Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Economics Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Yale University

Discipline
Keyword
Publication Year
Publication
Publication Type

Articles 2821 - 2850 of 3476

Full-Text Articles in Economics

Information Processing And Jury Decision Making, Alvin K. Klevorick, Michael Rothschild, Christopher Winship Jul 1982

Information Processing And Jury Decision Making, Alvin K. Klevorick, Michael Rothschild, Christopher Winship

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


The Distribution Of Matrix Quotients, Peter C.B. Phillips Jul 1982

The Distribution Of Matrix Quotients, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cramér’s inversion formula for the distribution of a quotient is generalized to matrix variates and applied to give an alternative derivation of the matrix t-distribution.


We Can't Disagree Forever, John Geanakoplos, Heracles M. Polemarchakis Jul 1982

We Can't Disagree Forever, John Geanakoplos, Heracles M. Polemarchakis

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Under the assumption of common priors, if the information partitions of two agents are finite, then simply by communicating back and forth and revising their posteriors the two agents will converge to a common equilibrium posterior, even though they may base their posteriors on quite different information. Furthermore, given any integer, n, one can construct an example in which the revision process not only takes n steps to converge, but no evident revision occurs — for (n – 1) steps both agents repeat the same conflicting posteriors — until the last step when the two agents decide to agree. Common …


Failure Of The Alternation Theorem In Rational Approximation Over C_0 (-Infinity,Infinity), Peter C.B. Phillips Jul 1982

Failure Of The Alternation Theorem In Rational Approximation Over C_0 (-Infinity,Infinity), Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


On Implicit Contracts And Involuntary Unemployment, John Geanakoplos, Takatoshi Ito Jul 1982

On Implicit Contracts And Involuntary Unemployment, John Geanakoplos, Takatoshi Ito

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We show that a firm can increase expected profits by undertaking the additional expense of paying unemployment compensation to the workers it lays off, if they are risk averse. When this argument is applied to the implicit contract models it makes the involuntary unemployment derived there disappear, where by involuntary unemployment we mean a situation in which one worker has a job at a wage w and another worker who is known to be productively identical and willing to take on the job at a lower wage h cannot find a job. We introduce into our model asymmetric information between …


Don't Bet On It, John Geanakoplos, James K. Sebenius Jul 1982

Don't Bet On It, John Geanakoplos, James K. Sebenius

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

If two people have different probability assessments about the realization of an uncertain event, they can design a contingent agreement such as a bet or gamble that offers each of them positive expected value. Yet, in the process of formulating this kind of agreement, information about the basis for each person’s probabilities may be indirectly revealed to the other. The very willingness to accept a proposed bet conveys information. This paper models a process by which private, asymmetrically-held information is progressively unveiled as a possible contingent agreement is discussed. If the two parties share priors and their information partitions are …


Integral Polyhedra In Three Space, Herbert E. Scarf Jun 1982

Integral Polyhedra In Three Space, Herbert E. Scarf

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


A Bookmaker Or Market Type Test For Specification In Discrete Choice Models, John J. Beggs Jun 1982

A Bookmaker Or Market Type Test For Specification In Discrete Choice Models, John J. Beggs

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper suggests that the predicted probabilities of outcomes given by an estimated discrete choice model by thought of as prices (or bookmaker odds) associated with those outcomes. By buying or selling contracts (gambling) at those prices (odds) it should not be possible to, on average, make a profit if the model is well specified and is generating “correct” prices. This notion then forms the basis of a model specification test.


Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria In A Private Goods Economy, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski May 1982

Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria In A Private Goods Economy, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Stochastic Games Ii: The Minmax Theorem, Curt Alfred Monash Apr 1982

Stochastic Games Ii: The Minmax Theorem, Curt Alfred Monash

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Equilibria For A Three-Person Location Problem, Martin J. Osborne, Carolyn Pitchik Apr 1982

Equilibria For A Three-Person Location Problem, Martin J. Osborne, Carolyn Pitchik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We find all the mixed strategy equilibria, within a certain class, of the simplified three-firm location model of Hotelling (in which the price variable is ignored).


Information About Moves In Extensive Games: Ii, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko Apr 1982

Information About Moves In Extensive Games: Ii, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Stochastic Games I: Foundations, Curt Alfred Monash Apr 1982

Stochastic Games I: Foundations, Curt Alfred Monash

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


On The Exact Distribution Of Liml, Peter C.B. Phillips Mar 1982

On The Exact Distribution Of Liml, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

It is shown that the exact distribution of the LIML estimator in a general and leading single equation case is multivariate Cauchy. The corresponding result for the IV estimator is a form of multivariate t density where the degrees of freedom depend on the number of instruments.


