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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Political economics (5)
- political transitions. (1)
- Redistribution. (1)
- Consensual Democracy (1)
- Coups (1)
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- Democracy (1)
- Endogenous Constitutions (1)
- Inequality (1)
- Majoritarian Democracy (1)
- Military (1)
- Nondemocracy (1)
- Political Economy (1)
- Political economy (1)
- Political entrenchment; constituencies; inequality; inefficient redistribution; checks and balances; political rents; state fiscal capacity. (1)
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy Of Science, Religion, And Growth, Roland Benabou, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy Of Science, Religion, And Growth, Roland Benabou, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We study the coevolution of religion, science and politics. We first uncover, in international and U.S. data, a robust negative relationship between religiosity and patents per capita. The model then combines: (i) scientific discoveries that raise productivity but sometimes erode religious beliefs; (ii) a government that allows innovations to diffuse, or blocks them; (iii) religious institutions that can invest in doctrinal reform. Three long-term outcomes emerge. The “Western-European Secularization” regime has declining religiosity, unimpeded science, and high taxes and transfers. The “Theocratic” regime involves knowledge stagnation, unquestioned dogma, and high religious-public-goods spending. The “American” regime combines scientific progress and stable …
A Theory Of Political Entrenchment, Gilles Saint-Paul, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
A Theory Of Political Entrenchment, Gilles Saint-Paul, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dynamic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in order to consolidate its future political power. Such policies increase the net gain that low-skill agents obtain from income redistribution, which only the Left (but not the Right) can credibly commit to provide, and therefore may help offsetting a potential future aggregate ideological shock averse to the left-wing party. We demonstrate that political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if …
Democracy, Dictatorship And The Cultural Transmission Of Political Values, Davide Ticchi, Thierry Verdier, Andrea Vindigni
Democracy, Dictatorship And The Cultural Transmission Of Political Values, Davide Ticchi, Thierry Verdier, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We develop a theory of endogenous regimes transitions (with a focus on democratic consolidation), which emphasizes the role of political culture and of its interaction with political institutions. Political culture reflects the extent of individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their children. The state invests resources in public indoctrination infrastructures. The …
Warfare, Taxation, And Political Change: Evidence From The Italian Risorgimento, Mark Dincecco, Giovanni Federico, Andrea Vindigni
Warfare, Taxation, And Political Change: Evidence From The Italian Risorgimento, Mark Dincecco, Giovanni Federico, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We examine the relationships between warfare, taxation, and political change in the context of the political unification of the Italian peninsula. Using a comprehensive new database, we argue that external and internal threat environments had significant implications for the demand for military strength, which in turn had important ramifications for fiscal policy and the likelihood of constitutional reform and related improvements in the provision of non-military public services. Our analytic narrative complements recent theoretical and econometric works about state capacity. By emphasizing public finances, we also uncover novel insights about the forces underlying state formation in Italy.
Persistence Of Civil Wars, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Persistence Of Civil Wars, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized …
Endogenous Constitutions, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Endogenous Constitutions, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively …
A Theory Of Military Dictatorships, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
A Theory Of Military Dictatorships, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Andrea Vindigni
We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions necessary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once transition to democracy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dictatorships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation.