Economics Commons^™

Endogenous Market Formation And Monetary Trade: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Dror Goldberg, Avi Weiss

ESI Working Papers

The theory of money assumes decentralized bilateral exchange and excludes centralized multilateral exchange. However, endogenizing the exchange process is critical for understanding the conditions that support the use of money. We develop a “travelling game” to study the emergence of decentralized and centralized exchange, theoretically and experimentally. Players located on separate islands can either trade locally, or pay a cost to trade elsewhere, so decentralized and centralized markets can both emerge in equilibrium. The former minimize trade costs through monetary exchange; the latter maximizes overall surplus through non-monetary exchange. Monetary trade emerges when coordination is problematic, while centralized trade emerges …

The Attack And Defense Games, Roman Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

The attack and defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.

On The Merit Of Equal Pay: Performance Manipulation And Incentive Setting, Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang, Angela Sutan

ESI Publications

Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.

A Bias Aggregation Theorem, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

In a market where some traders are rational (maximize expected utility) and others are systematically biased (deviate from expected utility due to some bias parameter, q), do equilibrium prices necessarily depend on q? In this note, focusing on the case where there is an aggregate and systematic bias in the population, we show that market prices can still be unbiased. Hence, we establish that systematically biased agents do not necessarily imply biased market prices. We show that the parametric model we use also predicts observed deviations from expected utility in laboratory and market environments.

Cooperation Among Strangers With And Without A Monetary System, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

Human societies prosper when their members move beyond local exchange and cooperate with outsiders in the creation of wealth. Collaboration of this type presents formidable challenges because interaction is impersonal, reciprocity is unfeasible and trust cannot be easily established. Here we study this cooperation problem by modeling strategic interaction among strangers through an Intertemporal Exchange Game. The setup can be easily implemented in the laboratory to study a variety of cooperation-enhancing institutions. In particular, we study the role of a fiat monetary system by introducing intrinsically worthless tokens that can be offered in exchange for cooperation. The experiments show that …

Humanomics: Moral Sentiments And The Wealth Of Nations For The Twenty-First Century, Vernon Smith, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Books and Book Chapters

Sometime in the last 250 years, economists lost sight of the full range of human feeling, thinking, and knowing in everyday life. Smith and Wilson show how Adam Smith's model of sociality can re-humanize twenty-first century economics by undergirding it with sentiments, fellow feeling, and a sense of propriety - the stuff of which human relationships are built. Integrating insights from The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations into contemporary empirical analysis, this book shapes economic betterment as a science of human beings.

Spanish California Missions: An Economic Success, Lynne Doti

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Starting in 1769, the Spanish established missions in Alta California. A small band of soldiers, Franciscan priests and volunteers walked from Baja California to San Francisco Bay through semi-arid, scarcely populated land stopping occasionally to establish a location for a religious community. Usually two priests, a few soldiers and a few Indians from Baja California settled at the spot. Their only resources for starting an economy were themselves, a few animals and a nearby source of water. They attracted the local Indians to join the community and perform the work necessary to create a strong economy. After only a few …

A Full Characterization Of Best-Response Functions In The Lottery Colonel Blotto Game, Dan Kovenock, David Rojo Arjona

ESI Working Papers

We fully characterize best-response functions in Colonel Blotto games with lottery contest success functions.

Money Is More Than Memory, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key institution that supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrangement for monitoring counterparts’ past conduct. If so, then a public record of past actions—or memory—should supersede the function performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate into an empirical equivalence: money removed the incentives to free ride, while memory did not. Monetary systems performed a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors.

Modeling Interactions Between Risk, Time, And Social Preferences, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

Recent studies have observed systematic interactions between risk, time, and social preferences that constitute violations of `dimensional independence' and are not explained by the leading models of decision making. This note provides a simple approach to modeling such interaction effects while predicting new ones. In particular, we present a model of rational-behavioral preferences that takes the convex combination of `behavioral' System 1 preferences and `rational' System 2 preferences. The model provides a unifying approach to analyzing risk, time, and social preferences, and predicts how these preferences are correlated with reliance on System 1 or System 2 thinking.

A Dual System Model Of Risk And Time Preferences, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

Discounted Expected Utility theory has been a workhorse in economic analysis for over half a century. However, it cannot explain empirical violations of 'dimensional independence' demonstrating that risk interacts with time preference and time interacts with risk preference, nor does it explain present bias or magnitude-dependence in risk and time preferences, or correlations between risk preference, time preference, and cognitive reflection. We demonstrate that these and other anomalies are explained by a dual system model of risk and time preferences that unless models of a rational economic agent, models based on prospect theory, and dual process models of decision making.

Using Response Times To Measure Ability On A Cognitive Task, Aleksandr Alekseev

ESI Working Papers

I show how using response times as a proxy for effort coupled with an explicit process-based model can address a long-standing issue of how to separate the effect of cognitive ability on performance from the effect of motivation. My method is based on a dynamic stochastic model of optimal effort choice in which ability and motivation are the structural parameters. I show how to estimate these parameters from the data on outcomes and response times in a cognitive task. In a laboratory experiment, I find that performance on a Digit-Symbol test is a noisy and biased measure of cognitive ability. …

Slow-Fast Analysis Of A Multi-Group Asset Flow Model With Implications For The Dynamics Of Wealth, Mark Desantis, David Swigon

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The multi-group asset flow model is a nonlinear dynamical system originally developed as a tool for understanding the behavioral foundations of market phenomena such as flash crashes and price bubbles. In this paper we use a modification of this model to analyze the dynamics of a single-asset market in situations when the trading rates of investors (i.e., their desire to exchange stock for cash) are prescribed ahead of time and independent of the state of the market. Under the assumption of fast trading compared to the time-rate of change in the prescribed trading rates we decompose the dynamics of the …

On Booms That Never Bust: Ambiguity In Experimental Asset Markets With Bubbles, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal

ESI Working Papers

We study the effect of ambiguity on the formation of bubbles and on the occurrence of crashes in experimental asset markets à la Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988). We extend their framework to an environment where the fundamental value of the asset is ambiguous. We show that, when the fundamental value is ambiguous, asset prices tend to be lower than when it is risky although bubbles form in both the ambiguous and the risky environments. Additionally, bubbles do not crash in the ambiguous case whereas they do so in the risky one. These findings regarding depressed prices and the absence …

Spending Too Little In Hard Times, Alessandro Del Ponte, Peter Descioli

Political Science Faculty Articles and Research

People’s decisions to consume and save resources are critical to their wellbeing. Previous experiments find that people typically spend too much because of how they discount the future. We propose that people’s motive to preserve their savings can instead cause them to spend too little in hard times. We design an economic game in which participants can store resources for the future to survive in a harsh environment. A player’s income is uncertain and consumption yields diminishing returns within each day, creating tradeoffs between spending and saving. We compare participants’ decisions to a heuristic that performed best in simulations. We …

Conditional Independence In A Binary Choice Experiment, Nathaniel Wilcox

ESI Working Papers

Experimental and behavioral economists, as well as psychologists, commonly assume conditional independence of choices when constructing likelihood functions for structural estimation. I test this assumption using data from a new experiment designed for this purpose. Within the limits of the experiment’s identifying restriction and designed power to detect deviations from conditional independence, conditional independence is not rejected. In naturally occurring data, concerns about violations of conditional independence are certainly proper and well-taken (for well-known reasons). However, when an experimenter employs contemporary state-of-the-art experimental mechanisms and designs, the current evidence suggests that conditional independence is an acceptable assumption for analyzing data …

Selection In The Lab: A Network Approach, Aleksandr Alekseev, Mikhail Freer

ESI Working Papers

We study the selection problem in economic experiments by focusing on its dynamic and network aspects. We develop a dynamic network model of student participation in a subject pool, which assumes that students' participation is driven by the two channels: the direct channel of recruitment and the indirect channel of student interaction. Using rich recruitment data from a large public university, we find that the patterns of participation and biases are consistent with the model. We also find evidence of both short- and long-run selection biases between males and females, as well as between cohorts of students. Males tend to …

Agglomeration And The Extent Of The Market: An Experimental Investigation Into Spatially Coordinated Exchange, Jordan Adamson

ESI Working Papers

How and why do agglomerations emerge? While economic historians emphasize trade and economic geographers emphasize variety, we still don’t understand the role of coordination. I fill this gap by extending the model of Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) to formalize Smith’s (1776) theory of agglomeration. I then test the model in a laboratory experiment and find individuals tend to coalesce purely to coordinate exchange, with more agglomeration when there is a larger variety of goods in the economy. I also find that tying individuals to the land reduces agglomeration, but magnifies the effect of variety.

Chinese And European Financial Systems: Instability Drivers And Contagion Channels, Paolo Canofari, Alessandro Del Ponte

Political Science Faculty Articles and Research

This paper identifies systemic risk levels in the Eurozone and China. We first analyze the political and macro-financial factors underlying potential financial instability in both currency areas. Then, we examine the impact of a possible breakup of the Eurozone on the Chinese financial system and the risk of redenomination of Chinese assets expressed in Euros. Finally, considering the increasing credit gap in the Chinese economy and the enduring political instability in several Eurozone countries, we warn against a possible opening of contagion channels between China and Europe.

Coordination And Evolutionary Dynamics: When Are Evolutionary Models Reliable?, Daniel Graydon Stephenson

ESI Publications

This study reports a continuous-time experimental test of evolutionary models in coordinated attacker–defender games. It implements three experimental treatment conditions: one with strong coordination incentives, one with weak coordination incentives, and one with zero coordination incentives. Each treatment exhibits identical equilibrium predictions but distinct evolutionary predictions. Observed behavior was tightly clustered around equilibrium under both the zero coordination treatment and the weak coordination treatment but widely dispersed from equilibrium under the strong coordination treatment. This result was anticipated by explicitly dynamic models but not by conventional stability criteria. In contrast to the widely maintained assumption of sign-preservation, subjects frequently switched …

Variation Among Populations In The Immune Protein Composition Of Mother's Milk Reflects Subsistence Pattern, Laura D. Klein, Jincui Huang, Elizabeth A. Quinn, Melanie A. Martin, Alicia A. Breakey, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Claudia Valeggia, Grazyna Jasienska, Brooke Scelza, Carlito B. Lebrilla, Katie Hinde

ESI Publications

Lay Summary: Adaptive immune proteins in mothers’ milk are more variable than innate immune proteins across populations and subsistence strategies. These results suggest that the immune defenses in milk are shaped by a mother’s environment throughout her life.

Background and objectives: Mother’s milk contains immune proteins that play critical roles in protecting the infant from infection and priming the infant’s developing immune system during early life. The composition of these molecules in milk, particularly the acquired immune proteins, is thought to reflect a mother’s immunological exposures throughout her life. In this study, we examine the composition of innate …

Do Negative Random Shocks Affect Trust And Trustworthiness?, Hernán Bejarano, Joris Gillet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Publications

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are …

Do Negative Random Shocks Affect Trust And Trustworthiness?, Hernán Bejarano, Joris Gillet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Publications

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are …

The Supply Side Determinants Of Territory And Conflict, Jordan Adamson, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Working Papers

What determines the geographic extent of territory? We microfound and extend Boulding’s “Loss of Strength Gradient” to predict the extensive and intensive margins of conflict across space. We show how economies of scale in the production of violence and varying costs of projecting violence at a distance combine to affect the geographic distribution of conflict and territory. We test and probe the boundaries of this model in an experiment varying the fixed costs of conflict entry. As predicted, higher fixed costs increase the probability of exclusive territories; median behavior closely tracks equilibrium predictions in all treatments.

Experimental Research On Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review …

The Distribution Of Information And The Price Efficiency Of Markets, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Apparently contradictory evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which financial markets are informationally efficient. Shedding new light on this old debate, we show that differences in the distribution of private information may explain why informational efficiency can vary greatly across markets. We find that markets are informationally efficient when complete information is concentrated in the hands of competing insiders whereas they are less efficient when private information is dispersed across traders. A learning model helps to illustrate why inferring others’ private information from prices takes more time when information is more dispersed. We discuss the implications of our findings …

Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Working Papers

"In this paper I want to begin with the neoclassical supply and demand model of markets (SDM), whose static equilibrium consequences predicted outcomes far more accurately than were anticipated in laboratory experimental tests of the theory actuated by Jevons (1862, 1871; Smith, 1962). The observed predictive accuracy of SDM was not anticipated because complete information on supply and demand was widely believed, thought and taught to be a necessary condition for finding equilibrium. 1 Jevons’ model required him to have complete information in any particular market, as he only articulated a model of market optimal outcomes, and no model of …

Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.

Comparison Of Country/Economies At Stage Of Development With Movement In Rankings Of Countries On Global Competitiveness, Pradip K. Shukla, M. P. Shukla, Y. P. Shukla, A. P. Shukla

Business Faculty Articles and Research

With close to 200 countries in the world today, these countries are at various stages of development from less developed to more develop; these stages are often labeled in a rising numerical sequence such as Stage 1 to 3. Countries in the world compete in a global economy to benefit their domestic firms and citizens. As countries move to a higher stage of economic development they offer more global competitiveness for global businesses seeking new markets for sales, offshore outsourcing, and investments.

“The World Economic Forum is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. The Forum engages the foremost political, business …

Big Data In Economics, Matthew Harding, Jonathan Hersh

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Big Data refers to data sets of much larger size, higher frequency, and often more personalized information. Examples include data collected by smart sensors in homes or aggregation of tweets on Twitter. In small data sets, traditional econometric methods tend to outperform more complex techniques. In large data sets, however, machine learning methods shine. New analytic approaches are needed to make the most of Big Data in economics. Researchers and policymakers should thus pay close attention to recent developments in machine learning techniques if they want to fully take advantage of these new sources of Big Data.