Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
-
- WellBeing International (774)
- Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School (445)
- University of Nebraska - Lincoln (426)
- Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, Western Australia (105)
- Wayne State University (74)
-
- City University of New York (CUNY) (71)
- SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad (65)
- University of Arkansas, Fayetteville (48)
- Utah State University (35)
- Western Kentucky University (33)
- Technological University Dublin (32)
- University of Colorado Law School (31)
- University of Nevada, Las Vegas (31)
- Central Washington University (29)
- Chapman University (29)
- Claremont Colleges (24)
- University of Rhode Island (22)
- Old Dominion University (20)
- Butler University (18)
- University of South Florida (14)
- Cal Poly Humboldt (13)
- University of Richmond (13)
- University of Kentucky (12)
- University of Montana (12)
- Antioch University (11)
- Colby College (11)
- Dartmouth College (11)
- The University of Southern Mississippi (11)
- Wilfrid Laurier University (10)
- Bemidji State University (9)
- Keyword
-
- Conservation (68)
- Ecology (58)
- Animal welfare (57)
- Evolution (57)
- Sentience (46)
-
- Canis lupus (43)
- Consciousness (41)
- Mongolia (37)
- Behavior (36)
- Climate change (35)
- Fish (33)
- Cognition (31)
- Pain (31)
- Welfare (28)
- Western Australia (25)
- Wildlife (25)
- Ethics (24)
- Biodiversity (23)
- Wolf (23)
- Dogs (22)
- United States (21)
- Distribution (20)
- Primates (20)
- Animal cognition (19)
- Library science (19)
- Population (19)
- Hunting (18)
- Sustainability (18)
- Predation (17)
- Biology (16)
- Publication
-
- Animal Sentience (477)
- United States Geological Survey, Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center: Publications (118)
- Erforschung biologischer Ressourcen der Mongolei / Exploration into the Biological Resources of Mongolia, ISSN 0440-1298 (97)
- Fisheries Management Papers (91)
- Karl Reinhard Publications (85)
-
- Module 10: Garden Ecology (85)
- Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection (59)
- Elephant (48)
- Module 13: Birds in the Urban Landscape (45)
- Module 05: Public Health & Water Quality (44)
- Module 01: Introduction to Urban Ecology (42)
- Module 02: Land Use (38)
- Module 06: Urban Biodiversity (38)
- Ethology Collection (37)
- Module 03: Energy & Climate Change (37)
- Sentience Collection (34)
- Module 04: Hazardous Waste (33)
- Module 12: Urban Wildlife (31)
- SURE Journal: Science Undergraduate Research Experience Journal (31)
- Publications and Research (28)
- Human–Wildlife Interactions (26)
- Module 11: Bird Migration (26)
- Theses and Dissertations (24)
- Human Biology Open Access Pre-Prints (23)
- Jeffrey Stevens Publications (22)
- All Master's Theses (21)
- Biodiversity Protection: Implementation and Reform of the Endangered Species Act (Summer Conference, June 9-12) (21)
- Graduate Theses and Dissertations (21)
- Ecology Collection (19)
- Library Impact Statements (19)
- Publication Type
- File Type
Articles 1711 - 1740 of 2814
Full-Text Articles in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor
Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish cannot experience pain based on (1) brain imaging in humans, (2) consequences of lesions and (3) direct brain stimulation. Imaging indeed shows that pain-relevant signals reach the cortex, but not that they underlie the subjective experience of pain. Lesions and stimulation data are more to the point, but Key paints an idiosyncratic and misleading picture of their effects. S1 and S2 ablation does not eliminate evoked or spontaneous pain, although there may be up- or down-modulation. Likewise, stimulation of pain-associated cortical areas rarely induces pain, and pain almost never occurs at the onset of epileptic seizures. …
Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain", Brian Key
Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain", Brian Key
Animal Sentience
The reader of Animal Sentience may surmise that because the weight of the commentaries on my target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is leaning towards not supporting my argument, it follows that the premise "fish do not feel pain" is incorrect. However, science does not prevail by popular opinion. History is plagued with numerous (and often widely accepted) examples of biological phenomena being explained by mysterious forces. In the absence of a mechanistic understanding, the many different guises of vitalism (the principle that life involves a vital energy) are often invoked to explain the unknown. Spurious …
Responses To Familiar And Unfamiliar Humans By Belugas (Delphinapterus Leucas), Bottlenose Dolphins (Tursiops Truncatus), & Pacific White-Sided Dolphins (Lagenorhynchus Obliquidens): A Replication And Extension, Heather M. Hill, Deirdre Yeater, Sarah Gallup, Sara Guarino, Steve Lacy, Tricia Dees, Stan A. Kuczaj Ii
Responses To Familiar And Unfamiliar Humans By Belugas (Delphinapterus Leucas), Bottlenose Dolphins (Tursiops Truncatus), & Pacific White-Sided Dolphins (Lagenorhynchus Obliquidens): A Replication And Extension, Heather M. Hill, Deirdre Yeater, Sarah Gallup, Sara Guarino, Steve Lacy, Tricia Dees, Stan A. Kuczaj Ii
Psychology Faculty Publications
Previous research has documented that cetaceans can discriminate between humans, but the process used to categorize humans still remains unclear. The goal of the present study was to replicate and extend previous work on the discrimination between familiar and unfamiliar humans by three species of cetaceans. The current study manipulated the familiarity and activity level of humans presented to 12 belugas (Delphinapterus leucas) housed between two facilities, five bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), and six Pacific white-sided dolphins (Lagenorhynchus obliquidens) during free-swim conditions. Two measures of discrimination were coded from video recordings of each trial: …
Pain In Parallel, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Pain In Parallel, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Key's (2016) arguments against the view that fish feel pain can be shown to be fallacious by considering some damage-related behaviors in invertebrates. Pain may have different neural bases in different organisms, so the absence in fish of the cortical structures that might underlie pain in mammals does not settle the question of fish pain.
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk
Animal Sentience
In discussing fish pain, Key (2016) privileges pain in humans — “the only species able to directly report on its feelings.” Human experience of pain is not necessarily best reflected by verbal self-report, however. Neural responses to noxious stimuli are influenced by individual differences and by context. Nonverbal pain displays such as facial expressions reflect part of the neural response to noxious stimuli. Most mammals have a specific facial grimace reflecting pain. If fish have a somatic expression of pain, the development of a reliable and accurate somatic pain scale specific to fish could make a contribution to the debate …
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege
Animal Sentience
In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral …
An Invertebrate Perspective On Pain, Jennifer A. Mather
An Invertebrate Perspective On Pain, Jennifer A. Mather
Animal Sentience
Although Key (2016) argues that mammals feel pain and fish do not, from an invertebrate perspective, it is obvious that the pain experience is shared by animals from a number of different animal groups.
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Animal Sentience
The target article by Key (2016) examines whether fish have brain structures capable of mediating pain perception and consciousness, functions known to depend on the neocortex in humans. He concludes, as others have concluded (Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2014), that such functions are impossible for fish brains. This conclusion has been met with hypothetical assertions by others to the effect that functions of pain and consciousness may well be possible through unknown alternate neural processes. Key's argument would be bolstered by consideration of other neurological as well as behavioral evidence, which shows that sharks and ray are fishes …
Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach
Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) affirms that we do not know how the fish brain processes pain but denies — because fish lack a human-like cortex — that fish can feel pain. He affirms that birds, like fish, have a singly-laminated cortex and that the structure of the bird brain is quite different from that of the human brain, yet he does not deny that birds can feel pain. In this commentary we describe how Key cites studies that substantiate mammalian pain but discounts the same kind of data as evidence of fish pain. We suggest that Key's interpretations are illogical, do not …
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Animal Sentience
In his excellent target article, Key (2016) develops a mechanistic argument in an attempt to show why it is unlikely that fish can “feel” pain or for that matter, “feel” anything. The topic is controversial and likely to achieve the goal of getting many hits for the inaugural issue of the new journal, Animal Sentience. In my view, the question is unlikely to be answered, for two reasons. First, because the proponents of the “fish feel pain” controversy are untrained and unskilled in the details and jargon of neurophysiology and/or neuroanatomy, and the opponents of the controversy, like Key, …
How Not To Move The Line Drawn On Pain, Bjorn H. Merker
How Not To Move The Line Drawn On Pain, Bjorn H. Merker
Animal Sentience
In this second commentary I outline the inadequacy of Key's responses to the many peer critiques of his thesis that have so far appeared in Animal Sentience. I illustrate with examples drawn from his response to my first commentary.
Could Fish Feel Pain? A Wider Perspective, Yew-Kwang Ng
Could Fish Feel Pain? A Wider Perspective, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Key’s (2016) target article provides some strong arguments but also makes some logical mistakes. The arguments are not sufficient to support a definite conclusion that fish cannot feel pain. A multi-faceted perspective taking into account brain structure, chemical secretion in brain, animal behavior, and evolutionary biology may be useful and appears, at least in some aspects, to suggest the opposite conclusion from that of the target article.
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) claims fish that fish do not feel pain because they lack the necessary neuronal architecture: their responses to noxious stimuli, according to Key, are executed automatically without any feelings. However, as pointed out by many of his commentators, this conclusion is not convincing. Plants might provide some clues. Plants are not usually thought to be very active behaviorally, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, in stressful situations, plants produce numerous chemicals that have painkilling and anesthetic properties. Finally, plants, when treated with anesthetics, cannot execute active behaviors such as touch-induced leaf movements or rapid trap closures after localizing …
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
Whether fish feel pain is a hot political topic. The consequences of our denial are huge given the billions of fish that are slaughtered annually for human consumption. The economic costs of changing our commercial fishery harvest practices are also likely to be great. Key outlines a structure-function analogy of pain in humans, tries to force that template on the rest of the vertebrate kingdom, and fails. His target article has so far elicited 34 commentaries from scientific experts from a broad range of disciplines; only three of these support his position. The broad consensus from the scientific community is …
Fish Pain: A Painful Topic, Carl Safina
Fish Pain: A Painful Topic, Carl Safina
Animal Sentience
If fish cannot feel pain, why do stingrays have purely defensive tail spines that deliver venom? Stingrays’ ancestral predators are fish. And why do many fishes possess defensive fin spines, some also with venom that produces pain in humans? These things did not evolve just in case sentient humans would evolve millions of years later and then invent scuba. If fish react purely unconsciously to “noxious” stimuli, why aren’t sharp jabbing spines enough? Why also stinging venom?
Pain-Capable Neural Substrates May Be Widely Available In The Animal Kingdom, Edgar T. Walters
Pain-Capable Neural Substrates May Be Widely Available In The Animal Kingdom, Edgar T. Walters
Animal Sentience
Neural and behavioral evidence from diverse species indicates that some forms of pain may be generated by coordinated activity in networks far smaller than the cortical pain matrix in mammals. Studies on responses to injury in squid suggest that simplification of the circuitry necessary for conscious pain might be achieved by restricting awareness to very limited information about a noxious event, possibly only to the fact that injury has occurred, ignoring information that is much less important for survival, such as the location of the injury. Some of the neural properties proposed to be critical for conscious pain in mammals …
Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain, Brian Key
Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Only humans can report feeling pain. In contrast, pain in animals is typically inferred on the basis of nonverbal behaviour. Unfortunately, these behavioural data can be problematic when the reliability and validity of the behavioural tests are questionable. The thesis proposed here is based on the bioengineering principle that structure determines function. Basic functional homologies can be mapped to structural homologies across a broad spectrum of vertebrate species. For example, olfaction depends on olfactory glomeruli in the olfactory bulbs of the forebrain, visual orientation responses depend on the laminated optic tectum in the midbrain, and locomotion depends on pattern generators …
Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe
Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermine Key’s (2016) thesis that fish are unconscious and unable to feel. Lack of a cortex is flimsy grounds for denying pain to fish, for on that criterion we must also then deny it to all non-mammals, including birds, which goes against scientific consensus. Notwithstanding science’s fundamental inability to prove anything, the precautionary principal dictates that we should give the benefit of the doubt to fish, and the state of the oceans dictates that we act on it now.
Fish Lack The Brains And The Psychology For Pain, Stuart W.G. Derbyshire
Fish Lack The Brains And The Psychology For Pain, Stuart W.G. Derbyshire
Animal Sentience
Debate about the possibility of fish pain focuses largely on the fish’s lack of the cortex considered necessary for generating pain. That view is appealing because it avoids relatively abstract debate about the nature of pain experience and subjectivity. Unfortunately, however, that debate cannot be entirely avoided. Subcortical circuits in the fish might support an immediate, raw, “pain” experience. The necessity of the cortex only becomes obvious when considering pain as an explicitly felt subjective experience. Attributing pain to fish only seems absurd when pain is considered as a state of explicit knowing.
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
Animal Sentience
Starting with its title, Key’s (2016) target article advocates the view that fish do not feel pain. The author describes the neuroanatomical, physiological and behavioural conditions involved in the experience of pain in humans and rodents and confidently applies analogical arguments as though they were established facts in support of the negative conclusion about the inability of fish to feel pain. The logical reasoning, unfortunately, becomes somewhat incoherent, with the arbitrary application of the designated human criteria for an analogical argument to one animal species (e.g., rodents) but not another (fish). Research findings are reported selectively, and questionable interpretations are …
Modulation Of Behavior In Communicating Emotion, Martin Gardiner
Modulation Of Behavior In Communicating Emotion, Martin Gardiner
Animal Sentience
King discusses many examples where two animals, as they bond, behave in ways we interpret as expressing love for one another. If one of the bonded animals then dies, signs of loving are replaced by signs we interpret as expressing grief by the animal who remains. I propose a pathway for emotional communication between an animal and an observer that can have a central role in these and other observations by King and in our overall ability to interpret observed behavior in relation to emotion. This pathway provides evidence of emotion in an observed animal by communicating evidence of emotion’s …
Spinning Our Wheels And Deepening The Divide: Call For An Evidence-Based Approach To The Fish Pain Debate, Steven J. Cooke
Spinning Our Wheels And Deepening The Divide: Call For An Evidence-Based Approach To The Fish Pain Debate, Steven J. Cooke
Animal Sentience
There is vigorous ongoing debate about whether fish feel pain and have the capacity to suffer. The body of literature dedicated to the topic is increasing but what is particularly problematic is that the majority of the contributions represent opinion pieces and thus fall within the realm of advocacy. Many of the empirical research papers purporting that fish do or do not feel pain have problems with cavalier use of definitions, poor experimental design, or statistical/technical issues and tend to include advocacy statements in their interpretations. Rather than continuing to spin our wheels and deepen the divide, I would advocate …
Pain And Fish Welfare, Eliane Gonçalves-De-Freitas
Pain And Fish Welfare, Eliane Gonçalves-De-Freitas
Animal Sentience
The evolutionary approach of Key’s (2016) target article, generically comparing humans with fish of all kinds, is simplistic. The author ignores published research on structural and molecular aspects of pain in fish. The target article reads more like a selective polemic against fish welfare than an even-handed analysis.
