Zoology Commons^™

Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel

Animal Sentience

Reber’s Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) has much to recommend it. However, while the CBC effectively renders null any ontological gap between mind and body, it leaves two important remaining gaps unaddressed: the epistemologic and the causal gap. Brakel’s (2013) Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) is briefly introduced as a beginning remedy for the epistemologic, but unfortunately not the causal, gap. Thus the “hard problem” remains both hard and problematic.

Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory …

Subscription And Organization Information [September 2016]

Nebraska Bird Review

The Nebraska Bird Review is published quarterly by the Nebraska Ornithologists' Union, Inc., as its official journal, and is sent to members not in arrears of dues. Annual subscription rates (on a calendar-year basis only): $25 in the United States and $35 in all other countries, payable in advance. Single copies are $7 each, postpaid, in the United States and $9 elsewhere. Send orders for back issues to Anita Breckbill, NOU Librarian, c/o Music Library, WMB 30, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588-0101.

Memberships in the NOU (on a calendar-year basis only): Active Household (one or more people) $25; Sustaining …

A Documented Occurrence Of Black Rail (Laterallus Jamaicensis) In Nebraska, Cody Mcgregor, Eric Bruster, Mary Bomberger Brown, Lauren R. Dinan, Joel G. Jorgensen

Nebraska Bird Review

Black Rails (Laterallus jamaicensis) are the smallest of the rails found in North America. Even though they are broadly distributed in coastal tidal and inland freshwater marshes, they are rarely seen and consequently are poorly known. They prefer areas of moist soil interspersed with scattered small pools of shallow water surrounded by fine-stemmed rushes, grasses, and sedges for use during migratory stopover and nesting. All populations of Black Rail have declined precipitously over the past century due to the draining of marshes and wetlands and demands on water resources. In 2011, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service initiated …

Summer Field Report, June–July 2016, W. Ross Silcock

Nebraska Bird Review

This was a routine summer, if there is such a thing. Items of interest involved some rarities, most of which were distributional and temporal, some range changes, and a few issues that triggered more discussion than usual.

The only mega-rarity was Nebraska's second Swallow-tailed Kite; this species has apparently moved northward on the Great Plains in the last couple of years. Distributional rarities included the 3rd record for the east of Long-billed Curlew, a White-eyed Vireo in Cherry Co, the 2nd fall Yellow-throated Vireo record for the Panhandle, the 6th Cherry Co record for Purple Martin, and the 5th and …

2015 (27th) Report Of The Nou Records Committee, Mark A. Brogie

Nebraska Bird Review

The “Official List of the Birds of Nebraska” was first published in 1988 (NOU 1988) and has been updated three times (NOURC 1997, 2004, 2009). The “Official List” has been appended twenty-five times: (Mollhoff 1989; Grenon 1990, 1991; Gubanyi 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Brogie 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015; Jorgensen 2001, 2002, 2003).

The American Ornithologists' Union Checklist of North American Birds, Seventh Edition (1998) and its following supplements (AOU: 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) contain many taxonomic changes affecting …

Nebraska Bird Review (September 2016) 84(3), Whole Issue

Nebraska Bird Review

Summer Field Report, June–July 2016 ... 110

A Documented Occurrence of Black Rail (Laterallus jamaicensis) in Nebraska … 132

2015 (27th) Report of the NOU Records Committee ... 138

Subscription and Organization Information ... 151

Bibliography To Current Knowledge Of Studies Of Pathogens In Colombian Mammals, Viviana Gonzalez-Astudillo, Héctor E. Ramírez-Chaves, Joerg Henning, Thomas R. Gillespie

MANTER: Journal of Parasite Biodiversity

Mammals provide an important ecological habitat or niche space to microbial diversity, protistans (or protozoans) and metazoan parasites that can have profound effects on both human and animal health. Thus, understanding the status of mammalian species as hosts for pathogens holds relevance, especially during this time of anthropogenic environmental change. Despite the great diversity in the mammal fauna of Colombia, data in the literature on the occurrence of parasites and pathogens in these mammals are scarce and widely scattered. In order to understand the state of the knowledge of pathogens carried by wild mammals in Colombia, a systematic review of …

Current Knowledge Of Studies Of Pathogens In Colombian Mammals, Viviana Gonzalez-Astudillo, Héctor E. Ramírez-Chaves, Joerg Henning, Thomas R. Gillespie

MANTER: Journal of Parasite Biodiversity

Mammals provide an important ecological habitat or niche space to microbial diversity, protistans (or protozoans) and metazoan parasites that can have profound effects on both human and animal health. Thus, understanding the status of mammalian species as hosts for pathogens holds relevance, especially during this time of anthropogenic environmental change. Despite the great diversity in the mammal fauna of Colombia, data in the literature on the occurrence of parasites and pathogens in these mammals are scarce and widely scattered. In order to understand the state of the knowledge of pathogens carried by wild mammals in Colombia, a systematic review of …

