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Articles 121 - 150 of 541

Full-Text Articles in Neuroscience and Neurobiology

Categorical Modelling Of Conscious States, Baruss, Imants Jan 2019

Categorical Modelling Of Conscious States, Baruss, Imants

CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century

In the last several decades, there has been an explosion of research concerning consciousness with some efforts at mathematical modelling. The purpose of this paper is to model conscious states using categorical constructions. In particular, this modelling captures temporality, the intentional structure of consciousness, and meaning fields, which provide the templates for occurrent events. The architecture of conscious states naturally lends itself to applications of category theory, more specifically to sheaf-like constructions in which the stacks over a site are topoi whose germs are the objects of the topoi. Each topos represents the potential experiential content of an individual where …


Psychotherapy In The Dream: A Phenomenological Exploration, Bustos, Nick Jan 2019

Psychotherapy In The Dream: A Phenomenological Exploration, Bustos, Nick

CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century

Post-materialist ontologies offer a transformed worldview whose implications point toward the illusory nature of the separate self, or ego. Aligned with the literature of mysticism and perennialist spiritual models, this portends a significantly altered backdrop for the practice and discipline of psychotherapy, the underlying premises of which assume a strict existential dichotomy between patient and therapist. Kenneth Wapnick, preeminent scholar of the twentieth-century spiritual document of A Course in Miracles, provides a relevant model toward integrating spiritually-based, ego-negative states within psychotherapy practice. The author studied the lived experiences of eight psychotherapists, both practicing and retired, who practice according to this …


Ecopedagogy: Learning How To Participate In Ecological Consciousness, Peterson, Eric Jan 2019

Ecopedagogy: Learning How To Participate In Ecological Consciousness, Peterson, Eric

CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century

This paper is the result of an inquiry into ecological consciousness through a participatory paradigm. The dialectical relationship between institutionalized education and consciousness is central to this inquiry’s focus. This exploration into ecological consciousness has lead to the following question: How can institutionalized education be designed, delivered, and experienced in a way that nurtures ecological intelligence, ecological consciousness, and more importantly, ecological activism? The ‘sense of self ‘is a central theme within the paper, and led to the conception of intraearthal and interearthal relationships as a way of communicating our need to identify as being in Earth. The author utilizes …


Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch Jan 2019

Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman suggest that judgments of human superiority underlie our cruelty to animals. It might be useful to examine how such judgments operate within the human community. Children arguably have a potential for developing “superior” capacities but are outperformed on many tasks by animals. There is a continuum of development in children’s capacities. Perhaps there are interspecies evolutionary continua too. This highlights the complexity of reasoning about humans, animals, and moral inclusion.


Anthropomorphism Is The First Step, Marthe Kiley-Worthington Jan 2019

Anthropomorphism Is The First Step, Marthe Kiley-Worthington

Animal Sentience

Individuals have intentions, beliefs and choices. This sense of “personhood” has been known and used for centuries by those who have dealt professionally with any nonhuman mammal. All mammals have a lot in common physically and mentally. The first step toward understand another species’ point of view is anthropomorphism.


Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens Jan 2019

Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens

Animal Sentience

Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.


Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew Jan 2019

Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew

Animal Sentience

Arguments about human uniqueness apply not only to extant species but also to extinct ones, that is, the hominin predecessors of anatomically modern Homo sapiens. Thus, unique and superior are doubly relative terms, in past and present. The scope for empirical comparison faces a spectrum of difficulty, from material (e.g., artefacts) to non-material (e.g., concepts) phenomena.


Sharing Emotions Builds Bridges Between Individuals And Between Species, Elisabetta Palagi Jan 2019

Sharing Emotions Builds Bridges Between Individuals And Between Species, Elisabetta Palagi

Animal Sentience

Many animal species express, perceive and share emotions. These abilities have been favoured by natural selection because they allow subjects to respond to various situations in an appropriate way, thus facilitating survival and increasing fitness. The same-face/same-emotion phenomenon is at the basis of sharing feelings and emotions. Recent studies show that this capacity is not unique to humans and that it plays an important role in creating cohesive societies in many different species.


“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino Jan 2019

“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino

Animal Sentience

The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.


Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund Jan 2019

Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund

Animal Sentience

Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so.


Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes, Jennifer Vonk Jan 2019

Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Marino & Merskin review evidence of the complexity of sheep cognition, concluding that researchers ought to feel sheepish about misrepresenting ovine cognitive capacities. However, the failure to situate the data in critical context risks pulling the wool over readers’ eyes.


Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso Jan 2019

Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso

Animal Sentience

Marino and Merskin (2019) list a number of tasks that sheep can perform well. As comparative psychologists, we are not surprised by these results. Indeed, many domesticated animal species show similar abilities.


Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk Jan 2019

Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Humans are certainly unique among living species. This is evident in the transformation of human environments and its resulting impact on other animals. However, many of the traits unique to humans are costly as well as adaptive and should certainly not be used to elevate their status above that of other species.


Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt Jan 2019

Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt

Animal Sentience

In the past few years, Marino and her colleagues have written a series of comprehensive and helpful review articles on the cognitive, emotional, and social complexity of pigs, chickens, cows, and most recently, sheep. These articles are similarly structured, even formulaic, which has benefits but also limitations. Here, I point out the limitations in order to suggest new directions and contributions for the authors in the future.


Positive Sentience Is Underrated, Teya Brooks Pribac Jan 2019

Positive Sentience Is Underrated, Teya Brooks Pribac

Animal Sentience

My commentary focuses on two aspects of ovine (well-)being considered in the review: the developmental context and (un)fulfilled potentialities.


Using Sheep Psychology To Guide Sheep Policy, Ralph Adolphs Jan 2019

Using Sheep Psychology To Guide Sheep Policy, Ralph Adolphs

Animal Sentience

Marino & Merskin’s valuable review of the literature on sheep cognition shows how entrenched common views of these animals’ mental lives are disputed by the research literature. Yet the evidence they muster faces three challenges that their target article does not discuss: (1) the behavioral tasks are strongly anthropocentric; (2) neuroscientific data are absent; and (3) applications are not discussed. I touch on all three of these here.


Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela Jan 2019

Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela

Animal Sentience

Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues that the octopus has an “Umwelt,” and, thus, a mind. I argue that Umwelt does not provide a conceptual basis for understanding the octopus as having a mind. First, Umwelt does not refer only to an organism’s perceptual abilities. Second, in providing evidence for decentralized control systems that underlie intelligent behaviors, Mather makes a case against an octopus Umwelt. Instead, the octopus is more akin to a collection of systems, or Umwelten, than a single system with an Umwelt.


The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher Jan 2019

The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher

Animal Sentience

Cephalopods split away from the phylogenetic tree about half a billion years ago, and octopus evolution has been accelerated by an extremely low survival rate. This helps explain why this unusual animal presents qualities found in no other. It has a radially organized nervous system with a processing centre for each of its eight tentacles. Yet, although this might suggest that each tentacle has its own centre of consciousness, it remains just one animal, with one mouth to feed, and one life to lose, and it behaves as if it is centrally controlled. Its capacity for a range of intelligent …


‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara Jan 2019

‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara

Animal Sentience

Scientific discussions about the ‘mind’ of an octopus are empirically vacuous and should be confined to folk psychology. This form of labelling is unhelpful for science and should be replaced by specific mechanistic accounts of behavior and associated neural structures, which are amenable to rigorous scientific investigation. Mather provides a detailed review of octopus behavior, but rather than making unquantifiable assumptions about what orchestrates octopus behavior, efforts should focus on investigating cognitive mechanisms that can be measured. In this commentary, we outline two lines of research that include quantifiable methods to facilitate a more robust understanding of cephalopod behaviors and …


The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra Jan 2019

The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra

Animal Sentience

I present a brief overview of the richness of cephalopod behavioral, neural and cognitive traits.


What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning Jan 2019

What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning

Animal Sentience

Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give us valuable insight into what is good for an octopus.


The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt Jan 2019

The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt

Animal Sentience

Mather (2019) presents convincing evidence that octopuses have minds, but in the first 85% of the target article, the evidence does not come through very clearly because it is hidden by other information and by problems with the paper’s organization. I propose ways to build a tighter argument in the author’s Response to the Commentaries.


Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran Jan 2019

Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran

Animal Sentience

Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.


Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken Jan 2019

Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken

Animal Sentience

Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.


Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino Jan 2019

Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino

Animal Sentience

Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.


Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard Jan 2019

Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard

Animal Sentience

Mather draws from a lifetime devoted to studying individual octopuses in the wild and in aquaria to combine a natural history account of their actions with an argument from design adopted from second-, often third-hand sources. The 'distributed' [decentralised] nervous system said to contrast with that of vertebrates – a premise largely accepted by Mather’s commentators so far – does not reflect the original literature on motor control, nor the facts of comparative anatomy, functional morphology and morphogenesis. Ontogeny is absent. With the help of some old or little-known illustrations from my own participant-observer experimental investigations, I will try here …


Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry Jan 2019

Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry

Animal Sentience

The first question to ask is whether octopuses are sentient, so that, if so, they can be protected. Three consensual criteria to evaluate animal sentience can be applied to the octopus. Octopuses meet all three of them.


Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin Jan 2019

Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin

Animal Sentience

Domestic sheep (Ovis aries) are among the earliest animals domesticated for human use. They are consumed worldwide as mutton, hogget, and lamb, kept as wool and milk producers, and used extensively in scientific research. The popular stereotype is that sheep are docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid, but a review of the research on their behavior, affect, cognition, and personality reveals that they are complex, individualistic, and social.


Is Knowing Enough To Change Human Attitudes And Actions?, Liv Baker Jan 2019

Is Knowing Enough To Change Human Attitudes And Actions?, Liv Baker

Animal Sentience

Marino & Merskin present evidence on key aspects of cognition, such as theory of mind, learning, emotional valence, and sociality, to make a convincing argument that sheep are due consideration as individual sentient beings. With this information, what will it take to produce a real, meaningful shift in our attitudes and actions towards other animals, including a species as disadvantaged as sheep? What else do we need to know?


Reflections On Sheep Rearing, Joyce D'Silva Jan 2019

Reflections On Sheep Rearing, Joyce D'Silva

Animal Sentience

Sheep rearing has an incredibly long history. Sometimes this alone can give credibility and status to a human practice. In the twenty-first century, it may be time to reassess our treatment of sheep and their place in nature. “Just because we’ve always done it” no longer has validity by itself. There are many other human practices which used to be accepted widely in certain societies and which we now may find abhorrent. With sheep intelligence now rightly regarded as an acceptable area of research within the academic community, it is a good time to reflect on our treatment of these …