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Articles 91 - 120 of 368
Full-Text Articles in Neuroscience and Neurobiology
Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung
Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung
Animal Sentience
The difference between a cod and a lizard is not just a quantitative one. The recognition of qualitative differences between species does not imply a moral ranking. Our species’ special abilities to shape the earth mean we have a special responsibility for ensuring a liveable future for all organisms, human and non-human.
Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa
Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s moral analysis fails to prove that the exploitation of animals or the environment is causally connected to beliefs about human capacities. Their exposition of the philosophical interpretations of animal cognition ignores historical context and confounds different levels of analysis. Their analysis of the scientific literature, from which they conclude that humans should not be considered as different from other animals, does not take into account many recent psychological and neuroscientific developments and rests upon a flawed understanding of the relationship between gradual and categorical differences, misrepresenting the two as mutually exclusive concepts.
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s comprehensive review of cognitive complexity in sheep is a laudable and important contribution to comparative psychology. It is also valuable because it shows promising directions for future research on this neglected species. The relatively small number of neurons in the bovid cerebral cortex indicates that sheep cognitive performance on traditional measures of complex learning is limited. Nevertheless, the social and emotional complexity of sheep underscores the importance of further research into domains including personality and psychological well-being.
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
Animal Sentience
It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can make some progress. In the Umwelt or perceptual world of an octopus, what the lateralized monocular eyes perceive is not color but the plane of polarization of light. Information is processed by a bilateral brain but manipulation is done by a radially symmetrical set of eight arms. Octopuses do not self-monitor by vision. Their skin pattern system, used for excellent camouflage, is open loop. The output of the motor system of the eight arms is organized at several levels — brain, …
What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather
What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather
Animal Sentience
It is gratifying to see the thorough discussion of whether octopuses have a mind, though perhaps a mind that is different from those of “higher” vertebrates. It stimulates us to look at the welfare of these animals and challenges us to find better ways to test mindfulness and cognition across animals with widely differing natural histories and sensory and motor capacities.
What Should We Do About Sheep? The Role Of Intelligence In Welfare Considerations, Heather Browning
What Should We Do About Sheep? The Role Of Intelligence In Welfare Considerations, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin (2019) demonstrate that sheep are more cognitively complex than typically thought. We should be cautious in interpreting the implications of these results for welfare considerations to avoid perpetuating mistaken beliefs about the moral value of intelligence as opposed to sentience. There are, however, still important ways in which this work can help improve sheeps’ lives.
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Animal Sentience
Is the mirror a reliable indicator of self-awareness for any species, whether sheep or human? Taking a cue from feminist, phenomenological, and cross-cultural philosophy, a relational self rather than a reflective one might better capture what is at stake for the lives of social animals and for science.
More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers
More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman have highlighted observations of animals performing, in nature, complex behaviour once thought to be unique to humans. Just as relevant to their argument are examples of cognition shown by domesticated species tested in controlled conditions. These strengthen the case for human/nonhuman similarities in behaviour and cognition. Recent research has brought to our attention the ability of nonhuman species to perform many tasks previously considered to be the hallmark of humans. Even though different species may use different ways of solving these tasks, the very fact that they can do it undermines the notion of human superiority.
Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay
Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman (2018) note that our tendency to categorize leads to a sense of human superiority that helps justify violence against nonhuman animals. Yet animals are turning out to have capacities previously thought to be uniquely human. We add a further factor that may contribute to the false sense of human superiority: the "corticocentric" bias of neuroscience. An evolutionary approach may help identify species similarities and differences, providing a better understanding of the uniqueness of each species.
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition, memory, and behavior. Anyone interested in cephalopod cognition and brain organization will find her target article informative and interesting. In this commentary, I challenge the idea that an individual organism must have an individual mind. Given the structure of the octopus brain and their complex behavior, one must consider the possibility that an octopus is a community of minds rather than a single mind.
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Animal Sentience
Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ but stops short of asking what having that mind means for octopus moral standing. One consequence of understanding the octopus mind should be a refusal to subject octopuses to mass production. Octopus farming is in an experimental phase and supported by various countries. We argue that it is unethical because of concerns about animal welfare as well as environmental impacts.
Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio
Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio
Animal Sentience
Mather’s (2019) provocative claim that octopuses have a mind hinges on the inference that their striking behavioural flexibility is evidence of “complex” cognitive abilities. I discuss alternative explanations — not to deny the possibility of complexity but to point out that current evidence does not allow us to draw firm conclusions. Only an agnostic approach will lead to the systematic investigation of octopus behaviour and ultimately, greater insights into the cognitive capacities of these fascinating creatures.
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Animal Sentience
An octopus has more neurons in their peripheral nervous system (PNS) than in their brain. PNS neurons could participate in forming cognitive networks with the central brain in the same way that the cerebellum is now thought to contribute to mammalian cognition. However, cephalopods lack myelinated fibres, which might decrease the ability of the PNS to participate in cognitive networks. The lack of myelinated fibres may also select for a less integrated brain, with an increased emphasis on local information processing. Alternatively, integration may still occur across distant neural centers, but proceed more slowly in cephalopods than in mammals.
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mostly unknown. This should be the starting point of a long process of scientific enquiry about these taxa, which must include discussions on operational definitions first and foremost. Discussing octopus mind might prove fruitless without more basic concepts. Some approaches are suggested here.
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman propose that dropping the categorical distinction between human and nonhuman animals may reduce the atrocious acts of humans towards nonhuman animals, but will it? Taking Darwinism seriously means accepting physical and behavioral continuity across species, including the capacity to feel pain.
Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude
Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman reject the notion that human beings are very different from other animals. The goal is to undermine the claim that human uniqueness and even superiority are reason enough to treat other animals badly. But evaluating human uniqueness for this purpose only plays into the hands of those who exploit invidious comparisons between us and other animals to justify mistreatment of the rest of the animal kingdom. What human uniqueness we may discover would still be no justification for how we behave toward other animals. We should also ask ourselves whether any human-centric criterion can be justification for …
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s target article calls for a reevaluation of claims of human uniqueness and superiority. It also adds to the literature on how species differences, as Darwin noted, are more of degree than kind. The threats to environmental health and species survival are a consequence of excluding nonhuman animals from moral concern and consideration. The theory of intersectionality should include speciesism in the array of discriminatory practices.
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
The first part of this commentary attempts to get "inside" the octopus mind a little further than Mather does, drawing on her description of octopus cognition in many places but diverging in others. The second part outlines other disagreements with her account of the animals, especially in the area of social behavior.
Casting A Sheep’S Eye On Science, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Casting A Sheep’S Eye On Science, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin review evidence that sheep are not just passive and reactive creatures. They have personalities that vary from individual to individual and endure over time. It follows that we must rethink what it means to study them scientifically.
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex learning capabilities. It should follow from Mather’s findings that these intelligent invertebrates are worthy of welfare considerations, just as vertebrate species with similar capabilities are. I provide a complementary environment-behavior analysis of how we might understand the world of the octopus more straightforwardly, borrowing from Mather’s examples, to show how to promote opportunities for complex learning and species-typical behaviors in the octopus.
An Investigation Of Vocal Learning Propensity In Zebra Finch (Taeniopygia Guttata), Tatsuya Hayashi
An Investigation Of Vocal Learning Propensity In Zebra Finch (Taeniopygia Guttata), Tatsuya Hayashi
Theses and Dissertations
The investigator attempted to predict the vocal learning propensity from either family pedigree or early vocal babbling (subsong). Pedigree trees suggest the possibility that vocal learning ability may depend on family. We failed to predict vocal learning propensity from subsong, but suggested that subsong may influence vocal learning outcome.
Chickens Play To The Crowd, Cinzia Chiandetti
Chickens Play To The Crowd, Cinzia Chiandetti
Animal Sentience
The time was ripe for Marino’s review of chickens’ cognitive capacities. The research community, apart from expressing gratitude for Marino’s work, should now use it to increase public awareness of chickens’ abilities. People’s views on many animals are ill-informed. Scientists need to communicate and engage with the public about the relevance and societal implications of their findings.
Post-Darwin Skepticism And Run-Of-The-Mill Suicide, John Hadley
Post-Darwin Skepticism And Run-Of-The-Mill Suicide, John Hadley
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán’s depiction of the opponent of animal suicide as a conservative is a straw man. It is possible to accept that animals are self-conscious and reflexive yet still reject the view that they have the mental wherewithal to commit run-of-the-mill suicide. That animal behaviour can be positioned on a continuum of self-destructive behaviour does not establish that animals can intentionally kill themselves.
An Adaptationist Perspective On Animal Suicide, Timothy P. Racine
An Adaptationist Perspective On Animal Suicide, Timothy P. Racine
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán’s discussion of suicide in nonhuman animals has broad implications. In this commentary, I focus on the logical relation between suicide and intention. Proximate cause must be distinguished from ultimate function in explanations of suicide. I briefly discuss two adaptationist accounts of suicidal behavior.
Lessons From Chimpanzee Sign Language Studies, Mary Lee Jensvold
Lessons From Chimpanzee Sign Language Studies, Mary Lee Jensvold
Animal Sentience
Claims are often made about behaviors being unique to humans; the evidence usually shows they are not. Sign language studies on chimpanzees may provide a useful model for comparative studies of suicide. A productive approach to comparative studies is to focus on observable behaviors rather than getting lost in the pitfalls of vague definitions and changing measures.
Can Nondolphins Commit Suicide?, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Can Nondolphins Commit Suicide?, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Animal Sentience
This Response addresses the scientific and philosophical criticisms of my 2017 target article “Can nonhuman animals commit suicide?” It defends my key claims and explores topics (such as animal judgment, animal theory of mind, and the evolution of suicide) that did not appear in the original article. It also points out areas in which further research is needed and concludes that we should be wary of accusations of “anthropomorphism” in debates about animal suicide.
Animal Suicide: Evolutionary Continuity Or Anthropomorphism?, Antonio Preti
Animal Suicide: Evolutionary Continuity Or Anthropomorphism?, Antonio Preti
Animal Sentience
Evolutionary processes are characterized by both continuity and discontinuity. Evidence on suicide in nonhuman animals is faint and often rests on the metaphorical or anthropomorphic use of the term. Suicidal behavior might be an evolutionary jump relatively recent in our species: a byproduct of living in groups of people who are not as closely related genetically as in social groups of nonhuman mammals.
Roots Of Self-Preservation Failure In Animal Behavior, Denys Decatanzaro
Roots Of Self-Preservation Failure In Animal Behavior, Denys Decatanzaro
Animal Sentience
Affective variation from euphoria to dysphoria, best understood in humans, is also found in the behavior and neurochemistry of many other mammals. Suicide in humans typically occurs in highly dysphoric and despondent individuals. Self-injurious behavior has been observed in dysphoric and despondent nonhuman primates. In humans, suicide is facilitated by a highly-evolved neocortex giving rise to behavioral flexibility and culture. As Peña-Guzmán indicates, some other mammals also have elaborate neocortices and the capacity for cognitive insight, particularly apes, delphinids, and whales. Suicide is most likely to occur in species where individuals live in stable groups of highly interdependent kin.
Animal Suicide And "Anthropodenial", Ryan Hediger
Animal Suicide And "Anthropodenial", Ryan Hediger
Animal Sentience
Increasing understanding of the impressive cognitive and social capacities of nonhuman animals suggests the possibility that they may sometimes commit suicide. Such notions tend to be dismissed as “anthropomorphism.” That interpretive hazard, I argue, must be weighed against the opposite hazard of “anthropodenial” — “the a priori rejection of shared characteristics between humans and animals” (de Waal 2006). If animals do commit suicide, how often is it motivated precisely by the impact of humans on animal life?