The Importance Of Mammalogy, Infectious Disease Research, And Biosafety In The Field, Matthew R. Mauldin, Jeffrey B. Doty, Yoshinori Nakazawa, Ginny L. Emerson, Darin S. Carroll

MANTER: Journal of Parasite Biodiversity

Large amounts of data and multitudes of publications have been independently generated by researchers in mammalogy and infectious diseases. The frequent confluence of these fields in epidemiological research as well as the facility of the data generated to be used in applied methods (e.g., conservation, public outreach, public health interventions) suggests that the intersection of these fields is important not only to their committed scientists but also to other areas of investigation, including public health. Given the increased frequency with which researchers in these fields interact with potentially infected humans, animals, and tissues, their occupations present a higher risk of …

If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …

Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo

Animal Sentience

Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.

Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff

Animal Sentience

According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.

Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin

Animal Sentience

Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.

Butheoloides Grosseri Sp. N. (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Uganda, František Kovařík

Euscorpius

A new species Butheoloides grosseri sp. n. is described and fully complemented with color photos of female holotype, as well as its habitat. This is the first species assigned to this genus from Uganda and represents southern limits of genus Butheoloides distribution.

Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Viii. Pandinops Birula, 1913 (Scorpionidae), With Description Of Two New Species, František Kovařík

Euscorpius

Complete Pandinops trichobothrial pattern and spiniform formula of tarsomeres of legs are published for the first time. P. friedrichi sp. n. from Somalia and P. turieli sp. n. from Ethiopia and Kenya are described. Information is provided about all Pandinops species, their taxonomy, and distribution, and P. turieli sp. n. discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016 is fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as its habitat.

Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Vii. Parabuthus Pocock, 1890 (Buthidae), With Description Of P. Hamar Sp. N. And P. Kajibu Sp. N. From Ethiopia, František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, Jana Plíšková, František Šťáhlavský

Euscorpius

All Parabuthus species from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somaliland were newly collected and are revised for the first time. The complex of Parabuthus liosoma is split into three sibling species with separate areas of distribution: P. abyssinicus Pocock, 1901 (Eritrea, Djibouti, central and north-eastern parts of Ethiopia), P. liosoma (Ehrenberg, 1828) (Yemen and Saudi Arabia), and P. maximus Werner, 1913 (Tanzania and Kenya). P. hamar sp. n. and P. kajibu sp. n., discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016, are described. Information is provided about all Parabuthus species from the Horn of Africa, their taxonomy, distribution, and ecology, fully complemented with …

To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …

No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.

What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker

Animal Sentience

Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.

Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg

Animal Sentience

Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.

Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands

Animal Sentience

The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.

Effects Of An Electronic, Motion-Activated Scarecrow On Foraging Time In Nocturnal Vertebrate Crop Pets In South Africa, Mallory Clouse

Mahurin Honors College Capstone Experience/Thesis Projects

The normal behaviors of animals can disrupt human activities, resulting in human wildlifeconflict. In South Africa, nocturnal crop raiders are a significant source of human wildlifeconflict for farmers. Major nocturnal pest animals are Cape porcupine (Hystrix africaeaustralis) and bushpig (Potamochoerus larvatus). Although methods of deterring animals from agricultural areas have been explored, nocturnal crop raiding remains difficult to mitigate. Most research studies focus on deterring non-human primates and elephants, but methods that may be successful in deterring such larger mammals are not necessarily effective at discouraging smaller, nocturnal crop raiders. This study examined the efficacy of …

Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens

Animal Sentience

Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.

What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.

Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?

Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson

Animal Sentience

A key contention of Klein & Barron (2016) is that consciousness does not depend on cortical structures. A critical appraisal suggests they have overestimated the strength of their evidence.

Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of mental life from the orthodox definition but argues that implicit unity of mind is sufficient for conferring personhood. This allows more or all animals to be considered persons. Implicit unity of mind may be a bridge too far for those who endorse the orthodox account of personhood, and for good reasons. More fundamentally, who gets to decide what personhood entails or that personhood per se matters to such other issues as who receives legal or moral status and consideration? Perhaps we should worry less about definitions …

Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye

Animal Sentience

I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentience and I briefly make a proposal of my own. Once it is granted that insects are sentient, a further question arises: which insects are subject to which states of sentience? Do insects feel pain, for example? If so, which ones? On the further question, I note, Klein & Barron have nothing to say.

Animal Grieving And Human Mourning, Matteo Colombo

Animal Sentience

King’s How animals grieve beautifully describes several ways in which animals and humans show a similar capacity for grief. Yet this book does not sufficiently emphasise the language-empowered capacity to objectify thinking and sentiments about death, which makes human mourning unique. Here I put this capacity into focus and relate it to the social-normative aspect of human mourning that seems to be missing in other animals.