Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Contract-Wrapped Property, Danielle D'Onfro

Scholarship@WashULaw

For nearly two centuries, the law has allowed servitudes that “run with” real property while consistently refusing to permit servitudes attached to personal property. That is, owners of land can establish new, specific requirements for the property that bind all future owners—but owners of chattels cannot. In recent decades, however, firms have increasingly begun relying on contract provisions that purport to bind future owners of chattels. These developments began in the context of software licensing, but they have started to migrate to chattels not encumbered by software. Courts encountering these provisions have mostly missed their significance, focusing instead on questions …

Law Library Blog (November 2023): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Law Library Newsletters/Blog

No abstract provided.

Provisional Measures In Aid Of Arbitration, Ronald A. Brand

Articles

The success of the New York Convention has made arbitration a preferred means of dispute resolution for international commercial transactions. Success in arbitration often depends on the extent to which a party may secure assets, evidence, or the status quo between parties prior to the completion of the arbitration process. This makes the availability of provisional measures granted by either arbitral tribunals or by courts fundamental to the arbitration. In this Article, I consider the existing legal framework for provisional measures in aid of arbitration, with particular attention to the sources of the rules providing for such measures. Those sources …

Leases As Forms, David A. Hoffman, Anton Strezhnev

All Faculty Scholarship

We offer the first large scale descriptive study of residential leases, based on a dataset of ~170,000 residential leases filed in support of over ~200,000 Philadelphia eviction proceedings from 2005 through 2019. These leases are highly likely to contain unenforceable terms, and their pro-landlord tilt has increased sharply over time. Matching leases with individual tenant characteristics, we show that unlawful terms are surprisingly likely to be associated with more expensive leaseholds in richer, whiter parts of the city. This result is linked to landlords' growing adoption of shared forms, originally created by non-profit landlord associations, and more recently available online …

The New Bailments, Danielle D'Onfro

Scholarship@WashULaw

The rise of cloud computing has dramatically changed how consumers and firms store their belongings. Property that owners once managed directly now exists primarily on infrastructure maintained by intermediaries. Consumers entrust their photos to Apple instead of scrapbooks; businesses put their documents on Amazon’s servers instead of in file cabinets; seemingly everything runs in the cloud. Were these belongings tangible, the relationship between owner and intermediary would be governed by the common-law doctrine of bailment. Bailments are mandatory relationships formed when one party entrusts their property to another. Within this relationship, the bailees owe the bailors a duty of care …

Error-Resilient Consumer Contracts, Danielle D'Onfro

Scholarship@WashULaw

When firms contracting with consumers make mistakes, people get hurt. Inaccurate billing, misapplied payments, and similar problems push lucky consumers into kafkaesqe customer-service queues and unlucky ones off the financial cliff. Despite significant regulatory interventions, firms contracting with consumers continue to struggle to accurately bill customers, update accounts, and process payments. Firms largely rely on technology, especially databases and software, to discharge these servicing obligations. This technology must accommodate firms’ innovations in their contracts, shifting regulations, and unpredictable consumer behavior. Given the complexity of servicing, the technology will inevitably produce mistakes even when firms invest in technology. When firms skimp …

Federal Student Loan Servicing Accountability And Incentives In Contracts, Rajeev Darolia, Andrew Sullivan

Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Working Papers

Student loan servicers play a critical and underappreciated role in federal student loan programs. The federal government contracts out to servicers an array of many of the most critical functions related to student loan repayment, including account management, payment processing, and the provision of information about payment plans and solutions for distressed borrowers. In fact, most borrowers’ interactions with federal student loan repayment are almost exclusively with their servicer. We aim to improve upon the scarce research literature about federal student loan servicers by exploring the complicated set of measures that determine how servicers are compensated for servicing each debtor …

Justifying Bad Deals, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

All Faculty Scholarship

In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that individual commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships and traditional promises. Even take-it-or-leave it consumer contracts get substantial deference from consumers — even when the terms are unenforceable, even when the assent is procedurally compromised, and even when the drafter is an impersonal commercial actor. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that people import the morality of promise into situations that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative, or coercive. The purpose of this Article is to propose a framework for understanding what seems to be widespread acceptance of regulation …

Contractual Arbitrage, Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Standard-form contracts are likely to be incomplete because they are not tailored to the needs of particular deals. In an attempt to reduce incompleteness, standard-form contracts often contain clauses with vague or ambiguous terms. Terms with indeterminate meaning present opportunities for strategic behavior well after a contract has been executed. This linguistic uncertainty in standard-form commercial contracts creates an opportunity for “contractual arbitrage”: parties may argue ex post that the uncertainties in expression mean something that the contracting parties did not contemplate ex ante. This chapter argues that the scope for contractual arbitrage is a direct function of the techniques …

Smart Contracts And The Illusion Of Automated Enforcement, Danielle D'Onfro

Scholarship@WashULaw

This symposium essay explores the barriers to deploying smart contracts in the consumer finance space: the humans themselves, existing consumer protection laws, and the other businesses who have financial contracts with consumers but that cannot deploy smart contracts. These three barriers render perfectly automated enforcement all but impossible. Nevertheless, there may be room for modifiable smart contracts in the consumer financial space although these contracts may be only marginally more efficient than traditional contracts.

Contract Law And The Liberalism Of Fear, Nathan B. Oman

Faculty Publications

Liberalism’s concern with human freedom seems related to contractual freedom and thus contract law. There are, however, many strands of liberal thought and which of them best justifies contract is a difficult question. In The Choice Theory of Contracts, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller offer a vision of contract based on autonomy. Drawing on the work of Joseph Raz, they argue that extending autonomy should be the law’s primary concern, which requires that we extend the range of contractual choices available. While there is much to admire in their work, I argue that autonomy as conceived by Dagan and Heller …

Law Library Blog (August 2019): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Law Library Newsletters/Blog

No abstract provided.

Hushing Contracts, David A. Hoffman, Erik Lampmann

All Faculty Scholarship

The last few years have brought a renewed appreciation of the costs of nondisclosure agreements that suppress information about sexual wrongdoing. Recently passed bills in a number of states, including New York and California, has attempted to deal with such hush contracts. But such legislation is often incomplete, and many courts and commentators continue to ask if victims of harassment can sign enforceable settlements that conceal serious, potentially metastasizing, social harms. In this Article, we argue that employing the public policy doctrine, courts ought to generally refuse to enforce hush agreements, especially those created by organizations. We restate public policy …

Essentials Of A Publication Agreement, Stephen Wolfson, Mariann Burright

Presentations

This session will focus on authors' rights and publishing contracts. When academic publishers agree to publish academic works, they require the authors to sign agreements before doing so. In the past, these “agreements” – contracts, by another name – often have contained provisions that primarily benefit the publishers, including assigning intellectual property rights in the works to the publishers and limiting authors’ abilities to use their works after transferring their rights. Faculty authors often ask librarians for their guidance on how to read and negotiate publication agreements. As such, this session will discuss common provisions found in publishing contracts to …

What's In A Licensing Agreement?, Stephen Wolfson, Mariann Burright

Presentations

Now that you know the foundations of enforceable contracts, and want to have more familiarity with some nuts and bolts of contract language to become a better negotiator for your institutions, you will want to take this second webinar.
Participants will learn:
• What are the basic provisions or clauses of a contract?
• What do these provisions obligate my institution to do?
• What do these provisions obligate the other party to do?
• What rights does my institution have if the other party breaks its obligations?

Contract Basics For Librarians And Others In Higher Ed, Stephen Wolfson, Mariann Burright

Presentations

If you have signature or negotiation authority for your institution, and would like to get an overview of contracts to learn what your institution’s rights and obligations may be under a contract, this session is for you! Participants will learn:

• Why it is important to understand how contracts work?
• What does it mean for a contract to be enforceable in a US court?
• How is an enforceable contract formed?
• What could lead to contract breach?

The Behavioral Economics Of Multilevel Marketing, Heidi H. Liu

All Faculty Scholarship

Multilevel marketing companies (MLMs) - sales organizations that compensate independent consultants based on the sales and recruitment of other consultants - form a significant part of the American economy. Yet, MLMs provide little information to regulators and potential participants regarding potentially material information. Although MLMs are often compared to pyramid schemes, consultants argue that participation in a MLM allows them to make money outside of the traditional full-time labor force. This paper examines the law, economics, and psychology of MLMs, suggesting that MLMs may draw on prospective consultants' cognitive biases in persuading consultants to join and continue a MLM. Consultants …

The Pros And Cons Of Workplace Tournaments, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate personal development. Tournament-based contracts can be very effective in eliciting high effort, often outperforming other compensation contracts, but they can also have negative consequences for both managers and workers. The benefits and disadvantages of workplace tournaments have been identified in theoretical, empirical, and experimental research over the past several decades. Based on these findings, I provide suggestions and guidelines for when it might be beneficial to use tournaments in the workplace.

