Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition.

United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This chapter adopts the working assumption that it is conceivable that at some time in the future it would be in the interest of the United States to restructure its sovereign debt (i.e., to reduce the principal amount). It addresses in particular U.S. Treasury Securities. The chapter first provides an overview of the intermediated, tiered holding system for book-entry Treasuries. For the first time the chapter then explores whether and how—logistically and legally—such a restructuring could be effected. It posits the sort of dire scenario that might make such a restructuring advantageous. It then outlines a novel scheme …

Technical Bulletins: Should Your City Consider Privatization? (2011), David Angerer

MTAS Publications: Technical Bulletins

Many cities have come to see privatization as a means of saving money and improving the quality of the services they provide to the public.

Do Major League Baseball Hitters Come Up Big In Their Contract Year?, Heather M. O'Neill, Matthew J. Hummel

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

In sports, especially baseball, there is a lot of talk about contract year performance. Beginning in spring training and continuing throughout the season, sports journalists and fans converse about how players in the last year of their contract will perform. Experts in the media, often ex-baseball players themselves, speculate contract year players will have break-out seasons in order to secure a better contract in upcoming contract negotiations. This leads to the question: do baseball players increase their effort and performance during their contract year to increase the value of their next contract?

A Moral Contractual Approach To Labor Law Reform: A Template For Using Ethical Principles To Regulate Behavior Where Law Failed To Do So Effectively, Zev J. Eigen, David S. Sherwyn

Faculty Working Papers

If laws cease to work as they should or as intended, legislators and scholars propose new laws to replace or amend them. This paper posits an alternative—offering regulated parties the opportunity to contractually bind themselves to behave ethically. The perfect test-case for this proposal is labor law, because (1) labor law has not been amended for decades, (2) proposals to amend it have failed for political reasons, and are focused on union election win rates, and less on the election process itself, (3) it is an area of law already statutorily regulating parties' reciprocal contractual obligations, and (4) moral means …

Foreword: Advances In The Behavioral Analysis Of Law: Markets, Institutions, And Contracts, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

Avishalom Tor, Special Editor

The collection of articles in this Special Issue is based on an international conference on Advances in the Behavioral Analysis of Law: Markets, Institutions, and Contracts that took place on December 8, 2009 at the University of Haifa Faculty of Law in Israel. The conference addressed cutting-edge legal issues at the intersection of law, economics, and psychology from a diverse set of viewpoints, bringing together scholars engaged in both theoretical and experimental behavioral analyses of law.

Qualification Based Selection: An Mtas Guide For Procuring Professional Engineering Services In Tennessee (2010), Sharon Rollins

MTAS Publications: Full Publications

The purpose of this guide is to present a simple, step-by-step procedure to aid Tennessee municipal officials in procuring engineering, architectural, land surveying, and other professional services by using the QBS process.

Slides: Celebrating Flpma: Land Use Planning At The Blm, Marcilynn Burke

The Past, Present, and Future of Our Public Lands: Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the Public Land Law Review Commission’s Report, One Third of the Nation’s Land (Martz Summer Conference, June 2-4)

Presenter: Marcilynn Burke, BLM Deputy Director - Programs and Policy, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, (Washington, D.C.)

30 slides

Applications Barriers To Entry And Exclusive Vertical Contracts In Platform Markets, James Prieger, Wei-Min Hu

School of Public Policy Working Papers

Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompetitive. We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect network effects and thus are susceptible to applications barriers to entry. Exclusive contracts in vertical relationships between the platform provider and software supplier can heighten entry barriers. We test these theories in the home video game market. We find that indirect network effects from software on hardware demand are present, and that exclusivity takes market share from rivals, but only when most games are non-exclusive. The marginal exclusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand. Thus, allowing …

New York State And Mid-Hudson Valley Nonprofits: The Impacts Of Late Contract Payments, Jodi Fernandes

Master in Public Administration Theses

No abstract provided.

Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers experimental evidence that parties are more willing to exploit efficient-breach opportunities when the contract in question includes a liquidated-damages clause. Economists claim that the theory of efficient breach allows us to predict when parties will choose to breach a contract if the legal remedy for breach is expectation damages. However, the economic assumption of rational wealth-maximizing actors fails to capture important, shared, nonmonetary values and incentives that shape behavior in predictable ways. When interpersonal obligations are informal or underspecified, people act in accordance with shared community norms, like the moral norm of keeping promises. However, when sanctions …

Breach Is For Suckers, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, David A. Hoffman

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents results from three experiments offering evidence that parties see breach of contract as a form of exploitation, making disappointed promisees into “suckers.” In psychology, being a sucker turns on a three-part definition: betrayal, inequity, and intention. We used web-based questionnaires to test the effect of each of the three factors separately. Our results support the hypothesis that when breach of contract cues an exploitation schema, people become angry, offended, and inclined to retaliate even when retaliation is costly. This theory offers a useful advance insofar it explains why victims of breach demand more than similarly situated tort …

The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller

Working Paper Series

In any large corporate acquisition, there is a delay between the time the parties enter into a merger agreement (the signing) and the time the merger is effected and the purchase price paid (the closing). During this period, the business of one of the parties may deteriorate. When this happens to a target company in a cash deal, or to either party in a stock-for-stock deal, the counterparty may no longer want to consummate the transaction. The primary contractual protection parties have in such situations is the merger agreement’s “material adverse change” (MAC) clause. Such clauses are heavily negotiated and …

Film Finance: Teaching/Research, Collaborative Project

Dyson College- Seidenberg School of CSIS : Collaborative Projects and Presentations

This entry adheres to the use of the quad chart template to provide a succinct description only of the current research project undertaken by the participants. It provides for the following information

1. Participants and Affiliations
2. Overall Project Goals
3. Illustrative picture
4. Specific research/artistic/pedagogic foci

Consumer Harm Acts? An Economic Analysis Of Private Actions Under State Consumer Protection Acts, Henry N. Butler, Jason S. Johnston

Faculty Working Papers

State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices that would not be redressed but for the existence of the acts. In this sense, CPAs were designed to fill existing gaps in market, legal and regulatory protections of consumers. CPAs were designed to solve two simple economic problems: 1) individual consumers often do not have the incentive or means to pursue individual claims against mass marketers who engage in unfair and deceptive practices; and, 2) because of the difficulty of establishing elements of either common law fraud or breach …

Managing Risks Associated With The Jbcc(Principal Building Agreement) From Thesouth African Contractor’S Perspective, Ayman Ahmed Ezzat Othman, Nishani Harinarain

Architectural Engineering

Construction is a complex and risky business. It is a time-consuming process involving a multitude of organisations with different objectives and skills. In addition, increasing client expectations coupled with the technological development of materials and equipment made the construction industry subject to more risks than any other industry. Contracts are essential tools for organising the relationship between involved parties and managing associated risk. For years the South African construction industry had a very poor reputation in managing construction risks. In order to improve the image of the South African construction industry and to assist contractors to develop their proper risk …

Using The Unidroit Principles To Fill Gaps In The Cisg, John Y. Gotanda

Working Paper Series

The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) sets forth only a basic framework for the recovery of damages, thereby giving a court of tribunal broad authority to determine an aggrieved party’s loss based on circumstances of the particular case. Unfortunately, the lack of specificity has resulted in much litigation, and seemingly conflicting results. To remedy this problem, some have argued that the gaps in the CISG damages provisions should be filled with the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. In this paper, I argue that the gap-filling rules of CISG preclude the UNIDROIT Principles from being …

Bribes V. Bombs: A Study In Coasean Warfare, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

The use of bribes to co-opt an enemy’s forces can be a more effective way to wage war than the conventional use of force: Relative to bombs, bribes can save lives and resources, and preserve civic institutions. This essay evaluates the efficacy and normative desirability of selectively substituting bribes for bombs as a means of warfare. We show how inter-country disparities in wealth, differences in military strength, the organization of the bribing and recipient forces, uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, and communications technology can contribute to the efficacy of bribes. We discuss methods for enforcing bargains struck between …

Inefficient Worker Turnover, Nicolas L. Jacquet

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers’ mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt after the match is formed. It is shown that the efficiency of worker turnover depends on contract enforceability, and that in the absence of complete enforceability the equilibrium fails to be efficient. This is because without complete enforceability firms cannot credibly offer workers contracts that will guarantee them the entire future of all potential future matches.

It’S Not About The Money: The Role Of Preferences, Cognitive Biases And Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, Michael Mccann

Law Faculty Scholarship

Professional athletes are often regarded as selfish, greedy, and out-of-touch with regular people. They hire agents who are vilified for negotiating employment contracts that occasionally yield compensation in excess of national gross domestic products. Professional athletes are thus commonly assumed to most value economic remuneration, rather than the love of the game or some other intangible, romanticized inclination.

