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Articles 301 - 330 of 840

Full-Text Articles in Economics

Working Too Much For Too Little: Stochastic Rewards Cause Work Addiction, Brice Corgnet, Simon Gaechter, Roberto Hernán González Feb 2020

Working Too Much For Too Little: Stochastic Rewards Cause Work Addiction, Brice Corgnet, Simon Gaechter, Roberto Hernán González

ESI Working Papers

People are generally assumed to shy away from activities generating stochastic rewards, thus re-quiring extra compensation for handling any additional risk. In contrast with this view, neurosci-ence research with animals has shown that stochastic rewards may act as a powerful motivator. Applying these ideas to the study of work addiction in humans, and using a new experimental paradigm, we demonstrate how stochastic rewards may lead people to continue working on a re-petitive and effortful task even after monetary compensation becomes saliently negligible. In line with our hypotheses, we show that persistence on the work task is especially pronounced when the …

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Adam Smith’S Theory Of Value: A Reappraisal Of Classical Price Discovery, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith Feb 2020

Adam Smith’S Theory Of Value: A Reappraisal Of Classical Price Discovery, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Working Papers

The relevance of Adam Smith for understanding human morality and sociality is recognized in the growing interest in his work on moral sentiments among scholars of various academic backgrounds. But, paradoxically, Adam Smith’s theory of economic value enjoys a less prominent stature today among economists, who, while they view him as the “father of modern economics”, considered him more as having had the right intuitions about a market economy than as having developed the right concepts and the technical tools for studying it. Yet the neoclassical tradition, which replaced the classical school around 1870, failed to provide a satisfactory theory …

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A Computational And Experimental Examination Of The Fcc Incentive Auction, Logan Gantner Jan 2020

A Computational And Experimental Examination Of The Fcc Incentive Auction, Logan Gantner

Computational and Data Sciences (PhD) Dissertations

In 2016, the Federal Communications Commission debuted a new auction mechanism, the Incentive Auction, with the intention of obtaining high frequency television broadcasting spectrum, repurposing it for cellular use, and reselling these licenses at profitable prices. In designing this process, the traditional mechanism used for spectrum auctions, the Simulta- neous Multiple Round Auction (SMR), was modified in order to speed the process. This new mechanism, the Incentive Forward Auction (IFA), intended to reduce the number of rounds per auction by lumping similar spectrum licenses together. However, the IFA discourages straightforward bidding strategies and can result in bidders committing more in …

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News-Driven Expectations And Volatility Clustering, Sabiou M. Inoua Jan 2020

News-Driven Expectations And Volatility Clustering, Sabiou M. Inoua

ESI Publications

Financial volatility obeys two fascinating empirical regularities that apply to various assets, on various markets, and on various time scales: it is fat-tailed (more precisely power-law distributed) and it tends to be clustered in time. Many interesting models have been proposed to account for these regularities, notably agent-based models, which mimic the two empirical laws through a complex mix of nonlinear mechanisms such as traders switching between trading strategies in highly nonlinear way. This paper explains the two regularities simply in terms of traders’ attitudes towards news, an explanation that follows from the very traditional dichotomy of financial market participants, …

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Citizen-Consumers Wanted: Revitalizing The American Dream In The Face Of Economic Recessions, 1981-2012, Gokcen Coskuner-Balli Jan 2020

Citizen-Consumers Wanted: Revitalizing The American Dream In The Face Of Economic Recessions, 1981-2012, Gokcen Coskuner-Balli

Business Faculty Articles and Research

This article brings sociological theory of governmentality to bear on a longitudinal analysis of American presidential speeches to theorize the formation of the citizen-consumer subject. The 40-year historical analysis which expands through four economic recessions and the presidential terms of Ronald Reagan, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Hussein Obama, illustrates the ways in which the national mythology of American Dream myth has been linked to the political ideology of the state to create the citizen-consumer subject in the United States. The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data demonstrates first, the consistent emphasis on responsibility as a …

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All Pay Quality-Bids In Score Procurement Auctions, Dan Kovenock, Jingfeng Lu Jan 2020

All Pay Quality-Bids In Score Procurement Auctions, Dan Kovenock, Jingfeng Lu

ESI Working Papers

In this paper, we study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. A supplier’s score is the difference between his quality and price bids. The supplier with the highest score wins and gets paid his own price bid. The procurer’s payoff is the difference between the winner’s quality and the procurer’s payments to the suppliers. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without first obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. We find that quality bids, the suppliers’ payoffs and the procurer’s payoff do not depend on whether price bids are made contingent on quality bids. Compared to a benchmark of winner-pay …

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Rationally Inattentive Savers And Monetary Policy Changes: A Laboratory Experiment, Andrea Civelli, Cary Deck, Antonella Tutino Jan 2020

Rationally Inattentive Savers And Monetary Policy Changes: A Laboratory Experiment, Andrea Civelli, Cary Deck, Antonella Tutino

ESI Working Papers

We study the response of consumption and saving decisions of rationally inattentive individuals to changes in monetary policy in the laboratory. First, we theoretically characterize the choices of a rationally inattentive agent processing information about the interest rate. Then, we design an experiment with induced inattention to test for the predictions of the model, contrasting them to the full information case. Consistent with the predictions, experimental subjects (a) increase attention when utility gains exceed cognitive costs of tracking the policy rate and decrease savings when their perceived economic outlook deteriorates; (b) respond to Delphic, but not Odyssean, forms of forward …

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Reconsidering Rational Expectations And The Aggregation Of Diverse Information In Laboratory Security Markets, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, Kyle Hampton, Erik O. Kimbrough Jan 2020

Reconsidering Rational Expectations And The Aggregation Of Diverse Information In Laboratory Security Markets, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, Kyle Hampton, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Working Papers

The ability of markets to aggregate dispersed information is a cornerstone of economics and finance. In a seminal experiment, Plott and Sunder (1988) offer support for the rational expectations hypothesis. However, recent laboratory experiments have called into question the robustness of those initial results. In this paper, we offer the first attempt to directly replicate key findings of the original study. Failing to replicate their results, the post-study probability that market performance is better described by rational expectations than the prior information (Walrasian) model is low. Given this result, we introduce a new treatment that implements a market structure consistent …

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An Experimental Comparison Of News Vending And Price Gouging, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova Jan 2020

An Experimental Comparison Of News Vending And Price Gouging, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova

ESI Working Papers

The newsvendor problem is a workhorse model in operation management research. We introduce a related game that operates in the price dimension rather than the inventory dimension: the price gouging game. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare news vending and price gouging behavior. We replicate the standard pull-to-center effect for news vending and find that the equivalent pattern occurs with price gouging. Further, we find that the pull-to-center is asymmetric both for newsvendors and price gougers. More broadly, the experimental results reveal that choices are similar across the theoretically isomorphic games, suggesting that observed behavior in newsvendor experiments is representative …

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Reference Dependent Prices In Bargaining: An Experimental Examination Of Precise First Offers, Erik O. Kimbrough, David Porter, Mark Schneider Jan 2020

Reference Dependent Prices In Bargaining: An Experimental Examination Of Precise First Offers, Erik O. Kimbrough, David Porter, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

Evidence from psychology and marketing suggests that those who make a "precise" first offer in bargaining get a better deal than those who make a "round" first offer. We report on a series of experiments designed to test for and improve our understanding of the "precise first offer" (PFO) effect in bargaining and whether it likely reflects rational optimizing or equilibrium behavior. Our experimental treatments vary whether decisions are incentivized and whether the PFO effect can emerge as an equilibrium of a cheap-talk signaling game. We find evidence of a PFO effect when subjects read a vignette and make unincentivized …

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The Doors Of Perception, Gary Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso Dec 2019

The Doors Of Perception, Gary Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso

ESI Working Papers

We investigate how a player’s strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions she uses in thinking about the game, i.e., the “frame”. To do so, we consider matching games where two players are presented with a set of objects, from which each player must privately choose one (with the goal of matching the counterpart’s choice). We propose a novel theory positing that different player types are aware of different attributes of the strategy options, hence different frames; we then rationalize why differences in players’ frames may lead to differences in choice behavior. Unlike previous theories of framing, our …

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Predicting Market Trends: Effects Of Gdp And Pmi On Changes In Stock Closing Prices, Charley Renna Dec 2019

Predicting Market Trends: Effects Of Gdp And Pmi On Changes In Stock Closing Prices, Charley Renna

