Securities Law Commons^™

Sticky Charters? The Surprisingly Tepid Embrace Of Officer-Protecting Waivers In Delaware, Jens Frankenreiter, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the response to Delaware’s much-heralded 2022 legal reform that permitted corporations, for the first time, to adopt charter provisions exculpating corporate officers from liability for breaching their fiduciary duty of care. Contrary to widespread predictions that corporate actors would swiftly adopt officer exculpation provisions, our analysis — using both traditional and generative artificial intelligence (AI) methods — reveals a surprisingly low rate of uptake, over three years after the reform’s enactment.

Our study makes both methodological and substantive contributions. Methodologically, we present a novel application of large language models (LLMs) to identify and interpret technical clauses in …

Denizens Of Dexit: Why Controlled Companies Are The First To Leave The First State, Jack Kanzler

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

A series of high-profile companies announcing plans to leave the state of Delaware and reincorporate out of state has sparked many commentators to predict a coming wave of corporate exodus from the First State called “DExit.” This paper seeks to explore the DExit “movement” with a particular focus on “controlled companies” and the recent doctrinal developments that have created a perception that Delaware law has become hostile to such governance arrangements. I will begin by discussing a brief history of Delaware’s corporate law and its current role in the American corporate legal system. I will then move to a robust …

Leaving Delaware? The Essential Role Of Specialized Corporate Courts, Zohar Goshen, Tomer S. Stein

Faculty Scholarship

Following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s invalidation of Elon Musk’s fifty-six- billion-dollar compensation package, Tesla moved its incorporation from Delaware to Texas. Shortly thereafter, Delaware’s legislature, seeking to protect Delaware’s dominant incorporation position, passed the most sweeping corporate law amendments in fifty years.

Both supporters of Musk and defenders of Delaware’s judiciary have accused each other of partisanship, but neither side has addressed the central question: What is the role of specialized corporate courts?

This Essay presents a novel theory of why such courts are necessary. Corporate disputes are distinct because they arise within ongoing relationships between shareholders and management, …

Amending Regulation D’S Accredited-Investor Definition To Allow Natural Persons To Opt Out Of Unwanted Regulatory Protections, John Orcutt

Law Faculty Scholarship

Everyone can invest in the heavily regulated registered (or public) securities market, but the more lightly regulated unregistered securities markets are more restricted. The most important unregistered securities market for capital-raising purposes is Rule 506 of Regulation D, which has grown to become the United States’ largest capital-raising market. Far more capital is raised each year in Rule 506 offerings than registered offerings, and the Rule 506 market is where many of the country’s highest-growth (and highest-return) entrepreneurial companies sell their securities. But most Americans are excluded from investing in the Rule 506 market because it is fundamentally restricted to …

The Problem Of Purpose In Corporate Law, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

For the last half century, shareholder primacy has reigned as the dominant definition of corporate purpose, as to both the purpose of individual companies and corporate law more generally. Recently, however, the Business Roundtable, the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law: Corporate Governance, and many business and legal academics have developed new answers to explain why we have corporations, and the ends to which their massive economic powers should be directed. This Essay endeavors to reframe the focus of the debate beyond purpose itself into the realm of actual governing power. In order to be meaningful, purpose needs governance. …

Altering Rules: The New Frontier For Corporate Governance, Gabriel Rauterberg, Sarath Sanga

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate law has taken a contractarian turn. Shareholders are increasingly contracting around its foundational rules — statutory rights, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, even the central role of the board — and Delaware courts are increasingly enforcing these contracts. In the one case where they did not, the legislature swiftly overruled the decision and adopted a new statutory provision permitting boards to completely cede their powers to a shareholder by contract. These developments have sparked a polarized debate, with some calling for a return to mandatory rules, while others push for total contractual freedom.

We argue, however, that the best …

Giant Asset Managers, The Big Three, And Index Investing, Dorothy S. Lund, Adriana Z. Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

A robust literature describes the incentives and stewardship practices of the “Big Three” asset managers (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors), often referring to these asset managers as “passive.” This is so common that the “Big Three,” “index fund,” and “passive manager” are used almost interchangeably by both academics and practitioners. This shorthand emerged in the foundational scholarship in this area, and while it may remain useful in certain contexts, its casual use obscures important features of the market and contributes to misperceptions. In this chapter, we demonstrate that it is a mistake to equate passive investing with index …

Beyond Profit Motives, William J. Moon

Michigan Law Review

A review of The Profit Motive: Defending Shareholder Value Maximization By Stephen M. Bainbridge.