Naval Procurement Problems: Theory And Practice, Zvi A. Livne, Martin Shubik Mar 1982

Naval Procurement Problems: Theory And Practice, Zvi A. Livne, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Exact Small Sample Theory In The Simultaneous Equations Model, Peter C.B. Phillips Mar 1982

Exact Small Sample Theory In The Simultaneous Equations Model, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria: I, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski Mar 1982

Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria: I, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Information About Moves In Extensive Games: I, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko Mar 1982

Information About Moves In Extensive Games: I, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies. Part I: Replica Games, Externalities, And Approximate Cores, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders Feb 1982

Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies. Part I: Replica Games, Externalities, And Approximate Cores, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Sufficient conditions are demonstrated for the non-emptiness of asymptotic cores of sequences of replica games, i.e., for all sufficiently large replications, the games have non-empty approximate cores and the approximation can be made arbitrarily “good”. The conditions are simply that the games are superadditive and satisfy a very non-restrictive “per-capita” boundedness assumption (these properties are satisfied by games derived from well-known models of replica economies). It is argued that the results can be applied to a broad class of games derived from economic models, including ones with external economies and diseconomies, indivisibilities and non-convexities. To support this claim, in Part …


Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies: Part Ii. Set-Up Costs And Firm Formation In Coalition Production Economies, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders Feb 1982

Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies: Part Ii. Set-Up Costs And Firm Formation In Coalition Production Economies, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A general model of a coalition production economy allowing set-up costs, indivisibilities, and non-convexities is developed. It is shown that for all sufficiently large replications, approximate cores of the economy are non-empty.


Macroeconomics And Fiscal Policy: Paul A. Samuelson And Modern Economics, James Tobin Feb 1982

Macroeconomics And Fiscal Policy: Paul A. Samuelson And Modern Economics, James Tobin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Small Sample Distribution Theory In Econometric Models Of Simultaneous Equations, Peter C.B. Phillips Feb 1982

Small Sample Distribution Theory In Econometric Models Of Simultaneous Equations, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders Feb 1982

Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given subset pi of coalitions of N and only coalitions in pi play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the cores of all games with essential coalitions pi are developed. These conditions appear extremely restrictive. However, when N is “large,” there are relatively few “types” of players, and members of pi are “small” and defined in terms of numbers of players of each type contained in subsets, then approximate cores are non-empty.


The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: The Application To Monopoly And Oligopoly, Mamoru Kaneko Jan 1982

The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: The Application To Monopoly And Oligopoly, Mamoru Kaneko

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper applies the theory of the conventionally stable set to monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. A market model with a finite number of producers and a continuum of buyers is presented and then is formulated as a strategic game in which the producers’ strategies are prices and the buyers’ strategies are demands for commodities. It is shown that a conventionally stable set in this game corresponds to a conventionally stable one in a game where the producers are only players but the buyers are treated as a certain kind of demand function. Furthermore, it is shown that the theory of …


How Fast Should We Graze The Global Commons?, William D. Nordhaus Jan 1982

How Fast Should We Graze The Global Commons?, William D. Nordhaus

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Unlike the vast preponderance of planets, earth has been bequeathed a hospitable environment in which to thrive. Up to now, man’s activities have affected this environment negligibly. Scientists are becoming convinced, however, that release of carbon dioxide (CO2) from combustion of fossil fuels will lead to a significant modification of the global climate (see Woodwell). How should we think about such a destruction of our heritage? Should it be treated as anathema, like bondage? Or should the pace and extent of use of our global commons be subject to the same reasoned balancing of costs and benefits as other economic …


Entrepreneurial Abilities And Liabilities In A Model Of Self-Selection, Christophe Chamley Dec 1981

Entrepreneurial Abilities And Liabilities In A Model Of Self-Selection, Christophe Chamley

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


The Epsilon Core Of A Large Game, Myrna Holtz Wooders Dec 1981

The Epsilon Core Of A Large Game, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Sufficient conditions are given for large replica games without side payments to have non-empty approximate cores for all sufficiently large replications. No “balancedness” assumptions are required. The conditions are superadditivity, a very weak boundedness condition, and convexity of the payoff sets. An example is provided to show that under these conditions, the (exact) core well may be empty.


Payoffs In Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach, Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman Dec 1981

Payoffs In Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach, Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Money And Finance In The Macro-Economic Process, James Tobin Dec 1981

Money And Finance In The Macro-Economic Process, James Tobin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Lecture presented December 8, 1981 at the Stockholm School of Economics in connection with the 1981 Prize for Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel.


Macroconfusion: The Dilemmas Of Economic Policy, William D. Nordhaus Nov 1981

Macroconfusion: The Dilemmas Of Economic Policy, William D. Nordhaus

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.