Student Scholar Symposium Abstracts and Posters

In an effort to learn more about the impact of certain economic variables on the stock market, I chose to analyze the impact that the Purchasing Managers’ Index and U.S. Gross Domestic Product have on three major stock indices: S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, and Nasdaq 100. The PMI is an index of the direction of economic trends in the manufacturing and services sector. Released on the first business day of every month, it consists of a diffusion index that summarizes whether market conditions are expanding, staying the same, or contracting. An index level greater than 50 percent suggests …

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Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González Dec 2019

Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González

ESI Working Papers

We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to …

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News-Driven Expectations And Volatility Clustering, Sabiou M. Inoua Dec 2019

News-Driven Expectations And Volatility Clustering, Sabiou M. Inoua

ESI Working Papers

Financial volatility obeys two well-established empirical properties: it is fat-tailed (power-law distributed) and it tends to be clustered in time. Many interesting models have been proposed to account for these regularities, notably agent-based computational models, which typically invoke complicated mechanisms, however. It can be shown that trend-following speculation generates the power law in an intrinsic way. But this model cannot exaplain clustered volatility. This paper extends the model and offers a simple explanation for clustered volatility: the impact of exogenous news on traders’ expectations. Owing to the famous no-trade results, rational expectations, the dominant model of news-driven expectations, is hard …

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Price Signaling And Bargain Hunting In Markets With Partially Informed Populations, Mark Schneider, Daniel Graydon Stephenson Nov 2019

Price Signaling And Bargain Hunting In Markets With Partially Informed Populations, Mark Schneider, Daniel Graydon Stephenson

ESI Working Papers

Classical studies of asymmetric information focus on situations where only one side of a market is informed. This study experimentally investigates a more general case where some sellers are informed and some buyers are informed. We establish the existence of semiseparating perfect Bayesian equilibria where prices serve as informative signals of quality to uninformed buyers, while informed buyers can often leverage their informational advantage by purchasing high quality items from uninformed sellers at bargain prices. These models provide a rational foundation for the co-existence of bargains, price signaling, and Pareto efficiency in markets with asymmetric information. We test these theoretical …

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Identity And The Self-Reinforcing Effects Of Norm Compliance, Mark A. Pickup, Erik O. Kimbrough, Eline A. Rooij Nov 2019

Identity And The Self-Reinforcing Effects Of Norm Compliance, Mark A. Pickup, Erik O. Kimbrough, Eline A. Rooij

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

When making political and economic decisions (e.g., voting, donating money to a cause), individuals consider the expectations of groups with which they identify. These expectations are injunctive norms, shared beliefs about appropriate behavior for identity group members, and individuals' choices reflect trade‐offs between adherence to these norms and other preferences. We show that when those who identify moderately/strongly with the group pay a cost as a consequence of avoiding a norm violation, they subsequently view the norms as stronger than those that paid no cost. This is evident in their greater willingness to pay an additional cost to punish/reward other …

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Do Appeals To Donor Benefits Raise More Money Than Appeals To Recipient Benefits? Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment With Pick.Click.Give., John A. List, James J. Murphy, Michael K. Price, Alexander G. James Nov 2019

Do Appeals To Donor Benefits Raise More Money Than Appeals To Recipient Benefits? Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment With Pick.Click.Give., John A. List, James J. Murphy, Michael K. Price, Alexander G. James

ESI Working Papers

We partnered with Alaska’s Pick.Click.Give. Charitable Contributions Program to implement a statewide natural field experiment with 540,000 Alaskans designed to explore whether targeted appeals emphasizing donor benefits through warm glow impact donations. Results highlight the relative import of appeals to self. Individuals who received such an appeal were 4.5 percent more likely to give and gave 20 percent more than counterparts in the control group. Yet, a message that instead appealed to recipient benefits had no effect on average donations relative to the control group. We also find evidence of long-run effects of warm glow appeals in the subsequent year.

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A Class Of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information, Christian Ewerhart, Dan Kovenock Nov 2019

A Class Of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information, Christian Ewerhart, Dan Kovenock

ESI Working Papers

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent’s vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent’s resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent’s valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.

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Cooperation In Indefinitely Repeated Helping Games: Existence And Characterization, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré Nov 2019

Cooperation In Indefinitely Repeated Helping Games: Existence And Characterization, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré

ESI Working Papers

Experiments that investigate the spontaneous emergence of money in laboratory societies rely on indefinitely repeated helping games with random matching (Camera et al., 2013; Camera and Casari, 2014). An important open issue is the lack of a general proof of existence of an equilibrium capable of supporting the efficient allocation under private monitoring, without money. Here, we fill this gap by offering a general proof, as well as by characterizing the efficient non-monetary equilibrium. This technique can be extended to study games with simultaneous actions.

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Breaking Up: Experimental Insights Into Economic (Dis)Integration, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl, Rolf Weder Oct 2019

Breaking Up: Experimental Insights Into Economic (Dis)Integration, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl, Rolf Weder

ESI Working Papers

Standard international economic theory suggests that people should embrace economic integration because it promises large gains. But recent events such as Brexit indicate a desire for economic disintegration. Here we report results of an experiment, based on a strategic analytical framework, of how size and distribution of potential gains from integration influence outcomes and individuals’ inclination to embrace integration. We find that cross-country inequality in potential gains acts as a friction to realize those gains. This suggests that to better understand recent phenomena, international economic theory should account for distributional considerations and behavioral aspects it currently ignores.

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Short- And Medium-Term Car Registration Forecasting Based On Selected Macro And Socio-Economic Indicators In European Countries, Lubor Homolka, Vu Minh Ngo, Drahomíra Pavelková, Bach Tuan Le, Bruce Dehning Oct 2019

Short- And Medium-Term Car Registration Forecasting Based On Selected Macro And Socio-Economic Indicators In European Countries, Lubor Homolka, Vu Minh Ngo, Drahomíra Pavelková, Bach Tuan Le, Bruce Dehning

Accounting Faculty Articles and Research

The automotive industry plays a key role in the European economy. In this paper, we determine which macro and socio-economic indicators have significant predictive power on car registrations - a proxy to automotive sector performance - across European countries. Contrary to the current literature which mainly focuses on long-term forecasting, we built our models on the highly seasonal monthly data of a medium-term period to make short-term forecasts. Our approach utilises predictors identified by the literature review. Presented models are built on the Vector Autoregressive models and are accompanied by formal tests, such as the Granger causality test. We have …

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Make It Too Difficult And I’Ll Give-Up; Let Me Succeed And I’Ll Excel: The Interaction Between Assigned And Personal Goals, James Fan, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres, Samuel Smithers Oct 2019

Make It Too Difficult And I’Ll Give-Up; Let Me Succeed And I’Ll Excel: The Interaction Between Assigned And Personal Goals, James Fan, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres, Samuel Smithers

ESI Working Papers

We examine the motivational effects of setting both assigned and personal non-binding goals on a real effort laboratory experiment. In order to derive conjectures for our experiment, we develop a model with goal-dependent preferences. In line with previous studies, we find that goal setting leads to a higher performance. We also find that goal-setting is most effective if subjects were able to achieve previous goals. Therefore, in goal setting, “success breeds success”. In particular, we observe that when subjects are initially allowed to attain assigned goals, they are better at self-motivating in the future when performing under personal goals.

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Investment Choice Architecture In Trust Games: When “All-In” Is Not Enough, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields Oct 2019

Investment Choice Architecture In Trust Games: When “All-In” Is Not Enough, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Working Papers

While many economic interactions feature “All-or-Nothing” options nudging investors towards going “all-in”, such designs may unintentionally affect reciprocity. We manipulate the investor’s action space in two versions of the “trust game”. In one version investors can invest either “all” their endowment or “nothing”. In the other version, they can invest any amount of the endowment. Consistent with our intentions-based model, we show that "all-or-nothing” designs coax more investment but limit investors’ demonstrability of intended trust. As a result, “all-in” investors are less generously reciprocated than when they can invest any amount, where full investments are a clearer signal of trustworthiness.

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Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange And Reference Wages: Your Gift Need Not Be Mine!, Hernán Bejarano, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres Oct 2019

Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange And Reference Wages: Your Gift Need Not Be Mine!, Hernán Bejarano, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres

ESI Working Papers

We extend Akerlof’s (1982) gift-exchange model to the case in which reference wages respond to changes in the work environment such as those related to unemployment benefits or workers’ productivity levels. Our model shows that these changes spur disagreements between workers and employers regarding the value of the reference wage. These disagreements tend to weaken the gift-exchange relationship thus reducing production levels and wages. We find support for these predictions in a controlled, yet realistic, workplace environment. Our work also sheds light on several stylized facts regarding employment relationships such as the increased intensity of labor conflicts when economic conditions …

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Nonbinding Goals In Teams: A Real Effort Coordination Experiment, James Fan, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres Sep 2019

Nonbinding Goals In Teams: A Real Effort Coordination Experiment, James Fan, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres

ESI Publications

Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant) goals, set by a manager, on a team of workers with “weak-link” production technology. Can nonbinding goals improve team production when team members face production complementarity? Academic/practical relevance: Nonbinding goals are easy to implement and ubiquitous in practice. These goals have been shown to improve individual performance, but it remains to be seen if such goals are effective in team production when there is production complementarity among workers. Methodology: We first develop a theoretical model where goals act as reference points for workers’ intrinsic motivation to complete the …

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Give Me A Challenge Or Give Me A Raise, Aleksandr Alekseev Sep 2019

Give Me A Challenge Or Give Me A Raise, Aleksandr Alekseev

ESI Working Papers

I study the effect of task difficulty on workers' effort and compare it to the effect of monetary rewards in an incentivized lab experiment. I find that task difficulty has an inverse-U effect on effort, and that this effect is quantitatively large when compared to the effect of conditional monetary rewards. Difficulty acts as a mediator of monetary rewards: conditional rewards are most effective at the intermediate or high levels of difficulty. I show that the inverse-U pattern of effort response to difficulty is not consistent with the Expected Utility model but is consistent with the Rank-Dependent Utility model that …

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Review Of The Promise And Peril Of Credit: What A Forgotten Legend About Jews And Finance Tells Us About The Making Of European Commercial Society, Jared Rubin Sep 2019

Review Of The Promise And Peril Of Credit: What A Forgotten Legend About Jews And Finance Tells Us About The Making Of European Commercial Society, Jared Rubin

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A review of The Promise and Peril of Credit: What a Forgotten Legend about Jews and Finance Tells Us about the Making of European Commercial Society, by Francesca Trivellato, published by Princeton University Press.

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Self-Selecting Into Being A Dictator: Distributional Consequences, Lara Ezquerra, Praveen Kujal Sep 2019

Self-Selecting Into Being A Dictator: Distributional Consequences, Lara Ezquerra, Praveen Kujal

ESI Working Papers

We allow for principals to self-select into delegating, or not, the allocation decision to an agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game arises when principal´s choose to make the allocation decision themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent under delegation (or in the standard dictator game). Principals choose to be a dictator nearly half of the time. The average amount transferred by individuals who delegate in more than half of the rounds is significantly higher than the quantity transferred by those who choose to …

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Lying And Shirking Under Oath, Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, James J. Murphy, Jason F. Shogren Aug 2019

Lying And Shirking Under Oath, Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, James J. Murphy, Jason F. Shogren

ESI Working Papers

This study explores whether an oath to honesty can reduce both shirking and lying among crowd-sourced internet workers. Using a classic coin-flip experiment, we first show that a substantial majority of Mechanical Turk workers both shirk and lie when reporting the number of heads flipped. We then demonstrate lying can be reduced by first asking each worker to swear voluntarily on his or her honor to tell the truth in subsequent economic decisions. The oath, however, did not reduce shirking as measured by time- at-coin-flip-task, although it did increase the time they spent answering a demographic survey. Conditional on response, …

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Kinship, Fractionalization And Corruption, Mahsa Akbari, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Erik O. Kimbrough Aug 2019

Kinship, Fractionalization And Corruption, Mahsa Akbari, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Erik O. Kimbrough

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We examine the roots of variation in corruption across societies, and we argue that marriage practices and family structure are an important, overlooked determinant of corruption. By shaping patterns of relatedness and interaction, marriage practices influence the relative returns to norms of nepotism/favoritism versus norms of impartial cooperation. In-marriage (e.g. consanguineous marriage) generates fractionalization because it yields relatively closed groups of related individuals and thereby encourages favoritism and corruption. Out-marriage creates a relatively open society with increased interaction between non-relatives and strangers, thereby encouraging impartiality. We report a robust association between in-marriage practices and corruption both across countries and within …

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