A History Of Corporate Law Federalism In The Twentieth Century, William W. Bratton

Seattle University Law Review

This Article describes the emergence of corporate law federalism across a long twentieth century. The period begins with New Jersey’s successful initiation of charter competition in 1888 and ends with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The federalism in question describes the interrelation of state and federal regulation of corporate internal affairs. This Article takes a positive approach, pursuing no normative bottom line. It makes six observations: (1) the federalism describes a division of subject matter, with internal affairs regulated by the states and securities issuance and trading regulated by the federal government; (2) the federalism is an …

The Structure Of Corporate Law Revolutions, William Savitt

Seattle University Law Review

Since, call it 1970, corporate law has operated under a dominant conception of governance that identifies profit-maximization for stockholder benefit as the purpose of the corporation. Milton Friedman’s essay The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, published in September of that year, provides a handy, if admittedly imprecise, marker for the coronation of the shareholder-primacy paradigm. In the decades that followed, corporate law scholars pursued an ever-narrowing research agenda with the purpose and effect of confirming the shareholder-primacy paradigm. Corporate jurisprudence followed a similar path, slowly at first and later accelerating, to discover in the precedents and …

Chilling Climate Change Disclosure: The Enabling Role Of Corporate Counsel In Management Misstatements Of Esg Matters, J. Robert Brown Jr., Eli Wald

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

Regulation of Environmental and Social Governance (ESG) disclosure is necessary to ensure investors receive the information they want to have. Fortunately, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is considering adopting ESG rules. Unfortunately, such rules, if adopted, are likely to be ineffective. New ESG disclosure rules are going to fail for the same reason periodic disclosure rules have been ineffective: managers of publicly-traded companies systematically escape liability for failure to disclose material information to investors. Management escapes liability by pressuring securities lawyers to erroneously advise the companies that material information need not be disclosed, only to then turn around and …

The Failure Of Market Efficiency, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have witnessed the near total triumph of market efficiency as a regulatory goal. Policymakers regularly proclaim their devotion to ensuring efficient capital markets. Courts use market efficiency as a guiding light for crafting legal doctrine. And scholars have explored in great depth the mechanisms of market efficiency and the role of law in promoting it. There is strong evidence that, at least on some metrics, our capital markets are indeed more efficient than they have ever been. But the pursuit of efficiency has come at a cost. By focusing our attention narrowly on economic efficiency concerns—such as competition, …

Stewardship Theater, Jeff Schwartz

Utah Law Faculty Scholarship

Large asset managers like BlackRock and Vanguard have amassed staggering equity holdings. The voting rights that accompany these holdings give them enormous power over many of the world’s largest companies. This unprecedented concentration of influence in a small group of financial intermediaries is a pressing policy concern. While law and finance literature on the topic has recently exploded, no one has offered a satisfying theory to explain their voting behavior. Existing work tries to understand their approach to voting in conventional terms—as an attempt to improve the performance of portfolio firms—but this is not why large asset managers vote the …

Shareholder Engagement In The United States, Vikramaditya S. Khanna

Book Chapters

Shareholder voting and engagement in the US have undergone substantial changes over the last 50 years. They have moved from being relatively sleepy issues to those that trigger insomnia in even the most hardened executives. The changes in the ownership structure of US publicly traded firms are probably the most important reason for the shift, but so too are rule changes that have facilitated greater shareholder activism. This chapter explores these developments while describing the rules of the road for shareholder voting in the US by focusing on Delaware jurisprudence and changes in US federal securities regulations. It also examines …

Taking Corwin Seriously, Itai Fiegenbaum

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Corporate law’s most important development is founded on a misunderstanding of the channels and consequences of shareholder empowerment. The Article’s title references the seminal Delaware Supreme Court decision that ruled that a positive shareholder vote effectively insulates a friendly sale from judicial oversight. Central to Corwin’s reasoning is the notion that the shareholder vote provides an effective restraint against insider overreaching. Yet every deal that includes a premium over the market price is assured of shareholder approval. The doctrinal lynchpin’s real-life insignificance exposes a baffling inconsistency in contemporary takeover jurisprudence.

This Articles makes two novel contributions to the bourgeoning scholarship …

The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

This Symposium Article examines how the public/private divide works today and maps out some of the potential implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly from private companies. For more than fifty years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a wider and deeper pool of capital, among other …

Virtual Annual Meetings: A Path Toward Shareholder Democracy And Stakeholder Engagement, Yaron Nili, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Faculty Scholarship

From demanding greater executive accountability to lobbying for social and environmental policies, shareholders influence how managers run modern companies. In corporate doctrine, the principal venue reserved for shareholders to influence and engage with management and each other is the annual share-holders meeting. Historically, the annual meeting was a vibrant forum for share-holder democracy and occasionally even a platform for debating pressing social issues. For decades, however, the role of the annual meeting in corporate governance has been in decline, resulting in today’s largely pro forma annual meetings. This Article explores how technological integration can resurrect the annual meeting as the …

Hidden Agendas In Shareholder Voting, Scott Hirst, Adriana Z. Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

Nothing in either corporate or securities law requires companies to notify investors what they will be voting on before the record date for a shareholder meeting. We show that, overwhelmingly, they do not. The result is “hidden agendas”: for 88% of shareholder votes, investors cannot find out what they will be voting on before the record date. This poses an especially serious problem for investors who engage in securities lending: they must decide whether the expected benefit of voting exceeds the expected benefit of continuing to lend their shares (or making them available for lending) without knowing what they will …

Do Esg Funds Deliver On Their Promises?, Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch, Adriana Z. Robertson

Michigan Law Review

Corporations have received growing criticism for contributing to climate change, perpetuating racial and gender inequality, and failing to address other pressing social issues. In response to these concerns, shareholders are increasingly focusing on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria in selecting investments, and asset managers are responding by offering a growing number of ESG mutual funds. The flow of assets into ESG is one of the most dramatic trends in asset management.

But are these funds giving investors what they promise? This question has attracted the attention of regulators, with the Department of Labor and the Securities and Exchange …

Delaware's Global Competitiveness, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

For about a hundred years, Delaware has been the leading jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States. The state, which deliberately embarked on a mission to build a haven for corporate law in the early twentieth century, now supplies corporate charters to over two thirds of Fortune 500 companies and a growing share of closely held companies. But Delaware’s domestic dominance masks the important and yet underexamined issue of whether Delaware maintains its competitive edge globally.

This Article examines Delaware’s global competitiveness, documenting Delaware’s surprising weakness competing in the emerging international market for corporate charters. It does so principally …

The Corporate Contract And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Mohsen Manesh

American University Law Review

In the landmark case Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a corporate charter provision restricting the rights of shareholders to bring federal securities law claims. Although rights arising under federal securities law lie beyond the internal affairs doctrine, which has traditionally defined the boundaries of state corporate law, the Salzberg court ruled that such rights may be regulated by the “corporate contract,” created by state corporate law and comprised of a corporation’s charter and bylaws. Embracing contractarian precepts, the Salzberg court rejected the lower Chancery Court’s concession theory of the corporate contract as inextricably bound …

The Growth Of Vancouver As An Innovation Hub: Challenges And Opportunities, Camden Hutchison, Li-Wen Lin

All Faculty Publications

This article assesses the development of Vancouver as an entrepreneurial region. Using data collected from commercial startup databases, we find that Vancouver produces more startups and receives more venture capital financing per capita than any other major Canadian city. However, we also find that Vancouver lags many U.S. cities on these same metrics. In light of our empirical findings, we explore whether differences in entrepreneurial activity between Canada and the United States are due to differences in the countries’ legal environments. We conclude that legal differences do not explain observed economic disparities, and that differences in entrepreneurial activity are due …

Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers

A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corporations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doctrine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter and bylaw provisions …

Working Hard Or Making Work? Plaintiffs' Attorneys Fees In Securities Fraud Class Actions, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, A. C. Pritchard

Articles

In this article, we study attorney fees awarded in the largest securities class actions: “mega- settlements.” Consistent with prior work, we find larger fee awards but lower percentages in these cases. We also find that courts are more likely to reject or modify fee requests made in connection with the largest settlements. We conjecture that this scrutiny provides an incentive for law firms to bill more hours, not to advance the case, but to help justify large fee awards—“make work.” The results of our empirical tests are consistent with plaintiffs’ attorneys investing more time in litigation against larger companies, with …

The Misuse Of Tobin’S Q, Robert Bartlett, Frank Partnoy

Vanderbilt Law Review

In recent years, scholars have addressed the most important topics in corporate law based on a flawed assumption: that the ratio of the market value of a corporation’s securities to their book value is a valid measure of the value of the corporation. The topics have included staggered boards, incorporation in Delaware, shareholder activism, dual-class share structures, share ownership, board diversity, and other significant aspects of corporate governance. We trace the history of this flawed assumption, and document how it emerged from Tobin’s q, a concept from an unrelated area in macroeconomics. We show that scholars have misused Tobin’s q, …

Delaware's New Competition, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

According to the standard account in American corporate law, states compete to supply corporate law to American corporations, with Delaware dominating the market. This “competition” metaphor in turn informs some of the most important policy debates in American corporate law.

This Article complicates the standard account, introducing foreign nations as emerging lawmakers that compete with American states in the increasingly globalized market for corporate law. In recent decades, entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands have used permissive corporate governance rules and specialized business courts to attract publicly traded American corporations. Aided in part by a select group of private sector …

Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation to influence management—has become a popular tool to effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. These efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate management. However, a consensus on …

Social Activism Through Shareholder Activism, Lisa M. Fairfax

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article is based on the author's keynote address at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

In 1952, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to exclude proposals made “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.” The SEC did not reference civil rights activist James Peck or otherwise acknowledge that its actions were prompted by Peck’s 1951 shareholder proposal to Greyhound for desegregating seating. Instead, the SEC indicated that its change simply reflected a codification …

Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Zillow, and Snap, have issued stock that does not allow investors to vote on corporate decisions. But there is fundamental disagreement among scholars and investors about whether nonvoting stock is beneficial or harmful. Critics argue that nonvoting shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight, and therefore increase agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that nonvoting shares may provide benefits that exceed these agency costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders.

This Article offers a novel perspective on this …

The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Randall Thomas, Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven D. Solomon

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger …