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Articles 181 - 210 of 521
Full-Text Articles in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Is Human Uniqueness Fake News?, Sean Hermanson
Is Human Uniqueness Fake News?, Sean Hermanson
Animal Sentience
The world and its troubles don't need unfounded denials of human uniqueness.
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s target article calls for a reevaluation of claims of human uniqueness and superiority. It also adds to the literature on how species differences, as Darwin noted, are more of degree than kind. The threats to environmental health and species survival are a consequence of excluding nonhuman animals from moral concern and consideration. The theory of intersectionality should include speciesism in the array of discriminatory practices.
Mobilizing Heads And Hearts For Wildlife Conservation, Valérie A. M. Schoof, Simon L'Allier
Mobilizing Heads And Hearts For Wildlife Conservation, Valérie A. M. Schoof, Simon L'Allier
Animal Sentience
Highlighting the shared evolutionary relationships between humans and animals — and recognizing that all species, including humans, are unique in their own way — may facilitate caring for and conserving animals by tapping into a human emotion: empathy.
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Animal Sentience
I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to the view that differences between humans and other animals are irrelevant to deciding how we should treat other species, I point out that differences between any species in their capacity to suffer are morally relevant. And in response to the claim that suffering is the sole criterion for the moral treatment of animals, I argue that cognitive complexity and a capacity for empathy also have moral relevance to the extent that they influence suffering.
Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa
Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s moral analysis fails to prove that the exploitation of animals or the environment is causally connected to beliefs about human capacities. Their exposition of the philosophical interpretations of animal cognition ignores historical context and confounds different levels of analysis. Their analysis of the scientific literature, from which they conclude that humans should not be considered as different from other animals, does not take into account many recent psychological and neuroscientific developments and rests upon a flawed understanding of the relationship between gradual and categorical differences, misrepresenting the two as mutually exclusive concepts.
Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay
Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman (2018) note that our tendency to categorize leads to a sense of human superiority that helps justify violence against nonhuman animals. Yet animals are turning out to have capacities previously thought to be uniquely human. We add a further factor that may contribute to the false sense of human superiority: the "corticocentric" bias of neuroscience. An evolutionary approach may help identify species similarities and differences, providing a better understanding of the uniqueness of each species.
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman propose that dropping the categorical distinction between human and nonhuman animals may reduce the atrocious acts of humans towards nonhuman animals, but will it? Taking Darwinism seriously means accepting physical and behavioral continuity across species, including the capacity to feel pain.
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Animal Sentience
Our commentators come from many fields and disciplines and express highly divergent views, illustrating broad interest in the question. From the breadth of comments, we have identified two recurring themes, which we focus on here. The first is a preponderance of cautionary remarks about evaluating the differences between humans and nonhuman animals. The second concerns whether considering animals as worthy of moral consideration is one of many useful tools for conservationists trying to prevent extinction, habitat destruction, and climate change.
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Animal Sentience
We are failing to protect the biosphere. Novel views of conservation, preservation, and sustainability are surfacing in the wake of consensus about our failures to prevent extinction or slow climate change. We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of both human and non-human beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based, anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage those absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for futurity of all life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric …
Granting Political Representation To Non-Humans, Joe Gray
Granting Political Representation To Non-Humans, Joe Gray
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses the representation of individuals versus populations — human and nonhuman, present and future — in Treves et al.’s proposed trusteeship for futurity. Terminological questions are also discussed.
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) argue that individual organisms should be protected by the courts. This already happens in many countries for rare and endangered species and for symbolically important species (e.g., raptors, songbirds, and bats in the U.S.), and through the international treaty for whales. But protection of these individuals stems from a focus on preserving their populations, whereas hunting of individuals is still a culturally accepted practice. Killing of individuals should be limited to valid reasons (e.g., eating the meat) and covered by fair-chase and humane-killing laws (which is not always the case). But “futurity” will not inherit present-day …
Just Preservation And The Half-Earth View, Helen Kopnina
Just Preservation And The Half-Earth View, Helen Kopnina
Animal Sentience
For interspecies justice, animal welfare, and animal rights, the planet needs to be divided on the basis of species' natural resource requirements. The Half-Earth View is that to maintain viable populations of the Earth's remaining species, half of landscapes and seascapes need protection from intensive economic activity. This protection is needed outside the nature preserve system, such as in agricultural areas or cities, so nature can co-exist with local communities.
