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Full-Text Articles in Neuroscience and Neurobiology

Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe Apr 2016

Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe

Jonathan Balcombe, PhD

I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermine Key’s (2016) thesis that fish are unconscious and unable to feel. Lack of a cortex is flimsy grounds for denying pain to fish, for on that criterion we must also then deny it to all non-mammals, including birds, which goes against scientific consensus. Notwithstanding science’s fundamental inability to prove anything, the precautionary principal dictates that we should give the benefit of the doubt to fish, and the state of the oceans dictates that we act on it now.


Ought We To Forget What We Cannot Forget? A Reply To Sybille Schmidt, Attila Tanyi Dec 2014

Ought We To Forget What We Cannot Forget? A Reply To Sybille Schmidt, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

This is a short response to Sybille Schmidt's paper (in the same volume) "Is There an Ethics of Forgetting?". The response starts out by admitting that forgetting is an essential function of human existence, that it serves, as it were, an important evolutionary function: that it is good, since it contributes to our well-being, to have the ability to forget. But this does not give us as answer, affirmative or not, to Schmidt’s title question: “Is There an Ethics of Forgetting?” The main impediment to answering this question, certainly to answering it in the affirmative, seems to be a problem …


Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi Dec 2009

Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal …