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Articles 241 - 270 of 463
Full-Text Articles in Neuroscience and Neurobiology
Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters
Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters
Animal Sentience
Sentience is essential to most definitions of pain, including a detailed definition invoked by Sneddon et al. to argue that adult and perhaps larval fish feel pain. Because proving painful sentience in non-human animals is not feasible, multiple lines of indirect evidence are needed to implicate pain. This commentary examines the list of 17 criteria used by Sneddon et al. to conclude that fish have conscious pain. The criteria include tests of nociceptive, motivational, and cognitive properties useful for revealing pain-like states that can be understood biologically and be related evolutionarily to human pain. However, additional research is needed to …
Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz
Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz
Animal Sentience
Sneddon et al. rightly point out that the evidence of fish pain is now so strong and comprehensive that arguments against it have become increasingly difficult to defend in balanced academic discourse. But sentience involves more than just pain. Recent research indicates that fish have an impressive range of cognitive capacities, including the capacity for pleasure, in the form of play and other behaviors likely to involve positively valenced experience. Having made the case for pain, research can now focus on other aspects of fish sentience. Doing so will not only provide a more complete picture of the mental lives …
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
The majority of commentaries are supportive of our position on the scepticism that muddies the waters surrounding fish pain and sentience. There is substantial empirical evidence for pain in fish. Animals’ experience of pain cannot be compared to artificial intelligence (AI) because AI can only mimic responses to nociceptive input on the basis of human observations and programming. Accepting that fish are sentient would not be detrimental to the industries reliant on fish. A more proactive discussion between scientists and stakeholders is needed to improve fish welfare for the benefit of all.
The Inconvenient Truth About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
The Inconvenient Truth About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Original Abstract: Domestic chickens are members of an order, Aves, which has been the focus of a revolution in our understanding of neuroanatomical, cognitive, and social complexity. Some birds are now known to be on a par with many mammals in their intelligence, emotional sophistication, and social interaction. Yet views of chickens have largely remained unrevised in light of this new evidence. In this paper, I examine the data on cognition, emotions, personality, and sociality in chickens, exploring such areas as self-awareness, cognitive bias, social learning and self-control, and comparing their abilities with other birds and other vertebrates, particularly …
Ecologies Of Embodied Minds Embedded: Radical Romantic Perspectives On Architectures Of Technology, Sharmaine Browne
Ecologies Of Embodied Minds Embedded: Radical Romantic Perspectives On Architectures Of Technology, Sharmaine Browne
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
This dissertation explores Romantic responses to the role of architectural technologies in the development of material being, consciousness, and culture by applying a critical approach in which I combine radical embodied cognitive theory, ecocritical perspectives, and a phenomenological lens to select Romantic texts written from 1789 to 1884 in response to industrial modernity. While scholarship has thoroughly explored technology as a cultural force which inevitably shapes consciousness, I propose that a slight shift of emphasis from technology’s external influence to the material internalization of its influence allows for new perspectives—particularly in light of recent proposals in cognitive philosophy which assert …
Neuroscience, Materialism, And The Soul: Limit Questions, Jeremy M. Aymard
Neuroscience, Materialism, And The Soul: Limit Questions, Jeremy M. Aymard
Dialogue & Nexus
In light of recent discoveries in neuroscience linking the mind to physical processes, Christian philosophers have resorted to a more materialistic view of the human person, using neuroscience as support for their view that an immaterial soul does not exist. In this essay, I will point out a major flaw in the logic for defending a materialistic view, argue that either a bipartite or tripartite view of the human person is more aligned with Scripture, and hopefully point towards a more reliable means for attaining truth regarding human nature and the soul.
Mollifying Neuroscience And Christian Faith: An Emergent Monistic Claim For Free Will And The Soul, Paul Figel
Mollifying Neuroscience And Christian Faith: An Emergent Monistic Claim For Free Will And The Soul, Paul Figel
Dialogue & Nexus
Modern neuroscience makes it difficult for one to support a case for substance dualism regarding the existence of a soul and free will. The neuroscientific evidence stems from several experiments in which test subjects were instructed to perform a simple voluntary movement. Scientists consistently observed neurological antecedents preceding the subject’s conscious decision to perform the action. An examination of these experiments and the conclusions drawn will show several key inconsistencies that weaken the extreme anti-conscious will claim. However, it is important to not reject the neurological evidence against substance dualism, but instead discover a new perspective (e.g. emergent monism) that …
Volume 3 Editorial, Daniel Brannan
Model And World: Generalizing The Ontic Conception Of Scientific Explanation, Mark Povich
Model And World: Generalizing The Ontic Conception Of Scientific Explanation, Mark Povich
Arts & Sciences Graduate Student Theses and Dissertations
Model and World defends a theory of scientific explanation that I call the “Generalized Ontic Conception” (GOC), according to which a model explains when and only when it provides (approximately) veridical information about the ontic structures on which the explanandum phenomenon depends. Causal and mechanistic explanations are species of GOC in which the ontic structures on which the explanandum phenomenon depends are causes and mechanisms, respectively, and the kinds of dependence involved are causal and constitutive/mechanistic, respectively. The kind of dependence relation about which information is provided determines the species of the explanation. This provides an intuitive typology of explanations …
Raising Consciousness About Chicken Consciousness, Bernard Rollin
Raising Consciousness About Chicken Consciousness, Bernard Rollin
Animal Sentience
The topics explored by Marino are definitive, and should work well to lay to rest forever the widespread belief that chickens have no personality, are unintelligent, or in any other way lack a mental life.
Chickens’ Brains, Like Ours, Are Lateralized, Lesley J. Rogers
Chickens’ Brains, Like Ours, Are Lateralized, Lesley J. Rogers
Animal Sentience
This commentary draws attention to yet another attribute that has been instrumental in demonstrating the cognitive abilities of domestic chicks: lateralization of brain function. The discovery of lateralization in domestic chicks was part of the first evidence showing that humans are not unique in this respect. The effects on cognitive ability of sensory stimulation in critical stages of development have implications for the welfare of chicks, as well as other species.
Are Chicken Minds Special?, Rafael Freire, Susan J. Hazel
Are Chicken Minds Special?, Rafael Freire, Susan J. Hazel
Animal Sentience
The number of publications on chicken cognition and emotion exceeds that on most birds and is comparable to the number of publications on some more “advanced” mammals. We argue that the chicken is an excellent model for this type of research because of (1) the presence of well-established fundamental mental processes in the chicken, (2) a challenging ethological environment and (3) social pressures that may have facilitated the evolution of cognitive abilities similar to those of some mammals. Marino’s (2017) review provides an excellent foundation for the continued study of complex mental abilities in this species.
Chicken Of The Sea, Jonathan Balcombe
Chicken Of The Sea, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
Marino summarizes research showing that chickens perform cognitively and emotionally at a higher level than previously assumed. Here, I describe capacities of teleost fishes that parallel those of chickens, including the ability to recognize human faces, perspective-taking, and referential communication. Research on chickens and on fishes reveals an emerging trend in cognitive ethology: abilities once thought limited to a scant few highly intelligent non-humans may actually occur broadly across taxa.
In Memory Of Patrick Bateson, James A. Serpell
Chickening Out Of Change: Will Knowing More About Thinking Chickens Change Public Perceptions?, Ewan Bottomley, Steve Loughnan
Chickening Out Of Change: Will Knowing More About Thinking Chickens Change Public Perceptions?, Ewan Bottomley, Steve Loughnan
Animal Sentience
This commentary examines the next step in Marino’s target article – changing people’s attitudes and beliefs about chickens. The scientific case seems clear: chickens are far more complex, psychologically and socially, than originally thought. Marino suggests we use this information to make people feel uncomfortable about their dietary choices in the hope of changing them. We review the psychological literature, examining how people maintain meat consumption despite the clash with their moral beliefs (the “meat paradox”). This work highlights the important gap between what science knows about animals and what people think about animals.
Evolutionary Continuity, Anne Benvenuti
Evolutionary Continuity, Anne Benvenuti
Animal Sentience
The principle of evolutionary continuity states that all animal capacities and behaviors exist — with variations in degree — in continuity with other species. Rather than assuming discontinuity, we should ask why any behavior observed in humans would not be found in at least some other sentient animals under similar conditions. In the case of suicide, the more pertinent issue might be the ethical one: our human responsibility for creating conditions under which other animals might deliberately seek to end their own lives.
Non-Human Animal Suicide Could Be Tested, David Lester
Non-Human Animal Suicide Could Be Tested, David Lester
Animal Sentience
Schaefer (1967) showed that mice can discriminate live from dead mice and lethal from nonlethal environments, and that they avoid a lethal environment; but the experiment lacked some controls. This might be a way to test whether mice would ever choose a lethal environment. Humans may also choose a potentially lethal environment unconsciously.
Understanding Animal Suicide And Death Can Lead To Better End-Of-Life Care, Jessica Pierce
Understanding Animal Suicide And Death Can Lead To Better End-Of-Life Care, Jessica Pierce
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán’s target article on animal suicide will help inform end-of-life care for animals by emphasizing the need for a broad research focus on animal thanatology. Greater scientific understanding of the continuum of death-related awareness, experiences, and behaviors will help us improve veterinary care for animals at the end of life.