Slides: Water Allocation And Water Markets In Spain, Nuria Hernández-Mora

Coping with Water Scarcity in River Basins Worldwide: Lessons Learned from Shared Experiences (Martz Summer Conference, June 9-10)

Presenter: Nuria Hernández Mora, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain

22 slides

The Common Sense Of Contract Formation, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, David A. Hoffman

All Faculty Scholarship

What parties know and think they know about contract law affects their obligations under the law and their intuitive obligations toward one another. Drawing on a series of new experimental questionnaire studies, this Article makes two contributions.First, it lays out what information and beliefs ordinary individuals have about how to form contracts with one another. We find that the colloquial understanding of contract law is almost entirely focused on formalization rather than actual assent, though the modern doctrine of contract formation takes the opposite stance. The second Part of the Article tries to get at whether this misunderstanding matters. Is …

Demand For Breach, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

All Faculty Scholarship

These studies elicit behavioral evidence for how people weigh monetary and non-monetary incentives in efficient breach. Study 1 is an experimental game designed to capture the salient features of the efficient breach decision. Subjects in a behavioral lab were offered different amounts of money to break the deal they had made with a partner. 18.6% of participants indicated willingness to break a deal for any amount of profit, 27.9% were unwilling to breach for the highest payout, and the remaining subjects identified a break-point in between. Study 2 is an online questionnaire asking subjects to take the perspectives of buyers …

Gaming And Strategic Opacity In Incentive Provision, Florian Ederer, Richard Holden, Margaret Meyer

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in which the agent is privately informed about which task is less costly for him to work on. We examine two simple classes of incentive scheme that are “opaque” in that they make the agent uncertain ex ante about the values of the incentive coefficients in the linear payment rule. We show that, relative …

From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The question of whether, and to what extent, markets price contract terms in government bond issues has been one of considerable debate in the literature. We use a natural experiment thrown up by the Euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 to test whether a particular set of contract terms – ones that gave an advantage to sovereign guaranteed bonds over garden variety sovereign bonds – was priced. These contract terms turned out to be important for the holders of guaranteed bonds during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, where they helped the holders of guaranteed bonds escape the haircut …

Copyright’S Private Ordering And The 'Next Great Copyright Act', Jennifer E. Rothman

All Faculty Scholarship

Private ordering plays a significant role in the application of intellectual property laws, especially in the context of copyright law. In this Article, I highlight some of the dominant modes of private ordering and consider what formal copyright law should do, if anything, to engage with private ordering in the copyright space. I conclude that there is not one single approach that copyright law should take with regard to private ordering, but instead several different approaches. In some instances, the best option is for the law to get out of the way and simply continue to provide room for various …

Promises And Expectations, Florian Ederer, Alexander Stremitzer

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors’ expectations about promisees’ expectations that the promise will be kept) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide clean evidence that a promisor’s aversion to disappointing a promisee’s expectation leads her to keep her promise. We propose a simple theory of lexicographic promise keeping that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases.

Promises And Expectations, Florian Ederer, Alexander Stremitzer

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors’ expectations about promisees’ expectations) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide evidence that a promisor’s aversion to disappointing a promisee’s expectation leads her to behave more generously. We propose and estimate a simple model of conditional guilt aversion that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases.

Do Mlb Hitters Boost Performance In Their Contract Year?, Heather M. O'Neill

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

This study focuses on 256 MLB free agent hitters playing under the 2006-2011 CBA to determine whether they boost their offensive performance in their contract year. Prior studies’ results are mixed, depending on the econometric technique used and the choice of the offensive performance measure.

Having multiple year observations per player, one can incorporate the unobserved traits of the players (ability, risk aversion, work ethic, etc.) by using Fixed Effects (FE) estimation. Since these unmeasured player traits are likely to be correlated with observed predictors of performance (games played, playoff contention, age, etc.), traditionally used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and …

The Psychology Of Contract Precautions, David A. Hoffman, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

All Faculty Scholarship

This research tests the intuition that parties to a contract approach each other differently before the contract is formed than they do once it is finalized. We argue that one of the most important determinants of self-protective behavior is whether the promisee considers herself to be in negotiations or already in an ongoing contract relationship. That shift affects precaution-taking even when it has no practical bearing on the costs and benefits of self-protection: the moment of contracting is a reference point that frames the costs and benefits of taking precautions. We present the results of three questionnaire studies in which …

Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal

Research Collection School Of Economics

We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging inefficient, non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. Without requiring that agents have perfect foresight, we show that perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.

Local Government Public Works Standards And Specifications, John Chlarson, Sharon Rollins

MTAS Publications: Full Publications

This document was developed to provide Tennessee cities with guidelines for construction projects. It includes guidelines for construction standards, materials specifications, design criteria, and contract documents to be used for streets, storm sewers, sanitary sewers, and water distribution systems.