Koopmans
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Housing Market With Indivisibility, Mamoru Kaneko
Housing Market With Indivisibility, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper we present a model of rental housing market in which houses are treated as indivisible commodities. We provide a recursive equation which determines a competitive equilibrium and argue that we can regard the competitive equilibrium as a representative of the set of all competitive equilibria. Using this representative equilibrium, we provide several propositions on comparative statics, that is, we consider how the competitive rents change when certain parameters of the model change.
A Necessary And Sufficient Condition For The Nonemptiness Of The Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko
A Necessary And Sufficient Condition For The Nonemptiness Of The Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Let N be a finite set of players and let ρ be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and without sidepayments such that only the coalitions in pi play essential roles but not the others. For an arbitrary ρ, we get the class of all such games. The purpose of this note is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition with respect to pi for the nonemptiness of the cores of all games in the class.
The Central Assignment Game And The Assignment Markets, Mamoru Kaneko
The Central Assignment Game And The Assignment Markets, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a central assignment game. Next, we provide a market model with indivisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption. Applying the first result to the market model, we prove the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we provide a generalization of the market model and also show the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.
Solution And Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Dynamic Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models, Ray C. Fair, John B. Taylor
Solution And Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Dynamic Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models, Ray C. Fair, John B. Taylor
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Thinking About Carbon Dioxide: Theoretical And Empirical Aspects Of Optimal Control Strategies, William D. Nordhaus
Thinking About Carbon Dioxide: Theoretical And Empirical Aspects Of Optimal Control Strategies, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The scientific and policy discussion about the CO2 problem can be divided into three different parts: (a) understanding the carbon cycle and climatic effects of CO2 elevation; (b) understanding the economic and social impacts of CO2 and estimating abatement strategies; and (c) weighing the costs and benefits in (a) and (b) to set appropriate policies. Up to now, almost all scientific work has gone into (a); a handful of papers discusses (b); but there have been no attempts to pursue (c), that is to weigh scientific and economic evidence so as to give guidance on national or global policies. The …
Distribution, Peter C.B. Phillips
Distribution, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Formulae that are given in the literature for the characteristic function of the F distribution are incorrect and imply that the distribution has finite moments of all orders. Correct formulae are derived and the asymptotic behavior of the characteristic function in the neighborhood of the origin is characterized.
Best Uniform Approximation To Probability Densities In Econometrics, Peter C.B. Phillips
Best Uniform Approximation To Probability Densities In Econometrics, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A new method of approximating the probability density function (pdf’s) of econometric estimators and test statistics is developed. It is shown that best uniform approximants to a general class of pdf’s exist in the form of rational functions. A procedure for extracting approximants is devised and is based on modifying multiple-point Pade approximants to the distribution. The new approximation technique is very general and should be widely applicable in mathematical statistics and econometrics. It has the advantage, unlike the Edgeworth and saddlepoint approximations, of readily incorporating extraneous information on the distribution, even qualitative information. The new procedure is applied to …
On A Lemma Of Amemiya, Peter C.B. Phillips
On A Lemma Of Amemiya, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Perfect Or Robust Noncooperative Equilibrium: A Search For The Philosophers Stone?, Martin Shubik
Perfect Or Robust Noncooperative Equilibrium: A Search For The Philosophers Stone?, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Heterogeneous Information And The Theory Of The Business Cycle, Sanford Grossman, Laurence Weiss
Heterogeneous Information And The Theory Of The Business Cycle, Sanford Grossman, Laurence Weiss
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Intergenerational Political Economy (A Game Theoretic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik
Intergenerational Political Economy (A Game Theoretic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Extension Of A Dynamical Model Of Political Equilibrium, Gerald H. Kramer
Extension Of A Dynamical Model Of Political Equilibrium, Gerald H. Kramer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Policy Responses To The Productivity Slowdown, William D. Nordhaus
Policy Responses To The Productivity Slowdown, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
A Model Of Output, Employment, Capital Formation And Inflation, R. W. Bailey, Viv B. Hall, Peter C.B. Phillips
A Model Of Output, Employment, Capital Formation And Inflation, R. W. Bailey, Viv B. Hall, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Linear Complementarity And The Degree Of Mappings, Roger Howe
Linear Complementarity And The Degree Of Mappings, Roger Howe
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Incentive Arbitration And Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
Incentive Arbitration And Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In the context of the Nash Bargaining Problem an arbitrator is supposed to choose a solution point on the basis of ‘fairness’ requirements. By introducing time-related costs to the parties’ utility functions, a new class of arbitration changes the rules of the negotiations, and particularly the parties’ payoffs, and lets the parties negotiate. The changes are such that one or both parties are reimbursed by the arbitrator for their bargaining costs. A procedure in which only the party who makes the final concession is compensated, leads (in the case of complete information) to single dominating equilibrium strategies and to a …
An Extension Of The Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
An Extension Of The Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The Nash Bargaining is reformulated by introducing time-related costs into the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of the parties. A set of mathematical requirements on the solution is satisfied uniquely by a function called the Extended Raiffa Solution. The properties of this function are investigated. It is shown to coincide with the Nash Cooperative Solution (of a related Bargaining Problem) when the parties have identical discount rates. An interpretation of the solution and of the formal requirements is detailed. In this model the ‘bargaining power’ of the parties is determined by the bargaining costs related to the duration of the negotiations.
The Welfare Cost Of Capital Income Taxation In A Growing Economy, Christophe Chamley
The Welfare Cost Of Capital Income Taxation In A Growing Economy, Christophe Chamley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Optimal Intertemporal Taxation And The Public Debt, Christophe Chamley
Optimal Intertemporal Taxation And The Public Debt, Christophe Chamley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The optimal taxation problem is analyzed in a general equilibrium model of optimal growth. The private sector is represented by a single competitive household endowed with perfect foresight, and an infinite life. This household maximizes an intertemporal stationary utility function. Public consumption is financed by taxes on consumption, labor income and capital income (or wealth), or by borrowing. Different policies (first-best and second-best), are analyzed for various subsets of instruments. The problem of the optimal level of the public debt is also considered. The general conclusion supports the relative efficiency of the consumption tax with respect to the other instruments.
Output Supply, Employment, And Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion, Philip H. Dybvig, Gerald David Jaynes
Output Supply, Employment, And Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion, Philip H. Dybvig, Gerald David Jaynes
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.