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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Persistence Of Civil Wars, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Persistence Of Civil Wars, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized …
Endogenous Constitutions, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Endogenous Constitutions, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively …
A Theory Of Military Dictatorships, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
A Theory Of Military Dictatorships, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions necessary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once transition to democracy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dictatorships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation.