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Articles 571 - 600 of 933
Full-Text Articles in Zoology
A New Species Of Centruroides (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Quiché, Northwestern Guatemala, Rony E. Trujillo, Luis F. De Armas
A New Species Of Centruroides (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Quiché, Northwestern Guatemala, Rony E. Trujillo, Luis F. De Armas
Euscorpius
A new species of the genus Centruroides Marx, 1890 is described from Sotzil Village (15.61775°N, -91.09745°W, 1173 m a.s.l.), Chajul Municipality, Quiché Department, Guatemala, on basis of one female and one male. It closely resembles Centruroides caral Armas et Trujillo, 2013 from northeastern Guatemala (240 Km southeast of Chajul), but male differs by having a most globose pedipalp manus, as well as metasoma clearly more attenuate (len-gth/width ratio: segments II–IV = 2.4, 2.7 and 1.4, respectively; 1.7, 2.2 and 2.5 in the holotype of C. caral, the only known specimen of this taxon). Data on its habitat and some …
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Ix. Lanzatus, Orthochirus, And Somalicharmus (Buthidae), With Description Of Lanzatus Somalilandus Sp. N. And Orthochirus Afar Sp. N., František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Ix. Lanzatus, Orthochirus, And Somalicharmus (Buthidae), With Description Of Lanzatus Somalilandus Sp. N. And Orthochirus Afar Sp. N., František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský
Euscorpius
The rare Horn of Africa buthid genera Lanzatus Kovařík, 2001, Orthochirus Karsch, 1891, and Somalicharmus Kovařík, 1998 were newly collected. Lanzatus is reported for the first time from Somaliland, and Orthochirus for the first time from Ethiopia. We describe two new species, Lanzatus somalilandus sp. n. from Somaliland, and Orthochirus afar sp. n. from Ethiopia, both discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016. Information is provided for all Horn of Africa species belonging to these three genera: their taxonomy, distribution, and ecology, fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as their habitat. …
Consciousness And The Unity Of Mind, Mark Rowlands
Consciousness And The Unity Of Mind, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than objective fact, (4) reflective consciousness is more important than I realize, (5) my reliance on implicit self-awareness in the account of personhood is ill-advised, (6) my account entails that too many creatures qualify as persons, and …
Insects: Still Looking Like Zombies, Christopher S. Hill
Insects: Still Looking Like Zombies, Christopher S. Hill
Animal Sentience
In arguing that insect brains are capable of sentience, Klein & Barron rely heavily on Bjorn Merker’s claim that activity in the human mid-brain is sufficient for conscious experience. I criticize Merker’s claim by pointing out that the behaviors supported by midbrain activity are much more primitive than the ones that appear to depend on consciousness. I raise a similar objection to Klein & Barron’s contention that insect behaviors are similar to behaviors that manifest consciousness in human beings. The similarity is weak. I also respond to the related view that integrative activity in mid-brain structures is sufficient to explain …
Phylogeny, Systematics And Biogeography Of Short-Tailed Opossums (Didelphidae: Monodelphis), Silvia E. Pavan
Phylogeny, Systematics And Biogeography Of Short-Tailed Opossums (Didelphidae: Monodelphis), Silvia E. Pavan
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Short-tailed opossums (genus Monodelphis) comprise the most species-rich genus of New World marsupials, with 25 currently recognized species. Monodelphis comprise small, terrestrial species collectively widespread in South America, which makes the group potentially informative about biogeographic processes that have shaped the continental fauna. The genus exhibits striking variation in several phenotypic characters, notably pelage coloration, behavior, and reproductive strategies. This diversity is unique among Neotropical marsupials, and makes the group particularly interesting to investigate the evolution and the adaptive significance of phenotypic trait variation. Despite this potential, missing knowledge on phylogeny and basic taxonomy precludes broader studies on evolution …
Cognitive Dissonance Or Contrast?, Thomas R. Zentall
Cognitive Dissonance Or Contrast?, Thomas R. Zentall
Animal Sentience
According to Festinger (1957), cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s behavior or belief is inconsistent with another belief and one modifies one of the beliefs in an attempt to reduce the dissonance. In nonhuman animals, we have examined a version of human cognitive dissonance theory called justification of effort, according to which the value of reward following more difficult tasks increases, presumably to justify (to oneself or to others) performing the more difficult task. We have examined the justification of effort effect in animals and found a pattern similar to the one in humans but we propose a simpler underlying …
Darwin’S Empirical Evidence, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
Darwin’S Empirical Evidence, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
Animal Sentience
Darwin’s extensive writings may seem antiquated to current thinkers with their predilections for cognitive science, neuroscience, and analytic branches of philosophy. He showed that morphologies are not simply taxonomic distinctions that allow classification into species. They describe living animals, hence morphologies-in-motion: animate forms of life engaged in synergies of meaningful movement, all of which are testimony to animal sentience.