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Animal Sentience
The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development of new treatments …
Intertemporal Similarity: Discounting As A Last Resort, Jeffrey R. Stevens
Intertemporal Similarity: Discounting As A Last Resort, Jeffrey R. Stevens
Jeffrey Stevens Publications
Standard models of intertemporal choice assume that individuals discount future payoffs by integrating reward amounts and time delays to generate a discounted value. Alternative models propose that, rather than integrate across them, individuals compare within attributes (amounts and delays) to determine if differences in one attribute outweigh differences in another attribute. For instance, Leland (2002) and Rubinstein (2003) propose models that 1) compare the two reward amounts to determine whether they are similar, 2) compare the similarity of the two time delays, and then 3) make a decision based on these similarity judgments. Here, I tested discounting models against attribute-based …
Reflections Of The Social Environment In Chimpanzee Memory: Applying Rational Analysis Beyond Humans, Jeffrey R. Stevens, Julian N. Marewski, Lael J. Schooler, Ian C. Gilby
Reflections Of The Social Environment In Chimpanzee Memory: Applying Rational Analysis Beyond Humans, Jeffrey R. Stevens, Julian N. Marewski, Lael J. Schooler, Ian C. Gilby
Jeffrey Stevens Publications
In cognitive science, the rational analysis framework allows modelling of how physical and social environments impose information-processing demands onto cognitive systems. In humans, for example, past social contact among individuals predicts their future contact with linear and power functions. These features of the human environment constrain the optimal way to remember information and probably shape how memory records are retained and retrieved. We offer a primer on how biologists can apply rational analysis to study animal behaviour. Using chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) as a case study, we modelled 19 years of observational data on their social contact patterns. Much …
Cognitive Phenotypes And The Evolution Of Animal Decisions, Tamra C. Mendelson, Courtney L. Fitzpatrick, Mark E. Hauber, Charles H. Pence, Rafael L. Rodriguez, Rebecca J. Safran, Caitlin A. Stern, Jeffrey R. Stevens
Cognitive Phenotypes And The Evolution Of Animal Decisions, Tamra C. Mendelson, Courtney L. Fitzpatrick, Mark E. Hauber, Charles H. Pence, Rafael L. Rodriguez, Rebecca J. Safran, Caitlin A. Stern, Jeffrey R. Stevens
Jeffrey Stevens Publications
Despite the clear fitness consequences of animal decisions, the science of animal decision making in evolutionary biology is underdeveloped compared with decision science in human psychology. Specifically, the field lacks a conceptual framework that defines and describes the relevant components of a decision, leading to imprecise language and concepts. The ‘judgment and decision-making’ (JDM) framework in human psychology is a powerful tool for framing and understanding human decisions, and we apply it here to components of animal decisions, which we refer to as ‘cognitive phenotypes’. We distinguish multiple cognitive phenotypes in the context of a JDM framework and highlight empirical …
Differential Wolf-Pack-Size Persistence And The Role Of Risk When Hunting Dangerous Prey, Shannon M. Barber-Meyer, L. David Mech, Wesley E. Newton, Bridget L. Borg
Differential Wolf-Pack-Size Persistence And The Role Of Risk When Hunting Dangerous Prey, Shannon M. Barber-Meyer, L. David Mech, Wesley E. Newton, Bridget L. Borg
United States Geological Survey, Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center: Publications
Risk to predators hunting dangerous prey is an emerging area of research and could account for possible persistent differences in gray wolf (Canis lupus) pack sizes. We documented significant differences in long-term wolf-pack-size averages and variation in the Superior National Forest (SNF), Denali National Park and Preserve, Yellowstone National Park, and Yukon, Canada (p < 0.01). The SNF differences could be related to the wolves’ risk when hunting primary prey, for those packs (N = 3) hunting moose (Alces americanus) were significantly larger than those (N = 10) hunting white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) (F1,8 = 16.50, p = 0.004). Our data support the hypothesis that differential pack-size persistence may be …
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
The only feelings we can feel are our own. When it comes to the feelings of others, we can only infer them, based on their behavior — unless they tell us. This is the “other-minds problem.” Within our own species, thanks to language, this problem arises only for states in which people cannot speak (infancy, aphasia, sleep, anaesthesia, coma). Our species also has a uniquely powerful empathic or “mind-reading” capacity: We can (sometimes) perceive from the behavior of others when they are in states like our own. Our inferences have also been systematized and operationalized in biobehavioral science …
Nonhuman Mind-Reading Ability, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Nonhuman Mind-Reading Ability, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
Harnad (2016) is mistaken that humans are better at mind-reading than other species. Humans have context-independent language, but nonhuman species, especially mammals, have context-dependent nonverbal skills – perceptual, communicative and social -- that can be much keener than our own.