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Animal Sentience
Neither human young today nor future human generations nor non-human species have a voice in protecting the biosphere. Treves et al. propose courts and trustees for defending their interests. I describe an analogy with attempts to represent the interests of children and comatose patients in medicine.
Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela
Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela
Animal Sentience
Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues that the octopus has an “Umwelt,” and, thus, a mind. I argue that Umwelt does not provide a conceptual basis for understanding the octopus as having a mind. First, Umwelt does not refer only to an organism’s perceptual abilities. Second, in providing evidence for decentralized control systems that underlie intelligent behaviors, Mather makes a case against an octopus Umwelt. Instead, the octopus is more akin to a collection of systems, or Umwelten, than a single system with an Umwelt.
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so.
The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra
The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra
Animal Sentience
I present a brief overview of the richness of cephalopod behavioral, neural and cognitive traits.
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Mather’s work has been fundamental in informing scientists of the relatively mysterious behavior and cognition of an understudied group of animals – the cephalopods. This work helps to fill a gap in the comparative literature that has historically sought evidence for complex behavior only in species that are closely related to humans or share important ecological features such as social complexity.
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give us valuable insight into what is good for an octopus.
The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt
The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents convincing evidence that octopuses have minds, but in the first 85% of the target article, the evidence does not come through very clearly because it is hidden by other information and by problems with the paper’s organization. I propose ways to build a tighter argument in the author’s Response to the Commentaries.
The ‘Thing’ From This World, Sergio M. Pellis
The ‘Thing’ From This World, Sergio M. Pellis
Animal Sentience
Science progresses by making contrasts, and the living world is a gold mine of contrasts. Often disciplines become victims by focusing on too narrow a slice of that diversity, leading to a myopic view of how nature works. The relationships between the brain and behavior have been intensively studied in vertebrates, especially mammals, and we have become complacent in our assumptions about how behavior is constructed. As the target article by Mather (2019) shows, the relationship between the brain and behavior in octopuses forces us to reevaluate some of those assumptions.
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Animal Sentience
Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Animal Sentience
Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex learning capabilities. It should follow from Mather’s findings that these intelligent invertebrates are worthy of welfare considerations, just as vertebrate species with similar capabilities are. I provide a complementary environment-behavior analysis of how we might understand the world of the octopus more straightforwardly, borrowing from Mather’s examples, to show how to promote opportunities for complex learning and species-typical behaviors in the octopus.
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
The first part of this commentary attempts to get "inside" the octopus mind a little further than Mather does, drawing on her description of octopus cognition in many places but diverging in others. The second part outlines other disagreements with her account of the animals, especially in the area of social behavior.
Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio
Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio
Animal Sentience
Mather’s (2019) provocative claim that octopuses have a mind hinges on the inference that their striking behavioural flexibility is evidence of “complex” cognitive abilities. I discuss alternative explanations — not to deny the possibility of complexity but to point out that current evidence does not allow us to draw firm conclusions. Only an agnostic approach will lead to the systematic investigation of octopus behaviour and ultimately, greater insights into the cognitive capacities of these fascinating creatures.
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mostly unknown. This should be the starting point of a long process of scientific enquiry about these taxa, which must include discussions on operational definitions first and foremost. Discussing octopus mind might prove fruitless without more basic concepts. Some approaches are suggested here.
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Animal Sentience
An octopus has more neurons in their peripheral nervous system (PNS) than in their brain. PNS neurons could participate in forming cognitive networks with the central brain in the same way that the cerebellum is now thought to contribute to mammalian cognition. However, cephalopods lack myelinated fibres, which might decrease the ability of the PNS to participate in cognitive networks. The lack of myelinated fibres may also select for a less integrated brain, with an increased emphasis on local information processing. Alternatively, integration may still occur across distant neural centers, but proceed more slowly in cephalopods than in mammals.
Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard
Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard
Animal Sentience
Mather draws from a lifetime devoted to studying individual octopuses in the wild and in aquaria to combine a natural history account of their actions with an argument from design adopted from second-, often third-hand sources. The 'distributed' [decentralised] nervous system said to contrast with that of vertebrates – a premise largely accepted by Mather’s commentators so far – does not reflect the original literature on motor control, nor the facts of comparative anatomy, functional morphology and morphogenesis. Ontogeny is absent. With the help of some old or little-known illustrations from my own participant-observer experimental investigations, I will try here …