Securities Law Commons^™

Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy

Michigan Law Review

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …

Federalism In Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections On Delaware, California, And State Regulation Of Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this brief Essay, I offer some thoughts on both the theory and the politics underlying the federalism question. My comments will touch on some of the controversies and also look at a somewhat quieter question, the state regulation of insider trading. Over the course of the last few years, judges in California and Delaware have traveled markedly different routes on questions involving the states' role in regulating insider trading. A California court of appeal has recently expanded the reach of the state insider trading statute to cover a claim alleging misconduct in California by an executive of a Delaware …

The Essential Role Of Securities Regulation, Zohar Goshen, Gideon Parchomovsky

Faculty Scholarship

This Article posits that the essential role of securities regulation is to create a competitive market for sophisticated professional investors and analysts (information traders). The Article advances two related theses – one descriptive and the other normative. Descriptively, the Article demonstrates that securities regulation is specifically designed to facilitate and protect the work of information traders. Securities regulation may be divided into three broad categories: (i) disclosure duties; (ii) restrictions on fraud and manipulation; and (iii) restrictions on insider trading – each of which contributes to the creation of a vibrant market for information traders. Disclosure duties reduce information traders’ …

After The Revolution In Corporate Law, Roberta Romano

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.

Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …

The Irrelevance Of State Corporate Law In Governance Of Public Companies, J. Robert Brown Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Governance In The Former Soviet Union: The Failure Of The Self-Enforcing Model, J. Robert Brown Jr., Kostyantyn Shkurupiy

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

With the fall of the Soviet Union, a number of newly independent countries emerged, many of them attempting to put in place market based institutions and legal regimes. A number of corporate scholars from the United States participated in the development of these legal regimes. In the area of corporate law, problems arose from poor draftsmanship, lack of adequate expertise and institutions, poorly functioning courts, the problem of hold over directors from the Soviet period, and corruption. As a result of these and other factors, traditional corporate statutes of the type used in most developed countries did not work effectively. …

The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch

Faculty Scholarship

Transcript of a panel on a scholar's approach to corporation law.

Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Efficient Norm For Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation Of Fiduciary Duty, Thomas A. Smith

Michigan Law Review

To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing between directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the corporation1 itself smacks of reification - treating the fictional corporate entity as if it were a real thing. Now the orthodox view among corporate law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary duty is a norm that requires firm managers to "maximize shareholder value." Giving the corporation itself any serious role in the analysis of fiduciary duty, the thinking goes, obscures scientific insight with bad legal metaphysics. Some recent scholarship and legislation, such as constituency statutes, have challenged this "shareholder primacy" view. Contestants …

The Shaping Force Of Corporate Law In The New Economic Order, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

My topic for this Allen Chair lecture is the shaping force of corporate governance in the new economic order. It is easy to think of corporate law as an arcane field with mysterious terms and peculiar rules, ultimately of interest only to those who are prepared to bill at least 2000 hours a year to unravel its complexities. This is the view that there is a pointless mystery about shareholders, directors, common stocks, debentures, and the bizarre creature my class encountered recently, a convertible exchangeable cumulative preferred stock; and that ultimately corporate law and practice consists of the expert manipulation …

Reflections On Executive Compensation And A Modest Proposal For (Further) Reform, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

No abstract provided.

Legal Factors In The Acquisition Of A United State Corporation: Litigation By Hostile Targets, Johan E. Droogmans

LLM Theses and Essays

Acquisitions of United States corporations have become increasingly complex takeover contests, where bidders and target corporations are forced into offensive and defensive litigation strategies to protect their respective interests. Targets often assert that the bidders have violated federal or state securities laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin regulations, federal and state regulatory systems, and federal anti-racketeering laws. These lawsuits are primarily based on the principal federal regulation of takeovers in section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Williams Act. Target litigation is customary, but entails certain disadvantages; a lawsuit rarely stops an offer, is expensive, …

Efficient Markets, Costly Information, And Securities Research, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser

Faculty Scholarship

Courts, administrative policy makers and legal scholars have widely embraced the theory that well-developed markets are efficient. In this Article, Professors Gordon and Kornhauser cast doubt on the wisdom of reliance on the efficient market hypothesis as applied to various areas of corporate law. Their charge is that legal decision makers and scholars have misunderstood the assumptions and limitations of the theory and have neglected recent critical economics scholarship. Professors Gordon and Kornhauser begin by detailing the assertions of the hypothesis in relation to the workings of securities markets, focusing on various asset pricing models used to test the hypothesis …

A Structural Approach To Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics In Tender Offers, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Tender offers present an obvious and inherent conflict of interest between management and shareholders. On the one hand, an offer provides shareholders with the opportunity to sell their shares for a substantial premium over market price. On the other hand, the tender offer is the principal mechanism by which management can be forcibly unseated from control. It should thus come as no surprise that management often resists outsiders' efforts to direct tender offers at its shareholders. The form of that resistance, however, is somewhat surprising. Because the tender offer is the only form of corporate acquisition addressed directly to the …

Voluntary Recapitalization, Fairness, And Rule 10b-5: Life Along The Trail Of Santa Fe, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In corporate recapitalizations, the board of directors will sometimes propose a recapitalization plan which substantially alters the “bundle of rights” represented by preferred shares. Although these plans cannot usually be completed without the approval of a majority of the preferred shareholders, the preferred shareholders are at a disadvantage to protect their interests for several reasons. Thus preferred shareholders who are dissatisfied with the change in their rights will sometimes call upon state courts to enjoin the recapitalization on the grounds that it is unfair or fraudulent; state courts, however, have provided only slight protection for preferred shareholders. In this article, …

Cash Tender Offers: Judicial Interpretation Of Section 14(E), Alan J. Ross

Cleveland State Law Review

In the past fifteen years, the frequency of corporate takeover attempts in the form of cash tender offers has increased dramatically. During most of this period, cash tender offers were outside the scope of the federal securities laws. It was not until 1968 that Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by passing the Williams Act for the express purpose of placing the, cash tender offer under federal regulation. Section 14(e), the antifraud provision of the Williams Act, has been much litigated in the short time since its passage, and the meaning of the section is slowly being clarified. …

The Problems: An Overview, Mark S. Massel

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Securities regulation -- domestic and foreign -- has a technical fascination for the lawyer, whether he be a practicing attorney, corporate counsel, government regulator, or legal scholar. The intricate detail of the primary regulations and of their subsidiary byways provide opportunities for stimulating mental gymnastics. The piecing together of the various phases provides interesting occasions for experimentation, speculation, and analyzation.

Yet, a preoccupation with securities regulation which overlooks the setting can produce mere academic exercise. The need for an appreciation of the setting is all-important in examining foreign securities regulation. In considering United States securities regulation we do not need …

Rule 10b-5 And The Stockholder's Derivative Action, Lewis D. Lowenfels

Vanderbilt Law Review

This article focuses upon a new, emerging private cause of action based upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5-a stockholder's derivative action initiated on behalf of a corporation which has been defrauded in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Five reported cases, three decided in the last three months of 1964, have sustained a stockholder's derivative suit based upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The significance of these decisions becomes apparent, not only when one considers that the derivative suit has traditionally been an internal corporate matter governed exclusively by state law, but also when one focuses upon the …

Business Associations -- 1961 Tennessee Survey, Kenneth L. Roberts

Vanderbilt Law Review

I. CASES

A. Disregard of Corporate Entity

B. Action in Corporate Name After Revocation of Charter

C. Effect of Merger

1. Privilege Tax

2. Statute of Limitations

D. Judicial Intervention in Internal Corporate Affairs

E. Disregard of Fictitious Corporate Records

F. Criminal Liability of Corporation for Acts of Agents

G. Corporate Venue Under Federal Anti-Trust Laws

II. STATUTES

A. Unincorporated Associations Treated as Corporations

B. Amendments to Securities Law

C. Massachusetts Trust Act

D. Industrial Development Corporation "Projects"

E. Amendments Relating to General Welfare Corporations

F. Miscellany

Corporations - Stockholders - Effect Of State Constitutional Provisions On Liabilty To Creditors For Unpaid Subscriptions, Douglas Peck S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Basset and Company, an Oklahoma corporation, issued stock to defendant for which defendant never paid. The sum due was carried on the corporate books as "subscriptions receivable." The corporation became bankrupt and the trustee brought suit in the federal district court to recover the amount due on the subscriptions. Held, judgment for the defendant. Under the Oklahoma Constitution, where stock is issued for consideration which is less than par value, the issue is void. The stock certificate cannot serve as a consideration to support the would-be stockholder's promise to pay for the stock, and no liability attaches to the …