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Articles 121 - 150 of 444
Full-Text Articles in Zoology
Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate
Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s review shows that sheep are intelligent and highly social but their methodology has some shortcomings. I describe five problems with reviewing only the academic and scientific literature and suggest how one might provide an even more compelling case for the complexity of sheep minds.
Cognition, Emotion, Personality And The Conservation And Management Of Wild Ungulates, Rob Found
Cognition, Emotion, Personality And The Conservation And Management Of Wild Ungulates, Rob Found
Animal Sentience
Increasing public understanding of the complexity of wild ungulates can improve animal welfare and advance global conservation efforts of these keystone species. Unfortunately, shaping public opinion on wild species is challenging because personal experience with wildlife is declining, popular education is still biased towards the predator instead of the prey, and scientific research is more difficult to conduct on wild ungulates compared to those on farms, in zoos, or otherwise in captivity. Nevertheless, studies of cognition, individuality, and intelligence of wild ungulates are increasing. I briefly highlight some major results from my own work on complexity in wild elk, illustrating …
What Should We Do About Sheep? The Role Of Intelligence In Welfare Considerations, Heather Browning
What Should We Do About Sheep? The Role Of Intelligence In Welfare Considerations, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin (2019) demonstrate that sheep are more cognitively complex than typically thought. We should be cautious in interpreting the implications of these results for welfare considerations to avoid perpetuating mistaken beliefs about the moral value of intelligence as opposed to sentience. There are, however, still important ways in which this work can help improve sheeps’ lives.
Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt
Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt
Animal Sentience
In the past few years, Marino and her colleagues have written a series of comprehensive and helpful review articles on the cognitive, emotional, and social complexity of pigs, chickens, cows, and most recently, sheep. These articles are similarly structured, even formulaic, which has benefits but also limitations. Here, I point out the limitations in order to suggest new directions and contributions for the authors in the future.
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s comprehensive review of cognitive complexity in sheep is a laudable and important contribution to comparative psychology. It is also valuable because it shows promising directions for future research on this neglected species. The relatively small number of neurons in the bovid cerebral cortex indicates that sheep cognitive performance on traditional measures of complex learning is limited. Nevertheless, the social and emotional complexity of sheep underscores the importance of further research into domains including personality and psychological well-being.
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Animal Sentience
Is the mirror a reliable indicator of self-awareness for any species, whether sheep or human? Taking a cue from feminist, phenomenological, and cross-cultural philosophy, a relational self rather than a reflective one might better capture what is at stake for the lives of social animals and for science.
A Behaviorist Approach To Sheep Cognition, Intelligence, And Welfare, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behaviorist Approach To Sheep Cognition, Intelligence, And Welfare, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s review sheds light on the complexity of the mind, learning, and cognition of sheep. Readily observable behavior has value in its own right for promoting the well-being of animals. A behavior-analytic approach can add substantially to the understanding of sheep as individuals as well as their learning capacities. The findings can also be applied to arranging their environments to promote their well-being as well as behavioral change in those responsible for their care and management.
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Our Response is centered on five major themes: (1) our presentation of human mythologies about sheep; (2) the relevance of cognitive complexity (“intelligence”) as a dimension underlying the way people perceive and treat sheep; (3) whether our review is too anthropocentric or anthropomorphic; (4) animal welfare versus animal rights (abolitionism); and (5) whether knowledge and education are enough to change human attitudes and behavior.
Justice For Nature, Haydn Washington
Justice For Nature, Haydn Washington
Animal Sentience
Eight points are made in this commentary: (1) Ecocentrism is the preferable term. (2) Indigenous societies have long used a kinship ethics. (3) Earth jurisprudence and ecodemocracy should be considered. (4) Assumptions can be better defined. (5) Ethical pluralism is open to question. (6) The ethics of individuals vs. ecosystems needs further discussion. (7) Including justice for nature within social justice may be a serious mistake. (8) Trustees need to be ethically sophisticated.
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Animal Sentience
We are failing to protect the biosphere. Novel views of conservation, preservation, and sustainability are surfacing in the wake of consensus about our failures to prevent extinction or slow climate change. We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of both human and non-human beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based, anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage those absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for futurity of all life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric …
Granting Political Representation To Non-Humans, Joe Gray
Granting Political Representation To Non-Humans, Joe Gray
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses the representation of individuals versus populations — human and nonhuman, present and future — in Treves et al.’s proposed trusteeship for futurity. Terminological questions are also discussed.
To Preserve Or To Conserve?, Liv Baker
To Preserve Or To Conserve?, Liv Baker
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. propose the notion of trusteeship to help meet our responsibility to nature and individual animals, their homes, cultures, and societies. This proposal is grounded in a real-world framework that reveals how conservation has become distorted by anthropocentrism, human exceptionalism, and ethical hypocrisy.
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) argue that individual organisms should be protected by the courts. This already happens in many countries for rare and endangered species and for symbolically important species (e.g., raptors, songbirds, and bats in the U.S.), and through the international treaty for whales. But protection of these individuals stems from a focus on preserving their populations, whereas hunting of individuals is still a culturally accepted practice. Killing of individuals should be limited to valid reasons (e.g., eating the meat) and covered by fair-chase and humane-killing laws (which is not always the case). But “futurity” will not inherit present-day …
Human Interests, Helen Tiffin
Human Interests, Helen Tiffin
Animal Sentience
Treves et al.’s proposal is welcome, but it will have to face at least four challenges: the interconnectedness of the human and the nonhuman portions of the biosphere, conflicts of interest, human overpopulation, and capitalism itself.
The Intrinsic Value Of Nature, Joanna E. Lambert
The Intrinsic Value Of Nature, Joanna E. Lambert
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. explain the need to preserve the rights of nonhuman species, human youth, and future generations. Although conservation biology has claimed to have an intrinsic valuation ethic since its inception in the 1980s, many aspects of the field have taken a decidedly anthropocentric and instrumentalist trajectory. This has important consequences for conservation-related policy and practice at all scales: local, regional, and global.
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
Animal Sentience
It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can make some progress. In the Umwelt or perceptual world of an octopus, what the lateralized monocular eyes perceive is not color but the plane of polarization of light. Information is processed by a bilateral brain but manipulation is done by a radially symmetrical set of eight arms. Octopuses do not self-monitor by vision. Their skin pattern system, used for excellent camouflage, is open loop. The output of the motor system of the eight arms is organized at several levels — brain, …
Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela
Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela
Animal Sentience
Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues that the octopus has an “Umwelt,” and, thus, a mind. I argue that Umwelt does not provide a conceptual basis for understanding the octopus as having a mind. First, Umwelt does not refer only to an organism’s perceptual abilities. Second, in providing evidence for decentralized control systems that underlie intelligent behaviors, Mather makes a case against an octopus Umwelt. Instead, the octopus is more akin to a collection of systems, or Umwelten, than a single system with an Umwelt.
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so.
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition, memory, and behavior. Anyone interested in cephalopod cognition and brain organization will find her target article informative and interesting. In this commentary, I challenge the idea that an individual organism must have an individual mind. Given the structure of the octopus brain and their complex behavior, one must consider the possibility that an octopus is a community of minds rather than a single mind.
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Mather’s work has been fundamental in informing scientists of the relatively mysterious behavior and cognition of an understudied group of animals – the cephalopods. This work helps to fill a gap in the comparative literature that has historically sought evidence for complex behavior only in species that are closely related to humans or share important ecological features such as social complexity.
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give us valuable insight into what is good for an octopus.
The ‘Thing’ From This World, Sergio M. Pellis
The ‘Thing’ From This World, Sergio M. Pellis
Animal Sentience
Science progresses by making contrasts, and the living world is a gold mine of contrasts. Often disciplines become victims by focusing on too narrow a slice of that diversity, leading to a myopic view of how nature works. The relationships between the brain and behavior have been intensively studied in vertebrates, especially mammals, and we have become complacent in our assumptions about how behavior is constructed. As the target article by Mather (2019) shows, the relationship between the brain and behavior in octopuses forces us to reevaluate some of those assumptions.
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Animal Sentience
Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Animal Sentience
Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex learning capabilities. It should follow from Mather’s findings that these intelligent invertebrates are worthy of welfare considerations, just as vertebrate species with similar capabilities are. I provide a complementary environment-behavior analysis of how we might understand the world of the octopus more straightforwardly, borrowing from Mather’s examples, to show how to promote opportunities for complex learning and species-typical behaviors in the octopus.
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.
‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara
‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara
Animal Sentience
Scientific discussions about the ‘mind’ of an octopus are empirically vacuous and should be confined to folk psychology. This form of labelling is unhelpful for science and should be replaced by specific mechanistic accounts of behavior and associated neural structures, which are amenable to rigorous scientific investigation. Mather provides a detailed review of octopus behavior, but rather than making unquantifiable assumptions about what orchestrates octopus behavior, efforts should focus on investigating cognitive mechanisms that can be measured. In this commentary, we outline two lines of research that include quantifiable methods to facilitate a more robust understanding of cephalopod behaviors and …
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
The first part of this commentary attempts to get "inside" the octopus mind a little further than Mather does, drawing on her description of octopus cognition in many places but diverging in others. The second part outlines other disagreements with her account of the animals, especially in the area of social behavior.
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ but stops short of asking what having that mind means for octopus moral standing. One consequence of understanding the octopus mind should be a refusal to subject octopuses to mass production. Octopus farming is in an experimental phase and supported by various countries. We argue that it is unethical because of concerns about animal welfare as well as environmental impacts.