Complicated Grief, Teya Brooks Pribac
Complicated Grief, Teya Brooks Pribac
Animal Sentience
My commentary discusses complicated grief and the ensuing sense of helplessness that may lead to suicide. I close with a story about a pygmy pig.
Can Nonhuman Animals Commit Suicide?, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Can Nonhuman Animals Commit Suicide?, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Animal Sentience
Many people believe that only humans have the cognitive and behavioral capacities needed for suicidal behavior, such as reflexive subjectivity, free will, intentionality, or awareness of death. Three counterarguments — based on (i) negative emotions and psychopathologies among nonhuman animals, (ii) the nature of self-destructive behavior, and (iii) the problem of model fidelity in suicide research — suggest that self-destructive and self-injurious behaviors among human and nonhuman animals vary along a continuum.
Tribute To Jaak Panksepp, Jonathan Balcombe
Getting To The Other Side, Debra Merskin
Getting To The Other Side, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Marino’s comprehensive, detailed, and timely review provides clear evidence of the sentience of chickens and strong support for those wishing to challenge their exclusion from even the limited protections currently accorded to animals grown for food.
Sentience Does Not Require “Higher” Cognition, Giorgio Vallortigara
Sentience Does Not Require “Higher” Cognition, Giorgio Vallortigara
Animal Sentience
I agree with Marino (2017a,b) that the cognitive capacities of chickens are likely to be the same as those of many others vertebrates. Also, data collected in the young of this precocial species provide rich information about how much cognition can be pre-wired and predisposed in the brain. However, evidence of advanced cognition — in chickens or any other organism — says little about sentience (i.e., feeling). We do not deny sentience in human beings who, because of cognitive deficits, would be incapable of exhibiting some of the cognitive feats of chickens. Moreover, complex problem solving, such as transitive inference, …
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Animal Sentience
Marino has provided an accurate and nuanced view about chickens’ complex capabilities as sentient individuals. I explore the implications of these findings for scholars as well as for activists in the protection of farmed animals.
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Animal Sentience
Beginning mainly with the “cognitive revolution” in psychology in the latter half of the 20th century, psychological science has been committing “suicide” slowly via linguistic muddling. Peña-Guzmán’s target article is but one of thousands of cuts contributing to this death by “suicide.” Having said that, given the current state of affairs in animal cognition research, there is much to commend in Peña-Guzmán’s article. I leave that to others, however. This commentary explains how the suicide by muddling of psychological science is happening in general, with the understanding that it applies also to Peña-Guzmán’s target article.
On Assisted Suicide, Clark Glymour
On Assisted Suicide, Clark Glymour
Animal Sentience
What would be the moral implications of the capacity for suicide in nonhuman animals? Humans can be helped to end their lives if they no longer find them bearable. Should captive animals not be given the same possibility?
Self, Death, And Suicide: Does An Animal Know Of These?, Carolyn A. Ristau
Self, Death, And Suicide: Does An Animal Know Of These?, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán makes a strong case, using examples from the media and scientific literature, that many captive animals suffer severely. In examining the possibility of animal suicide, he dismisses the need for “reflective self-subjectivity” and “intent” in suicidal behavior. He claims that at least some animals understand “death,” citing examples of behavior he deems to be death “rituals.” But these can be more simply interpreted. The possibility of animal suicide remains more dubious than Peña-Guzmán suggests.
Changes In Behavior And Emotion Under Chicken Domestication, Martin Johnsson
Changes In Behavior And Emotion Under Chicken Domestication, Martin Johnsson
Animal Sentience
Marino’s target article provides an overview of chickens’ cognition, emotion, and personality, with the aim of changing how people view chickens. In this commentary, I will agree that chickens deserve better than their reputation, but contend with a statement about the lack of behavioral change under chicken domestication.
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
Animal Sentience
Animal vigilance is concerned with the monitoring of potential threats caused by predators and conspecifics. Researchers have argued that threats are part of a landscape of fear tracking the level of risk posed by predators and conspecifics. Vigilance, which is expected to vary with the level of risk, could thus be used as a measure of fear. Here, I explore the relationship between vigilance and fear caused by predators and conspecifics. The joint occurrence of vigilance and other physiological responses to fear, such as increased heart rate and stress hormone release, would bolster the idea that vigilance can be a …
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
Beauchamp’s target article raises important questions about the features that often accompany fear. How reliable an indicator of fear is vigilance? Is it constitutive, cause, or consequence of fear? These questions force us towards a clearer definition of “fear.”