Lending credibility to this intuition is the rational actor model, a law and economic precept which presupposes that when individuals are presented with a set of choices, they rationally weigh costs and benefits, and select the course of action that maximizes their …

The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

Standard form contracts, or contracts of adhesion, appear to provide contradictory evidence for the operation of bargaining in the markets where they are common. Non-negotiated contract terms that seemingly benefit sellers to the detriment of buyers call into question the efficiency implications of the Coase Theorem, which forms the foundation of positive law and economics. Proponents of the behavioral school of law and economics have suggested that behavioral biases, observed in experimental contexts, provide the most plausible explanation for standard form contracts. However, price discrimination might provide a more parsimonious explanation for abusive terms in contracts. If there is heterogeneity …

Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

The ideal of individual liberty and autonomy requires that society provide relief against coercion. In the law, this requirement is often translated into rules that operate “post-coercion” to undo the legal consequences of acts and promises extracted under duress. This Article argues that these ex-post anti-duress measures, rather than helping the coerced party, might in fact hurt her. When coercion is credible—when a credible threat to inflict an even worse outcome underlies the surrender of the coerced party—ex post relief will only induce the strong party to execute the threatened outcome, to the detriment of the coerced party. Anti-duress relief …

"Agreeing To Disagree": Filling Gaps In Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This Article develops a new standard for gap filling in incomplete contracts. It focuses on an important class of situations in which parties leave their agreement deliberately incomplete, with the intent to further negotiate and resolve the remaining issues. In these situations, neither the traditional no-enforcement result nor the usual gap filling approaches accord with the parties’ partial consent. Instead, the Article develops the concept of pro-defendant gap-fillers, under which each party is granted an option to enforce the transaction supplemented with terms most favorable (within reason) to the other party. A deliberately incomplete contract with pro-defendant gap fillers transforms …

Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the …

The Functions Of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization In A World Of Friction, David M. Driesen, Shubha Ghosh

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

This article critically examines the goal of minimizing transaction costs, including the costs of legal decision-making. This goal permeates the law and economics literature and has profoundly influenced public policy. While most transaction cost scholarship has focused upon private law, this influence has been especially pervasive in public law, where it has contributed to a variety of legal changes aimed at reducing public transaction costs, often through privatization.

We argue that transaction costs perform useful functions. They frequently enable those engaging in transactions to obtain information needed to correct for information asymmetries or inadequate information. They facilitate efficient transactions, allow …

Sovereign Bonds And The Collective Will, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The possibility of default limits available liquidity. If the potential default draws nearer, a liquidity crisis may ensue, causing a crash in asset prices, even if the probability of default barely changes, and even if no defaults subsequently materialize. Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of endogenous contracts, including endogenous margin requirements on loans. This in turn allows GE to explain liquidity and liquidity crises in equilibrium. A formal definition of liquidity is presented. When new information raises the probability and shortens the horizon over which a fixed income asset may default, …

Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of endogenous contracts, including endogenous margin requirements on loans. This in turn allows GE to explain liquidity and liquidity crises in equilibrium. A formal definition of liquidity is presented. When new information raises the probability a fixed income asset may default, its drop in price may be much greater than its objective drop in value because the drop in value reduces the relative wealth of its natural buyers, who disproportiantely own the asset through leveraged purchases. When the information also shortens the horizon over which the …

Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of endogenous contracts, including endogenous margin requirements on loans. This in turn allows GE to explain liquidity and liquidity crises in equilibrium. A formal definition of liquidity is presented. When new information raises the probability a fixed income asset may default, its drop in price may be much greater than its objective drop in value because the drop in value reduces the relative wealth of its natural buyers, who disproportiantely own the asset through leveraged purchases. When the information also shortens the horizon over which the …

Comparison Of Law Enforcement Contracts In Onondaga County, Syracuse University. Maxwell School. Community Benchmarks Program

Community Benchmarks Program

This study provides information on the contractual agreements of 14 of the16 police departments

in Onondaga County. The study was conducted by the Community Benchmarks Program (CBP)

at The Maxwell School of Syracuse University.

Information for this study was obtained from the bargaining unit contracts negotiated by

representatives of the police and sheriff’s departments with the governing bodies of their

respective municipalities or the county. The New York State and Local Police and Fire

Retirement System and the 1999 New York Municipal Reference Guide were also used as source material. This report looks at 14 of the 16 contracts in …