Animal Personhood Is An Evolutionary Issue, James E. King
Animal Personhood Is An Evolutionary Issue, James E. King
Animal Sentience
The Rowlands target article makes a case, based on John Locke’s metaphysical argument, that personhood can be applied to many species beyond a few nonhuman primates. The problem with this argument is that personhood has an open-ended list of defining attributes and can, at best only be partially applied to nonhuman species. Therefore, a dichotomous distinction cannot be made between qualifying and non-qualifying species. Instead, between-species comparisons must be based on observational and experimental procedures to demonstrate the extent to which human mental attributes are shared with other species. This would allow a more informed view about the appropriateness of …
Another New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From The Taurus Mountains In Antalya Province, Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur, Aristeidis Parmakelis, Kadir Boğaç Kunt
Another New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From The Taurus Mountains In Antalya Province, Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur, Aristeidis Parmakelis, Kadir Boğaç Kunt
Euscorpius
A new scorpion species, Euscorpius alanyaensis sp. n., is described based on specimens collected from the Taurus Mountains in Antalya Province (Alanya District) in southern Turkey. It is a sibling species of the recently described E. gocmeni Tropea et al., 2014, and similarly, the new species is also characterized by a high trichobothrial count (Pv = 9–11, et = 7, em = 4, and eb = 4), a high pectinal teeth count (Dp = 9–11 in males, 8 in females), medium-small size, and light to medium brown-reddish colour. In addition, for the first time a phylogenetic …
How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?, Max Velmans
How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?, Max Velmans
Animal Sentience
The sudden appearance of consciousness that Reber posits in creatures with flexible cell walls and motility rather than non-flexible cells walls and no motility involves an evolutionary discontinuity. This kind of “miracle” is required by all “discontinuity” theories of consciousness. To avoid miraculous emergence, one may need to consider continuity theories, which accept that different forms of consciousness and material functioning co-evolve but assume the existence of consciousness to be primal in the way that matter and energy are assumed to be primal in physics.
“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong, Brian Key
“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Reber (2016) attempts to resuscitate an obscure and outdated hypothesis referred to as the “cellular basis of consciousness” that was originally formulated by the author nearly twenty years ago. This hypothesis proposes that any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds, and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness. Reber seeks to reduce consciousness to a fundamental property inherent to individual cells rather than to centralised nervous systems. This commentary shows how this hypothesis is based on supposition, false premises and a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. The cellular basis of consciousness …
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience. Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein & Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological phenomenon of consciousness.
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, (i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the …
Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood
Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropods, notably crustaceans. Various species of crustaceans show responses consistent with their feeling pain. Hermit crabs also show prolonged investigation of new shells. They clearly attend to and integrate information from a wide variety of sources that enable them to evaluate the quality of the new shell relative to their current shell. These observations too are consistent with their having subjective experience.
Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel
Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel
Animal Sentience
Reber’s Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) has much to recommend it. However, while the CBC effectively renders null any ontological gap between mind and body, it leaves two important remaining gaps unaddressed: the epistemologic and the causal gap. Brakel’s (2013) Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) is briefly introduced as a beginning remedy for the epistemologic, but unfortunately not the causal, gap. Thus the “hard problem” remains both hard and problematic.
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory …
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Animal Sentience
Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.
Butheoloides Grosseri Sp. N. (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Uganda, František Kovařík
Butheoloides Grosseri Sp. N. (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Uganda, František Kovařík
Euscorpius
A new species Butheoloides grosseri sp. n. is described and fully complemented with color photos of female holotype, as well as its habitat. This is the first species assigned to this genus from Uganda and represents southern limits of genus Butheoloides distribution.
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Viii. Pandinops Birula, 1913 (Scorpionidae), With Description Of Two New Species, František Kovařík
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Viii. Pandinops Birula, 1913 (Scorpionidae), With Description Of Two New Species, František Kovařík
Euscorpius
Complete Pandinops trichobothrial pattern and spiniform formula of tarsomeres of legs are published for the first time. P. friedrichi sp. n. from Somalia and P. turieli sp. n. from Ethiopia and Kenya are described. Information is provided about all Pandinops species, their taxonomy, and distribution, and P. turieli sp. n. discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016 is fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as its habitat.
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Vii. Parabuthus Pocock, 1890 (Buthidae), With Description Of P. Hamar Sp. N. And P. Kajibu Sp. N. From Ethiopia, František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, Jana Plíšková, František Šťáhlavský
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Vii. Parabuthus Pocock, 1890 (Buthidae), With Description Of P. Hamar Sp. N. And P. Kajibu Sp. N. From Ethiopia, František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, Jana Plíšková, František Šťáhlavský
Euscorpius
All Parabuthus species from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somaliland were newly collected and are revised for the first time. The complex of Parabuthus liosoma is split into three sibling species with separate areas of distribution: P. abyssinicus Pocock, 1901 (Eritrea, Djibouti, central and north-eastern parts of Ethiopia), P. liosoma (Ehrenberg, 1828) (Yemen and Saudi Arabia), and P. maximus Werner, 1913 (Tanzania and Kenya). P. hamar sp. n. and P. kajibu sp. n., discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016, are described. Information is provided about all Parabuthus species from the Horn of Africa, their taxonomy, distribution, and ecology, fully complemented with …
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
Animal Sentience
Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.
Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands
Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.
Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens
Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.
What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer
What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer
Animal Sentience
If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.