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Strong Inferences About Pain In Invertebrates Require Stronger Evidence, Edgar T. Walters Jan 2022

Strong Inferences About Pain In Invertebrates Require Stronger Evidence, Edgar T. Walters

Animal Sentience

Evidence for sentience in animals distantly related to humans is often sought in observations of behavioral and neural responses to noxious stimuli that would be painful in humans. Most proposed criteria for painful sentience in “lower” animals such as decapod crustaceans have no necessary links to the affective (“suffering”) component of pain. The best evidence for painful affect in animals is learned aversion to stimuli associated with noxious experience, and conditioned preference for contexts associated with relief from aversive consequences of noxious experience, as expressed in voluntary behavior. Such evidence is currently lacking for any invertebrate except octopus.


Human-Like Behavior And Cognition: Not A Good Starting Point, Magnus Helgheim Blystad Jan 2018

Human-Like Behavior And Cognition: Not A Good Starting Point, Magnus Helgheim Blystad

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman make use of observations and studies that show how humans may not be as unique in our behaviour and cognition as previously thought. I wholeheartedly agree that our uniqueness might be small and that if it exists, it should not give our species any right to act cruelly towards other animals. However, this kind of logic can be problematic. I present a few of the issues in this commentary.


Lack Of Neocortex Does Not Imply Fish Cannot Feel Pain, Georg Striedter Jan 2016

Lack Of Neocortex Does Not Imply Fish Cannot Feel Pain, Georg Striedter

Animal Sentience

Some contemporary scientists are using comparative neurobiological data to argue that non-mammalian vertebrates have feelings, most notably of pain (e.g., Braithwaite, 2010; Mashour and Alkire, 2012), while Key (2016) uses the same general data to reach the opposite conclusion. In a nutshell, he argues that fish cannot feel pain because fish don’t have a neocortex, which humans need to consciously experience pain. I don’t know how these scientists can look at essentially the same data and reach such disparate conclusions, but I suspect that some of them have strong a priori beliefs and, therefore, view the data through differently tinted …